Linked Enterprises and Conservation
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Linked Enterprises and Conservation |
A qualitative analysis of 20 BCN case studies
By
Gabriel Wishik, B.S.
Submitted 8/16/99
List of Projects by Number
The projects are referred to throughout the text by the number of the project. Listed below are the names of the projects (by location) and the project number.
Humla (#1)
Royal Chitwan (#2)
Garhwal (#3)
Sikkim (#4)
Bilgiri Rangan Hills (#5)
Gunung Halimun (#6)
Gunung Palung (#7)
Sanggau (#8)
Lore Lindu (#9)
Arfak Mountains (#10)
Padaido Islands (#11)
Mindanao (#12)
Palawan (#13)
Kalahan (#14)
Crater Mountain (#15)
Lakekamu Basin (#16)
East New Britain (#17)
Arnavon Islands (#18)
Makira (#19)
Verata Villages (#20)
The Biodiversity Conservation Network (BCN) has funded 20 enterprise based conservation projects in the Asia Pacific region. Four years later, these projects are now being evaluated to determine what relationships exist between biodiversity linked enterprises and positive conservation outcomes. A quantitative analysis of case study variables has already been conducted. This report offers a qualitative analysis of the same case studies to provide another perspective and especially to illuminate issues for which the quantitative analysis was unable to answer clearly.
What should be expected from this report? There should not be any earth shattering news here. The primary reason for this lies in the data source. The same text that was, in many cases used to create categorical variables for quantitative analysis was drawn upon for qualitative analysis. By transforming this text into numbers, some of the richness in the case studies narratives is lost. This is one place that qualitative analysis can contribute to the final report. There is no guarantee that the conclusions drawn here will be similar to those of the quantitative analysis. However, if both parties have conducted sound research, the trends identified by each analysis should be similar since they are based on essentially the same data. Therefore, this analysis should 1) confirm BCN's current thinking or alter it slightly, 2) bring richness out of the text to explain observed variable relationships and strengthen whatever conclusions appear in the final report, 3) provide the insight of an outsider.
BCN's core hypothesis is that, if enterprise-oriented approaches to community-based conservation are going to be effective, they must: 1) have a direct link to biodiversity, 2) generate benefits, and 3) involve a community of stakeholders. This draft (7/22/99) tackles some of BCN's established codes, and is roughly organized by the above three criteria. These appear to be the fundamental issues, but subsequent analysis of the full framework may alter the model presented here.
2.1 Characteristics and Limitations of the Data
The text data used in this analysis is drawn primarily from two sources. BCN project managers have provided detailed reports addressing domains in the BCN analytical framework for each of the 20 case studies. These Data Text Documents (DTD's) included excerpts from site visit reports, technical reports, and other relevant documentation for the cases. The more extensive case files were consulted occasionally, but the existence of the DTD's made this unnecessary in most cases. In addition to the DTD's, the stories contained in BCN's Final Annual Report (FAR's) were examined. These documents were collaboratively authored by project staff and BCN project managers. For several cases, additional text was available in the form of notes and interviews published in BSP's Lessons From the Field newsletter.
There are limitations in the range of the above data that were known by BCN at the start of this analysis. However, it is important to clearly recognize what these limitations are.
There are validity issues with the data. First, although the above texts come from a variety of sources, the primary key informants (for the DTD's) are just 6 individuals involved in the management of the 20 cases. This was the reason that analysis was expanded to include the FAR's. Second, not all of the project managers held the same level of knowledge about their cases. This weights the analysis slightly toward those cases with rich information (Indonesia and the Pacific).
Further, all key informants are involved in the management of BCN's projects, and community voices are noticeably absent. Quotes made by community members have been filtered through various levels of project management before appearing as the text data used in this analysis. Generally, qualitative analysis benefits from a wide range of perspectives and any biases added by the small sample and selection of key informants will be reflected here. However, doing it ‘right' by adding community interviews for each case study is clearly not an option. Due to the nature of the data, the discussion of some variables is weakened (e.g. community perceptions of linkage, impact of perceived cash and non-cash benefits).
Lastly, the current evaluation of projects is being performed midstream, for some projects more than others. Ideally, an evaluation of these projects would occur after they had clearly failed or reached some level of organizational sustainability. Of course, one of BCN's assumptions is that useful conclusions can be made before all the data is in and that analysis now is both necessary for the organization and worthwhile for the timely communication of lessons learned. However, the timing issue remains a weakness to the analysis, as some organizations are taking longer to organize than others. At this point, it may be difficult to say that a sluggish start is ‘worse' than a fast start, although two such programs may have very different outcome measures.
Data collection was completed prior to the consultant's arrival. Analysis was conducted in three phases: initial coding, focused coding, and analytical writing. While these may be drawn out as separate activities, they frequently have temporal overlap in practice.
The data sources discussed above were initially coded using an existing guide provided by BCN. An additional code was added to provide a dumping ground for potentially valuable examples of other phenomena. Most of the data was available on disk and a separate coding file was created for each code. As coded text was produced, it was transferred into the coding files.
During coding, a separate conceptual file was created to store notes analyzing selected pieces of data that emerged during initial coding. These notes then formed the basis of preliminary analysis.
Following the completion of the coding files, each code was sequentially examined and analyzed. During this time, as needed, the data source was consulted repeatedly through focused coding. This refers to a comprehensive scan for specific information. For example, during analysis of non-cash benefits, it became clear that environmental education activities may play an important role in the emerging theory. Therefore, the data was again consulted to extract all information specifically related to this topic.1
Aspects of each variable were identified and trends in the data were described. Each variable was so analyzed and the results contributed to the emerging theory.
3. AnalysisAnalysis here is divided into six sections. First, the primary and secondary outcome measures are considered and defined. Conservation is the primary outcome, and under the BCN hypothesis, enterprise success is the direct precursor to this outcome and is both a predictor of conservation and treated as an outcome measure of its own here. The next three sections are modeled around the three components of BCN's core hypothesis. The last section provides a place to discuss secondary factors that may influence the above listed ones in some small way. The possible subjects of analysis have not yet been exhausted in this draft.
Conservation outcome is the primary measure of interest in this analysis. It was therefore necessary to divide the projects based on how well they accomplished conservation. The ranking may be made qualitatively or quantitatively. BCN has established the Threat Reduction Assessment (TRA) as its primary measure of conservation outcome, and it will be used for this analysis to rank project success (See Salafsky and Margoluis 1999 for further details). The TRA is the frame over which the discussion of conservation outcome here is hung. The TRA is used in two manners for this analysis. Its basic ranking is used in some places, but for further analysis, categories of ‘good' and ‘bad' were created.
The distribution of TRA scores is shifted below 0.5, although scores ranged from 0.02 to 0.988. However, four projects were clearly superior to the rest, with scores for all enterprises above 0.75 (the next project weighed in at 0.55). Therefore, these four projects (#12, #14, #17, and #20) are considered superior as measured by conservation ends and are examined together in this analysis, referred to as Group A.
On the other end, the TRA did not separate the worst projects as clearly. Four projects (#5, #6, #8, and #15) fell cleanly below 0.25 and selected enterprises within three additional projects (#9.1, #9.2, #11.2, and #16.1) were also below this cutoff. These four projects and selected enterprises are referred to as Group D. Groups A and D will be compared as extremes throughout the analysis to identify trends related to conservation outcome. The implied Groups B (0.5 to 0.74) and C (0.25 to 0.49) will also be referred to occasionally, but it should be recognized that these divisions are somewhat arbitrary as the TRA scores were not distributed around 0.5.
Further analysis may be made using a different conservation ranking (perhaps qualitative) and following the path laid out in this report with a minimum of difficulty. An independent qualitative ranking of conservation outcome among the 20 BCN projects may also be used to evaluate the TRA by comparing the project orders produced by each method. In this way, the TRA may be assessed as a good predictor or conservation. If the TRA emerges further strengthened, the current analysis will also be bolstered.
3.2. Measures of Enterprise Success 2Six BCN projects contain enterprises, which show a current profit on paper (#2, #5, #6, #11, #17, and #20). Of these, two belong to Group A, and three belong to Group D. The last (project #2) has a better than average score of 0.55. Based on just this information, it appears that there is no relationship between enterprise profitability and conservation outcome. However, a simple and crude measurement of profitability on paper cannot tell the whole story. As has been acknowledged elsewhere, the short time span of project implementation is less than optimal for evaluation purposes. Due to the timing of evaluation, we are catching many enterprises early in their business infancy. Considering only current profitability would miss the trajectory that many currently unprofitable enterprises are taking. Therefore, a closer look at the mechanics of the business is necessary.
Enterprises currently generating profitProfitability is one way of measuring financial success. Recognizing that not all successful businesses are profitable at all times, a better measure of success is needed. Of the profitable BCN projects, only one can be considered unsuccessful. The ecotourism project in West Java (#6) provides an interesting case of a moderately profitable enterprise that did not last long. Two of the three enterprises were making a profit and the third had covered variable costs before internal conflict among the stakeholders caused the enterprises to collapse. This suggests that enterprise profitability may be mediated by the ability to maintain a business trajectory. Among the other profitable enterprises, those in project #6 stood alone as unable to maintain their direction. Generally, profitability may be equated with financial success when the enterprise appears to be capable of maintaining their trajectory.
Enterprises not currently generating profitOf the fourteen enterprises not generating profits as of the final evaluation date, the first thing that becomes apparent is that some of them have room to grow, while others do not. For example, the Mountain Fresh brand food enterprise in the Philippines (#14) offers an example of an enterprise with room to expand in the market. Ladies' Choice, their primary competitor in the jam and jelly market enjoys 70% of sales, but their recent market study suggested that 50% of consumers don't actually like the taste of Ladies Choice. By providing a superior product, Mountain Fresh expects to expand into a market left weak by their competitors. Recent successes suggest that this is a reasonable expectation.
In contrast, the deep sea fishing in the Solomon Islands (#18) provides an extreme case of having no market to expand into. This project initially intended to access a large international fish market. Unfortunately, there were no easy ways to transport the fish, and the enterprise is now forced to rely primarily on the local market, which is currently saturated. As one community member put it "the community does not feel that the enterprise is viable. Thus, how can they add value to be sustainable?" The future of this project is uncertain.
The second thing that becomes apparent when looking at the fourteen currently unprofitable projects, is that some projects are well prepared to take advantage of the available markets. That is to say that some projects have the organizational infrastructure in place that will allow them to expand easily into the existing markets.
For example, in many ways, project #7 epitomizes the problems associated with examining enterprises too early. This Indonesian community logging operation has had a very sluggish start, and has not yet sold any timber. Since there is an existing timber market into which the project may expand, it passes the first test described above. However, it is also well prepared to enter this market. The project spent the past 4 years preparing to begin production by organizing the community, conducting a forest inventory, obtaining green certification, securing markets, and changing national laws to enable the eventual production to run smoothly. Given these circumstances, it is quite likely that the project will become profitable quickly soon after it begins production.
This can be compared to project #16, one of the ecotourism projects in Papua New Guinea. Like #7, very little ‘production' has been accomplished to date. Put another way, few tourists and researchers have visited the site. This project is attempting to tap a large global and regional ecotourism market. Although the site is remote and cannot expect to see hordes of tourists, there is certainly room for expansion. However, the organization has been torn apart by internal problems. Project staff did not communicate clearly with the community, and the rival ethnic groups involved have not unified behind the project. One project staff member expressed the concern that the community might even burn down the research station. In this extreme case, the project's future is uncertain and currently it is not at all prepared to expand into the existing market.
Given that not all financially successful enterprises are profitable at all times, especially in their infancy, the following criteria drawn from the above discussion may be used to evaluate the financial success of the BCN enterprises. They may be considered financial successes if they are 1) currently profitable, and 2) can maintain their current business trajectory, or if they are 1) not currently profitable, and 2) have a market to expand into, 3) are well prepared organizationally to expand. Enterprises are judged to be unsuccessful if they are 1) not profitable, and 2) do not have a clear market to expand into, or 3) are not well prepared organizationally to expand. This is shown graphically in Figure 1. The following discussion describes each program given the model presented. Two projects defied evaluation by these methods.
As described above, project #14 is well situated to expand into an open jam market, and project #7 is also well prepared to expand into the green timber market. The only project with all enterprises showing profit was Fijian bioprospecting (#20).
Projects #2 and #5 both had one profitable enterprise and one that covered only variable and management cost. Data for the ecotourism enterprises in Nepal (#2) is sparse, but there is no reason to believe that the Kumrose enterprise is not currently expanding into the market and are simply a little behind Bachhauli. The BR hills(#5) herbal medicine enterprise has suffered from production, marketing, and management problems. Although these factors may explain past lulls in profit, they have currently been remedied, and the enterprise will probably join its sibling honey and fruit enterprise showing profit in 1999.
Project #11 in Irian Jaya includes one profitable fishery enterprise and three ecotourism sites that are not currently producing profits. These three have suffered from a contracting regional tourism market due to economic and political instability. There is still a (smaller) market into which they may expand, consisting of foreign visitors as well as domestic tourism. The enterprise at Saba has adapted well to the changing environment and is prepared to make a profit soon. It is difficult to assess whether the other two communities (Wundi and Dawi) are well positioned to expand. As mentioned in the 1998 FAR, "because ecotourism as a local business is still relatively young, this will necessarily be a gradual process. The communities are still learning about what visitors want, how to divide labor and benefits among themselves, and how to arrange the logistics of attracting and servicing guests." These borderline enterprises (#11.2 and #11.3) will be considered unsuccessful here.
Only one of the six sustainable timber enterprises that make up project #17 showed a profit. The Katole brothers, one a mechanic and the other a bookkeeper, manage this enterprise in Mu. All of the enterprises have had equipment problems and internal clan disputes. In Mu, the management and repair skills brought to the project by the Katole brothers have allowed the enterprise to succeed. However, the other five enterprises do not appear prepared to expand into this market, and their future profitability is suspect.
The Humla essential oils project (#1) had some early marketing problems. These have now been resolved by hiring new staff. A large market exists both domestically and internationally and they are well positioned to expand.
The Garwhal silk and honey project (#3) had early technical problems. The enterprises are complex and there weren't enough local people with expertise. Currently, the government is behind the project and the community is well organized. There is a strong domestic market, and the project appears to be following a good trajectory.
The rattan-weaving project (#8) had trouble finding a suitable market for the first two years. However, in 1998, they went international and have been unable to supply the demand they found. There is plenty of room to expand, and the organization has had incredible success organizing the communities and training them to add value to the raw rattan through weaving.
The butterfly ranching in Irian Jaya (#10) is accessing a good market and has improved their production in the last year. Although hampered by the Asian economic crisis last year, they are well prepared to expand this year.
The ecotourism and ngali nut enterprises in the Solomon Islands (#19) are both covering fixed and variable costs and are poised to make a profit in the next year. The ecotourism enterprise has been seeking out new markets in travel agencies and recently won an award. It is well organized to pursue this market. The ngali nut enterprise had a slow start finding a consistent buyer for their product, but has recently secured the Body Shop among others and is well organized to take advantage of this.
As described above, project #6 could not maintain profitability and collapsed due to internal conflict. Project #18 does not have a fish market to expand into, and project #16 is not prepared to take advantage of the available ecotourism market for organizational reasons.
Like #16, the NTFP enterprises in the Philippines (#13) had internal problems. Both the local ethnic groups and the NGO partners had trouble working together and very few products were ever sold. The project had some successes, but is unlikely to continue and is not financially successful.
The ecotourism and handicrafts enterprise in Papua New Guinea (#15) has covered fixed and variable costs, but seems to have exhausted its market potential. Like project #16, also in Papua New Guinea, the site is very remote and recent instability has scared off potential tourists and researchers. This project cannot be expected to expand further and is therefore not financially successful.
The rafting enterprise in Indonesia (#9) was poorly planned. It was remote and required unusual skills. The market turned out to be small and the enterprise was not organized to take advantage of it. This enterprise may not continue into the future. The butterfly ranching and honey hunting enterprises are both very small scale and have not yet made any profit. The butterfly enterprise is beginning to seek out the extensive international market and the farmers are well organized. The honey hunting enterprise continues on a limited scale, but does not appear to have the technical capacity to increase production.
Although the Bendum NTFP project (#12) was initially conceived as an enterprise promotion strategy, it encountered tremendous barriers to this activity and changed its goals toward land tenure promotion and community empowerment. The enterprise continues to be very small and far from profitable. The project does not have plans to expand.
The model does not easily assess two of BCN's projects. The Indian trekking promotion project (#4) was the only of BCN's projects not expressly set up to collect revenue and become financially self-sustaining. It focused on building local capacity and institutions and cannot be adequately evaluated on a financial basis.
The second project to defy the model is the Fijian bioprospecting (#20). It is currently profitable and will probably remain so for several years. However, it cannot expect to maintain its trajectory because the enterprise is based on the sampling of a finite stock of resources. When all of them are sampled and sold, the enterprise will necessarily fold. Although this would label it an unsuccessful enterprise by the standards of the model, the Fijian project differs from other BCN enterprises in purpose. Unlike project #6 which failed to maintain a business trajectory due to organizational problems, project #20 was never intended to become a lasting enterprise. Its purpose was to jumpstart other projects in the community and the project is succeeding at that goal. For the purposes of this analysis project #20 will be considered a financial success. It should be noted that project #20 is different in purpose from the type of enterprise projects to which BCN would like to make recommendations.
To BCN's credit, more projects had financially successful enterprises than not. The above results are summarized in Table 1
Table 1 – Financial Success
Financially Successful
Financially Unsuccessful
Not easily categorized
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 19, 20
6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18
4
9.2
11.1, 11.4
17.4
9.1, 9.3
11.2, 11.3
17.1-3, 17.5, 17.6
If BCN were only interested in small enterprise development, financial success as defined above would be the bottom line. However, conservation enterprises should meet the ‘bottom-lines' of both profitability and conservation to be considered a success. An examination of the projects in Table 1 reveals that positive conservation did not clearly accompany financial success.
Several projects had both financial and conservation successes. Project #14 is perhaps the best example of this. Incidentally, it also has high apparent linkages to the local biodiversity. The community was drawn together by the project, which succeeded at establishing land tenure rights. As a result, they were able to prevent a highway from crossing their forest reserve, as well as minimize destructive agroforestry practices while at the same time developing a promising young jam business. Projects #1, #2, #10, and (#20), have also seen substantial conservation improvements accompanied by financial success.
Several projects were unsuccessful both financially and by conservation measures. Project #15 is a good example of this. The community has been unable to enforce anti-poaching laws and in at least one location, the palm used to make handicrafts is being depleted. The looming menace however, is mining which appears likely to proceed in the wildlife management area. Members of the community have been cooperating with both logging and mining interests. On top of that, the ecotourism enterprises have not seen fruition, partly because the location is so remote. Projects #6, #13, #16, #18, #9.2, and #9.3, had similar problems financially and with conservation.
If financial success were well associated with conservation outcome, it would follow that few if any projects would have financial success in the absence of conservation, and that few if any projects would effect conservation in the absence of financial success. This was not observed.
Project #8 provides a good example of a financially successful project that had a minimal effect on conservation and may have contributed to the depletion of forest resources. The project has been very successful at establishing a small industry selling raw rattan and has expanded to include value-adding activities such as weaving. A large market has been secured in which to sell the products and the community is well organized. However, the project has not had any measurable conservation impact. The primary threat of agricultural encroachment has not been abated and the additional threat of NTFP extraction (rattan) may have been increased. Projects #3, #5, #7, #19, and #9.1 have had similar problems with conservation amidst financial success.
Few projects with financially unsuccessful enterprises also had important conservation impacts. Although one of project #17's enterprises was financially successful, the other five were not, yet all sites received high TRA rankings (0.77 to 0.988). Project #12 was also ranked highly by the TRA (0.82) but was wildly unsuccessful financially. A comparison of these two is conducted in the next section.
Regarding conservation and financial success, project #11 straddled the categories developed above. All of the enterprises were moderately successful financially and at meeting their conservation threats, making this a middle-of-the-road case. Putting the enterprises of #11 definitively into the above four distinctions would not recognize this fact.
From the discussion to this point, it is clear that financial success does not automatically result in conservation (e.g. #3, #5, #7, and #19), and is therefore not a sufficient condition. It is also not a necessary condition for optimal conservation as demonstrated by projects #12 and #17. However, when Groups A and B are examined, it becomes apparent that most of them were financially successful (#'s 1, 2, 10, 14, 20, and 17.1) with the exceptions of project #12 and selected enterprises of #17. Therefore, although financial success is neither necessary nor sufficient, it may have a weak association with conservation by catalyzing other more important factors. The next section will attempt to uncover one of those.
3.3. Benefit GenerationThe conservation success of projects #12 and #17 in the absence of financial success beg the question: what caused their conservation success if not money? Both projects were involved in community development, #12 more than #17. Project #12 eventually recognized that while their goal was still conservation, their focus had shifted from enterprise development to community development. The community has secured land tenure rights, developed their leadership skills, incorporated their cultural history into school texts, and developed resource management plans. As put by one project officer "the enterprise project promotes cultural integrity." As a result, the community has moved to conserve their land and resources. Again, the same program officer: "without the enterprise project, more land would have been lost through logging and selling their land . . . One of the biggest non-cash benefit was the conservation of their resource base . . .They learned the value of their forest and its uniqueness and responsibility to society to hold it."
Project #17's role as a development agency in the community may also explain its conservation success and financial failure. Although not set up to perform development quite as expressly as project #12, the enterprises had a number of secondary benefits. In Lak, toilets have been constructed with project lumber, and in several communities, the project has purchased trucks. These vehicles have provided a link to a larger, even global community psychologically and by transporting goods into town. Several towns have developed secondary enterprises such as general stores selling goods supplied by the trucks. The project has also used its timber to construct schools and an aid post. Although most of project #17's enterprises were not profitable and are not likely to become so, they did produce benefits for the community that were directly related to the enterprise.
As projects #12 and #17 demonstrate, financial success is not essential to the conservation success of an enterprise project. However, the project must produce positive benefits for the community. This suggests a need to expand the analysis to include types and magnitude of benefits.
3.3.1. Scale and Distribution of Cash Benefits to IndividualsCash benefits made to individuals may influence their conservation practices. The absolute value of cash benefits3 will not be discussed in this analysis as it is more of a concern for cost comparison analysis for use by funders and may be best completed quantitatively. Ideally, this analysis would look at the impact that cash benefits have made in people's lives.4 The available data is inadequate to assess impact from individuals' perspectives. The closest available measure is the percentage of average income represented by cash benefits, although this too is missing for some projects. By assessing this in combination with the distribution patterns5, the impact that cash benefits to individuals may have on the community can be approximated.
Two of BCN's projects elected to pool revenues in a community trust fund for use in community development (#2, #20) and did not distribute cash benefits to individuals beyond a few salaries. All but one of the remaining projects attempted to distribute revenues to direct participants. Project #7 has not yet done so because sale of timber has not yet begun. Project #1 followed both strategies by distributing revenue to individuals and setting up community development trust funds.
Assuming that amount or distribution of cash benefits is related to conservation, Group A enterprises may be contrasted with Group D enterprises to assess the differences. Project #20 did not distribute any cash benefits to individuals. Project # 14 returned earnings to its members, contributing about 15% of the average household income. However, this was confined to its members and may not have had much impact on the community. Project #12 was able to return a substantial amount of revenues, providing an average 20% of household income and reaching the bulk of the community. Most of project #12's recipients were women. Lastly, project #17 produced a range of possibilities. Some enterprises produced no cash benefits at all, while the most successful one (Mu) supplied 44% of the average yearly wage to a large proportion of the community. In two of the other communities, distribution of cash benefits created problems. In Arabam, this led to unrest and the destruction of project equipment. The four Group A projects did not appear to follow any trends.
Group D projects also exhibited a range of cash benefits. Project #5 had a substantial cash impact on the community. Approximately 60% of households were participating in honey and fruit processing, and received income from this profitable project. Cash benefits for project #6 were based on participation and were generally no higher than one fifth of household income in each of the three enterprises. Distribution of benefits was not consistent. Project staff reported jealousies developing over distribution patterns, as those with organizational power are reaping larger benefits. Projects #9.1 and #9.2 both had little cash impact. The butterfly enterprise employs only a handful of farmers in the community. Although the honey enterprise employs more than 10% of the community and has improved the prices farmers receive, these only account for a tenth of household income. Project #11's ecotourism enterprises also appear to be reaching a tenth of the population and contributing to a tenth of household income. Like project #6, this ecotourism site suffers from unequal distribution based on position within the organization. For example, revenue from a guesthouse is benefiting a neighboring clan exclusively because one of their members is the administrator. Data for projects #8, #15, and #16 are not adequate for inclusion here.
In the absence of clear trends, the scale and distribution of cash benefits alone do not appear to have an impact on conservation. All three of the projects to establish community trust funds were also financially successful (#1, #2, and #20). This arrangement may have avoided the jealousies and rivalries over distribution that was seen in several financially unsuccessful projects (#6, #11, and #17.5). Although cash distribution did not lead to disruptive rivalries in all cases, it can be seen as one danger of this incentive strategy.
3.3.2. Non-cash Benefits to Communities6BCN's projects generated a wide variety of benefits for target communities. To separate them by cash and non-cash is almost misleading as the latter category includes some very different benefits. A survey of projects produces six broad types of non-cash benefits: educational activities, construction of infrastructure, economic development, community empowerment, improved external connections, and ecological conservation.
Educational activities were carried out by every project through some form of training and skill building to establish the enterprise. Often these skills opened doors for the community or its members beyond the scope of the enterprise itself. Management, accounting, and monitoring skills can all be used in other enterprises and activities. When asked what benefits the enterprises had brought them, community members and project staff from nearly every project cited this. Several projects also undertook other educational activities. For example, project #11 conducted English language classes, and projects #1 and #2 worked to improve literacy in their communities.
Several communities conducted infrastructure improvements such as sanitation works (e.g. #2, #17, and #19), and schools or clinics (#2, and #18,). Some communities also undertook economic development such as loan programs (#2), securing land tenure (#1, #7, and #13) and establishing small enterprise as spin-offs of the project. For example, the trucks used by enterprises of project #17 also enabled communities to exchange goods with distant markets. With these general stores emerged to sell locally imported goods.
Community empowerment took a number of forms. Several projects actively strengthened community institutions (#3, #4, #12, and #19,). Project #12 conducted a cultural awareness campaign including a the creation of a local history book that is now used in schools. Several projects actively empowered women (#2, #3, #8, #12, and #19). Project managers or community members in nearly every case reported that the enterprise instilled a sense of pride in the community, especially when the project stimulated national or international interest. For example, the ecotourism enterprise of Project #19 earned a prize in a travel magazine. As a result, a project manager writes "when the magazine arrived in the village everyone was extremely proud to read their names and consider themselves world famous!"
Projects often succeeded in improving community links to the outside world. Project #12 has increased communication with neighboring communities. Many projects worked directly with governments to forge a better relationship for the community (#3, #4, #7, #11, #13, and #18). A number of them also increased community exposure to other cultures (#8, #10, #11, #12, #17, #19, and #20). As one project manager writes, trucks used by project #17 also "provide an all important psychological connection with the outside world."
Conservation as an outcome measure was evaluated on a biological basis (the TRA starts with ecological threats). While an improvement in conservation will clearly benefit biodiversity, there is no reason to assume that all conservation outcomes produce social benefits to communities. This phenomenon is the primary reason that BCN entered the field of linked enterprises, attempting to capture a level of social benefit to general conservation. However, it should be noted that in several of the BCN cases, community members and project managers identified specific conservation outcomes as non-cash benefits. For example, community members in Fiji (#20) have recognized that several depleted food species are returning as a result of project activity and clearly value this conservation outcome.
BCN attempted to collect information regarding enterprise linkages to biodiversity. However, the social importance of secondary conservation outcomes was not explicitly assessed and references to this subject are not common in the case files. Community motivation to participate in conservation programs (enterprise based or other) may be related to the social importance of a variety of conservation outcomes, and may be a rich area of future study.
A summary of types of non-cash benefits identified in the case files is provided by project in Table 2. This analysis would benefit from a comparison of the categories in Table 2 to standard impact measures of community development programs.
Table 2 – Types of non-cash benefits listed by community members
and project staff for each of BCN's 20 projects
Project #
Education
Construction of Infrastructure
Economic Development
Community Empowerment
External Connections
Ecological Conservation
1
x
**
**
**
2
x
x
x
x
3
x
x
4*
x
x
x
x
5
x
6
x
x
x
x
7
x
x
x
8
x
x
x
9
x
x
x
10
x
x
x
x
11
x
x
x
x
12
x
x
x
x
x
13
x
x
x
x
14
x
x
x
x
15
x
x
16*
17
x
x
x
x
x
18
x
x
x
x
19
x
x
x
x
20
x
**
**
**
x
x
*poor data quality
** unspecified community development usage of community trust fund
A closer look at non-cash benefits for selected projects will now be attempted to compare the relative impacts of non-cash benefits conservation. Once again, Groups A and D will be used as opposite ends of the conservation scale.
All of Group A projects had substantial non-cash benefits. Project #20 possibly generated more income than any other project. All of this has been put into a community fund where it is being used to effect community development. The monitoring activities associated with the reef preservation have provided an educational diversion for the school children and have earned them prizes for related presentations. The program has effected pride in the community as numerous project-related visitors are becoming more frequent and other communities ask for their advice to set up similar programs. Through project activities, the community has networked with government and local and international NGOs. The preservation activities have also allowed regeneration of several local marine food species previously thought to have left the area for good.
Project #12 has made tremendous strides toward preservation and promotion of cultural integrity. The project has secured official recognition of their ancestral land rights. Putting women in control of the handicraft enterprises has empowered them and improved their position within the community. The project launched a series of textbooks that facilitate learning from the cultural perspective and are being used in area schools. Participation in project activities is estimated at 90%, developing leadership skills. One of the projects' goals is to empower the community to resolve conflicts rather than passively accept externally controlled changes. In fact, the community has become more assertive and is developing policy for itself. The community has been exposed to its neighbors and has developed a sense of pride in their culture. Conservation of their resource base has been particularly important for this community which maintains strong cultural ties to the forest.
Monitoring of the local biodiversity by project #14 has strengthened local autonomy by giving the community the ammunition to fight political battles. They have succeeded in keeping out a major highway development and are negotiating for a much needed road project that will go around the bioreserve and past extremely remote communities. By banning agricultural chemicals, they have increased area fish and wildlife considerably. Beyond improving their food base, this has attracted the attention of provincial and national leaders. A school based conservation curriculum is also attracting attention and community members have been asked to conduct ecology seminars in other communities. The project has helped the community to expand the range of their legal tenure rights. All of this has given the community a great sense of pride in their successes.
Project #17 has used locally hewn lumber for numerous construction activities in its communities. A woman's poultry project and the first ever pit toilets have been built in one community. Several communities have built new schools, and one constructed an aid post. In another, a number of homes have been weatherproofed. The enterprises have been particularly effective at leveraging cash to obtain other sources of funding. In addition to the poultry project, one community purchased a plantation and several have obtained trucks. The trucks have had a tremendous impact by giving communities access to distant markets. Local goods have been sent to market and the returning goods have allowed some communities to construct trade stores to sell these products in the community. Psychologically, the trucks have given people a stronger connection to the rest of the world.
Several of the Group D projects provided non-cash benefits to the community, but none did so as comprehensively as the Group A projects. Project #6 conducted some village development, and provided small loans to community members. During project activity (before its collapse), it attracted some domestic and international attention, and invitations were given to the community to attend seminars regarding ecotourism. This attention may have developed some pride in the community although there was a lot of internal conflict between stakeholders.
Ecotourism at project #15 has attracted visitors to the region. This has increase cultural exposure within the community and has resulted in more planes and vehicles journeying to the area, stimulating trade and bringing the community closer to markets. The project has attracted national attention and has generated pride in its participants. Several individuals have become been asked to travel and share their knowledge. The community has been empowered (on one occasion stood up to government officials who were poaching in the park).
Project #5 has not had many non-cash benefits beyond the technical training given to participants, and any pride they may take in the enterprise. It has seen numerous conflicts between the community and the NGO partners over the transfer of enterprise ownership.
Beyond the cash benefits provided by the successful rattan enterprise (#8), very few non-cash benefits have been observed. Women are the primary participants and have been empowered and their status in the community has increased.
Enterprises #9.1 and #9.2 provided participants with skills training and equipment to run the honey and butterfly operations. They were able to improve relations with government and the organization of the village has had some empowerment effect.
Data for project #16 is poor, but there is no indication that the project produced any significant benefits at all. There were repeated conflicts between groups of stakeholders and the enterprise never really got off the ground.
Although there have been substantial non-cash benefits for three of project 11's enterprises, the fourth (#11.2) and lowest ranked (by TRA) has been sluggish to keep up and has not enjoyed the same ones. The latter has enjoyed a number of skills trainings. Enterprises #11.1, #11.3, and #11.4 have had the same trainings and more. The enterprises have drawn these communities together, empowering them to assert their tenure rights. They have developed closer ties to government and have been learning English.
Some of the non-cash benefits seen in Group A are secondary effects, but in several cases, they were planned as part of project activities. In fact, all of the Group A projects had some kind of planned impact that was not directly related to the enterprises. In contrast, only one of the Group D projects (#6) planned non-enterprise activities for community development work.
In addition to minimal non-cash benefits among Group D sites, there is also evidence of numerous fundamental conflicts among stakeholders, although a discussion of this will be saved for section 3.5.7
A look at the projects that fell between Groups A and D support the observed trend. After Group A, the top four projects as measured by the TRA are #1, #2, #10, and the three project #11 enterprises discussed above (#11.1, #11.3, #11.4). These will be referred to as Group B.
Projects #1 and #2 have both established a number of small community development funds with their revenues. At the time of evaluation, the groups of project #1 had not spent much but were considering investing in solar electrification, trail construction, reforestation to prevent landslides. The project's top priority has been a literacy educational campaign, and it has prepared a conservation-related book for subsequent use. The community has been empowered through these and enterprise activities as well as gaining tenure rights to nearby forests.
Project #2 first secured royalty rights to park receipts and access rights to resources in the park buffer zone. The community development funds have been spending their revenues on a laundry list of development activities including: school infrastructure development; scholarships for poor students; construction of bridges, culverts, and irrigation canals; methane gas digester construction; road repairs; women's literacy programs; loans to farmers for beekeeping; bee house distribution; wildlife medication; support for people injured by wildlife attacks; health and sanitation programs; distribution of saw dust stoves; drinking water programs; and several other income generating programs for women and socially disadvantaged people. All of this has improved the quality of life in the communities. The ecotourism enterprise has reportedly produced pride in the community.
The new community organization that was established through the creation of project #10's enterprise produced several communal spin-off enterprises. Community members took advantage of their organization to develop fish farming and passion fruit syrup production. Recognition of their advances by outsiders has brought pride to the participants, and given them regular contacts with the larger nearby towns.
As discussed above, the high scoring enterprises of project #11 also had more non-cash benefits than the lower scoring one (#11.2). Group B projects (#'s 1, 2, 10, 11.1, 11.3, 11.4) clearly have more non-cash benefits than Group D. However, several of them do not appear to have substantially fewer non-cash benefits than Group A projects (for example, consider #2), yet the two categories differ substantially in conservation outcome (by at least 22% as measured by the TRA). Furthermore, several of Group C projects also appear to have substantial non-cash benefits. For example, project # 19 has improved sanitation and hygiene conditions, empowered women, worked to preserve traditional knowledge and stories, and garnered pride through substantial external attention and awards. Project #19 received a TRA of 0.31.
Underlying the earlier discussion of financial success is the assumption that this will produce cash benefits to community members. However, the BCN projects do not support a clear linkage. Further, there is little evidence to suggest that individual cash benefits are a good predictor of conservation outcome. Cash benefits were made to individuals in most projects. Projects #2, and #20 have demonstrated that the distribution of cash benefits is not necessary for financial success or conservation. Projects #12 and #17 have demonstrated that enterprise financial success is not necessary for conservation ends or to produce non-cash benefits for communities.
Given that all Group A projects and none of Group D projects provided substantial non-cash benefits, it is safe to assume that this variable is important to the conservation outcome. However, the apparently similar levels of non-cash benefits observed in some Group B and C projects suggest that non-cash benefits are a necessary but not sufficient condition for optimal conservation. Cash benefits do not appear to be a factor. Enterprise financial success is one of several methods that may be utilized to attain non-cash benefits to communities. Project #12 demonstrates that subsidized enterprise development accompanied by community development may also fulfill this necessary condition.
One of the principles of BCN's core hypothesis states that enterprises must generate benefits to be successful. Implicit in this statement is the assumption of cash and non-cash benefits. This analysis validates one piece of the core hypothesis but suggests that cash benefits may not be as important as non-cash benefits. It also supports the assertion that other factors are important, since non-cash benefits alone cannot explain the observed results. Assuming that all of BCN's projects had some kind of linkage to biodiversity (study inclusion criteria), the next step would be to determine if linkage type resulted in substantial conservation and what types did not. This is an area of further research.
3.4. Core Enterprise3.4.1. Perceived Degree of Enterprise Linkage8
One aspect of enterprise linkage is perceived degree. BCN requested that this qualitative analysis investigate the relationship between communities' perceptions of enterprise linkage and the conservation impact of the enterprise. While this is a fascinating question, the data was not there to adequately answer it. Some projects had staff impressions of the communities' perceptions, and direct quotes were available for several, but together these accounted for less than half of the sample. Therefore, no strong conclusions can be made. The following examples are listed in order of project rank by TRA:
Project staff with the jam and jelly enterprise in the Philippines (#14) report that a realization by the enterprise that agricultural chemicals would damage the sustainability of their business led to the banning of these chemicals by the community, suggesting a high perception of linkage. This project had a TRA of 0.82.
A community leader in the Humla essential oils project (#1) was quoted saying "we are realizing the value of these plants and will not kill the goose that lays the golden egg." This project had a TRA of 0.55.
Anecdotally, the community implementing ecotourism in Nepal (#2) appears to have changed behavior due to a recognition of the enterprise's link to biodiversity. As described in the 1998 FAR, "The density of the megafauna has increased in the buffer zone plantations. In the old days, this increase in animal populations would have surely led to increased antagonism towards the wildlife from neighboring peoples. The fact that these people are regarding the wildlife favorably is a powerful argument that they understand the link between their tourism income and the wildlife and view the benefits as outweighing the costs." This project also had a TRA of 0.55.
A manager of the local NGO partner (YBLBC) to the Arfak butterfly project (#10) is quoted saying "now, most of the high value species being farmed are primary forest dependent, and thus the enterprise acts as an incentive for conservation." This link appears to be well understood by the community of butterfly farmers. In one meeting, they explained that primary forest conservation was necessary to secure the highest product return per labor ratio for their enterprise. This project had a TRA of 0.5.
Staff working with the Solomon deep sea fishing project (#18) report that "community members interviewed felt there was no link between the MCA and the fishery enterprise." Poaching activities carried out at times by project participants supports this. This project received a TRA of 0.33.
Project #19 had two enterprises, both of which appear to have inspired linkages in the minds of community members. Regarding the ecotourism enterprise, project staff report "some community members have told other community members not to shoot the birds near the village or to burn forest for ‘fun' because the tourists who come want to see these things." The ngali nut enterprise was initially had a low linkage rating until staff realized that local pigeons, which require primary forest trees to roost, facilitated nut collection. This awareness was communicated to the community and by the final evaluation point, the entire community was aware of the linkages. During a recent meeting, several community members voiced the opinion that in retrospect, their enterprise/conservation strategy had been a blessing by sparing them the problems of neighboring communities, which had chosen to log their forests. This project received a TRA of 0.31.
One of project #9's enterprises was a rafting ecotourism site in Suluwesi, Indonesia. Regarding this enterprise, the project staff reports that "a strong link between the Park or forest and tourism does not yet exist in the minds of the local people who believe that most tourists travel to the area to view only local culture and the megaliths found in the valley. They do not yet feel that their resource use might have an impact on tourism in the area." This enterprise received a TRA of 0.29.
The rattan used to make handbags in the West Kalimatan project (#8) is being depleted. The project managers suggest that while there is awareness of this depletion, it has only just manifested as a motivation to conserve. The link between biodiversity and conservation appears to be weak in the community. This project received a TRA of 0.06.
Three of the enterprises in the Crater Mountain ecotourism project (#15) involve the manufacture of handicrafts. Like project #8, the palm used for making handicrafts in one village is now becoming scarce. According to project staff, the linkage between the enterprise and sustainable use of the resource is not clear to the people. When asked what was planned to deal with the shrinking stock of palm, "some people shrug their shoulders, while others think they can plant the palm near the villages." This enterprise received a TRA of 0.02.
Of the above projects for which there is information, the enterprises that appeared to have a good perceived linkage in the minds of the community tended to score higher TRA's than the ones that were less linked. Also, of the four projects with data suggesting a poor perceived linkage, one was a financially successful enterprise relying primarily on one forest species (#8) and the other three were financially unsuccessful (#9's rafting, #15, #18). In contrast all five projects with apparently good perceived linkages were financially successful (#'s 1, 2, 10, 14, 19). Again, it should be stressed that these trends are weak at best and would better point to the direction of further study than serve as the basis from which to draw conclusions.
3.4.2 Enterprise Ownership9 and Management10
In the interest of long term sustainability, BCN's projects all strove to establish enterprises that could survive independent of their NGO initiators. Local control was manifested in several ways, and the role of the NGO varied greatly by project.
The most striking pattern in the cases regards the NGO role. In projects that were successful at conservation, the NGO tended to move quickly from founder of the enterprise into a role as consultant, frequently to bolster the management skills which were weak onsite. Project #12 is a good example of this phenomenon, where management skills were locally poor. The NGO continues to remain involved providing big picture assistance, although nearly all of the decisions are made competently by the numerous local participants.
Most of group A and B projects resembled the above description. Project #17 is very similar to project #12, but the NGO had a tendency to abandon the few struggling enterprises. Most of the enterprises continued with strong local management and a little help from the NGO. Project #14 is locally owned and managed, but relies heavily on one individual. Due to his skills, the NGO plays a minor role in management assistance. Project #20 is the only Group A exception. The enterprise is owned locally by the community, but it is managed primarily by the NGO. Again, this is a product of the unique short lifespan of this project and the complexity involved in international negotiations with pharmaceutical firms.
Project #1 moved from complete management by the NGO to current management by numerous stakeholder groups with technical assistance from the NGO. Although the forest service manages project #2's park, the local community has an elected board that manages area ecotourism related activities with little support from the NGO partner. Project #10 does not have high local control of management. Although the enterprises are locally owned, the business is managed primarily by the NGO. Plans exist to improve local skills and subsequently transfer management responsibilities to the community.
In contrast, most of Group D projects were managed primarily by the NGO partner. Among these, only project #8 had substantial community participation in the project. For this one, the skills needed to make international sales could only be provided by the NGO, and it is responsible for this level of management. The remaining Group D projects experienced heavy NGO management.
Projects #6 and #16 never had full community endorsement and participation. The result was minimal local management and the NGO filled the vacuum. The NGO associated with project #15 maintained a strong involvement in the management of the enterprises because local leadership did not evolve. The resulting tension over whose enterprise it was caused one project staff member to comment that their continued presence in the community may be hindering the development of local leadership potential. Lastly, project #5 is managed by a council with the NGO as an advisor. However, the NGO plays a strong role in management decision-making. The project was trying to change this situation at t-final.
Every project sought to establish local enterprise ownership, despite the inner workings of the management team. On paper, all enterprises were locally owned. However, in several of the above Group D cases, de facto ownership of the enterprise was either nebulous or clearly in the NGO's hands. For example, project #15 has always belonged to the NGO in the eyes of the community. Even when the work involved is ostensibly for their own benefit, community members have sought payment for their labors of the NGO. Project #16 also failed early to get the community on board and never recovered. Ownership of the enterprise of project #6 was never clear. Internal struggles meant that community ownership by even one faction was not well established, and the NGO was left holding the bag. In contrast, the level of community participation seen in all of the Group A projects serves to reinforce the established community ownership.
Community ownership and management of the enterprise appears to be associated with positive conservation. There were exceptions to the pattern, but overall the projects that were successful at conservation tended also to be strongly owned and managed by the community. The NGO's in these cases remained involved in a consultancy role, but were not heavily involved in management of the enterprises.
3.4.3. Market Factors11Age of market
Fundamental to the success of any enterprise is the existence of a market. Of the sample projects, only two were entering new and emerging markets. The bioprospecting project in Fiji (#20) and the Ngali nut oil enterprise in the Solomon Islands (#19) both worked hard to secure contracts for their products. The market for bioprospecting is very young, and project #19 is only the second (and currently the only) producer of Ngali nut oil in the world. Both of these were successful enterprises and had at least moderate conservation impact. However, with only two cases of new markets to examine, it is not possible to establish a direct connection between the newness of the market and either enterprise financial success or conservation outcome.
Greenness of the marketOf the many factors in BCN's analytical framework, green market potential is perhaps the most difficult to define. Green markets themselves are difficult to define. The theory behind them goes something like this. Some segment of consumers is willing to pay a premium price for goods that are produced in an ecologically sustainable manner. In other words, given a choice between two brands of widgets, the concerned consumer will choose the recycled one, and may be willing to pay more for it. Clearly, the price premium potential is appealing to any enterprise, and given the conservation goals of BCN projects, it seems reasonable to assume that they may be able to realize a price premium in a green market for their products. If so, the enterprise will be able to occupy a solid market niche.
This potential may be illustrated by taking an example from the BCN files. The bioprospecting enterprise in Fiji (#20) has marketed their samples as green products, appealing the ‘ethical bioprospecting' market. As one program manager puts it, "[a] major accomplishment of the project has been to attract the interest of other people interested in access to biological samples collected in a socially responsible manner." However, there is no data to suggest that this enterprise has obtained a price premium beyond the above documented interest.
This reveals the basic problem here. The theory is sound, but is very difficult to assess. In order to ‘see' the green market at work, there must be an equivalent non-green option. Take the example of honey producers in the B.R. Hills (#5). The honey producers are (in theory) using the enterprise to make conservation possible and are therefore a good candidate for green marketing. There exists an alternative consumer option (regular honey), and it is therefore possible to assess the green market. In this case, the honey enterprise tried to market itself greenly by attaching pamphlets to its jars of honey explaining their greenness but was unable to realize a price premium.
The case of the honey market is similar to that of widgets, being well defined with clearly similar alternatives. However, in some cases, BCN's projects reached for markets with grayer boundaries. For example, eight projects incorporated ecotourism enterprises. Are these inherently green? Their success will (in theory) contribute to conservation. The ecotourism market is a subset of the tourism market but its comparability to other tourist activities such as cruise ship vacations is suspect.
Green market potential is difficult to assess with the current data. Every one of BCN's projects have the potential to market their product or service as ‘green' provided that they advertise the positive conservation impacts linked to the enterprise. The real question is whether people will pay a premium price for any of the BCN products and services. There are two ways to assess this potential. The first is through market surveys to identify consumer desires and the importance that concern for conservation plays in their spending habits for a given market. Only one of the BCN projects has conducted green market research. The community timber enterprise in Indonesia (#7) has determined that a high European demand exists for certified green wood. This enterprise is attempting to obtain certification but has not begun production.
The second way to assess the green market potential of a product is to experiment with marketing. However, failing to realize a green market potential does not necessarily mean that none exists, and this too is a less than perfect way of assessing this quantity. The added specialization may actually make marketing difficult for the enterprise. For example, green marketing attempts by the ecotourism enterprise of project #19 led them to work with a specialty tour provider and limited their market significantly. As one manager put it "in retrospect, the cultural sensitivity of One World Tours and its internal management problems have restricted marketing opportunities to the point where they were ineffective." This example illustrates the point that while a green market may exist, it does not always translate into a market advantage. Appropriate marketing to the desired niche appears to be very important in this case. The other project #19 enterprise relies solely on a green market for its existence. Sales of ngali nut oil are only possible because there is a market for expensive soaps made with sustainably harvested rainforest products.
In some cases, BCN projects did experiment with green marketing and had limited results. Beyond the few anecdotes presented here, the case files provided only project managers' scaled estimates of the green market potential which has been analyzed quantitatively. There is not enough data to draw conclusions regarding their relationship to conservation or enterprise financial success.12
CompetitionOf the group A projects, three had open markets with little competition (#12, #17, #20). The fourth (#14) was successfully competing in a competitive market, producing superior jams and jellies. Projects #17 and #12 were both operating within mature markets with many other providers, but demand was also very high for timber and raw abaca, resulting in little competition. Project #20 was operating in a new market with virtually no competitors since many of the species they offered bioprospecting companies were unique to the location.
Within Group D, the four ecotourism enterprises (#6, #11, #15, and #16) experienced high competition in the international market that they did not actively pursue. With the exception of these four ecotourism projects, the rest of the Group D projects did not appear to have a tremendous amount of competition. The honey enterprise in Western Ghats (#5) and the honey and butterfly enterprises of Indonesia (#9) both experienced markets with sufficiently low competition to absorb their products. Lastly, the rattan handbag project (#8) experienced a market so open that they could not supply the demand.
This analysis suggests a very weak association between market competition and conservation. Markets of Group A projects tended to have less competition than Group D. It should be stressed that this is a very weak association.
As described above, projects #17, #20, #5, and #8 are financially successful in an environment with little competition. Projects #7, #10, and #19 also fit this category. Project #7, although it has not yet sold any lumber, is looking at a very open market for green timber. The ngali nut oil enterprise (#19) is currently the only producer in the world and although demand is not overwhelming, they hold a monopoly. Project #10 is entering an established butterfly market, although there are few competitors for the species they sell.
Several projects in addition to #14, were financially successful in the presence of strong competition. Project #3 has entered a domestic silk and honey market in which silk and honey are well established. The same can be said for the Humla essential oils enterprise (#1). Project #2 is successfully meeting a competitive ecotourism market.
Of the financially successful projects, more were successful in markets with little competition (seven) than strong competition (four). Although this relationship confirms what might be suspected, it is more of an indication than a trend and is far from conclusive. If a weakly competitive market improves an enterprise's chances of success, it is a minor factor mediated by others.
Market Scope (National or International)The prospect of selling a product in the international market offers the potential for a higher price and larger customer base. However, it also requires much more organization and management to access. Therefore, it is reasonable to wonder what impact the location of the target market will have on enterprise financial success and conservation impact.
Of the ten projects attempting to access an international market, five were financially successful (#2, #7, #8, #10, #19), three were unsuccessful (#6, #15, #16), and two were split by enterprise (#11, #9). Of the five projects attempting to access domestic markets, three were successful (#3, #5, #14), and two were not (#12, #13). Three additional projects had both domestic and international projects (#1, #17, and #18). This does not imply any relationship between market scope and financial success.
Of the Group D projects, 2 (#5, #6) were aimed at the national market, with the remaining five setting their sites internationally. Only one Group A project attempted to access an international market. This one, the Fijian bioprospecting project (#20), had a difficult time obtaining the contracts necessary to sustain the enterprise. When it did, it became very successful. Similarly, the ngali nut enterprise (#19) had a hard time establishing international contracts, but has been successful in the long run.
This analysis does not suggest any clear relationship between market scope and enterprise financial success. However, there does appear to be a weak link to conservation, with domestic markets appearing preferable. Project #20 demonstrates that this is not necessary and several others (#8, #16, and #15) have demonstrated that a national market is not a sufficient condition for optimal conservation outcome.
Market Access and Financial SuccessMarket competition and scope as discussed do not appear to have a direct relationship with financial success. Although we might expect that projects targeting domestic markets with little competition might be more successful, this was not confirmed by the cases. The ecotourism project in Nepal (#2) relies on a competitive international market and is a successful, though small enterprise. The ecotourism project in the Solomon Islands (#19) is also accessing a competitive international market an is well positioned to become successful in the near future. The Bendum NTFP project (#12) was not financially successful despite open domestic markets for abaca and rattan. These three examples point to a market factor more important to enterprise financial success than any others identified by the BCN framework: access to the market.
A number of BCN's projects had access problems that tended to result in the failure of the enterprise. Of the nine projects with clearly unsuccessful enterprises, seven had significant problems accessing their markets. In contrast, none of the clearly successful enterprises had significant problems accessing their markets. This suggests that market access is closely linked to enterprise financial success.
The deep sea fishing enterprise in the Arnavon Islands (#18) had a number of difficulties getting the fish to market. In this case, there was an established international market, but it did not extend to the Solomons. This project could not access it, primarily due to the absence of regular shipping to transport the fish to market. In addition, the middleman buyer enjoyed a monopoly preventing the project from obtaining a fair price even when transportation was available.
The Padaido Islands' ecotourism enterprises (#11.1-3) also had trouble with accessing an existing market. Unexpectedly, the airplane carrying tourists that regularly stopped in Biak en route to Bali was rerouted shortly after the project's debut. Although this can hardly be seen as a fault of the program, it did result in the virtual disappearance of the market. Subsequently, this project had a much smaller market of adventure tourists willing to brave costly and long travel to get to the islands. Only one of these (#11.1) was able to overcome this by actively pursuing the domestic tourism market, but the other two have not been able to recover.
Project #16 was also an ecotourism sites and had trouble accessing the existing international market. This project was conducted in a remote location and without a clear marketing strategy to convince tourists to make the journey. As a result, few did and the potential market was not realized. Project #15 had similar problems attracting visitors to a remote ecotourism location. The same remoteness issues sank the rafting enterprise of Project #9.
Project #17 initially wanted to sell timber internationally, but could not organize well enough to follow established shipping protocols. Project #12 faced problems marketing handicrafts in a very saturated market.
Access was not clearly linked to conservation. All of the projects with the worst access problems discussed above (#11.2, #11.3, #16, #18) were also ranked in Group D, the least effective at conservation. However, several other Group D projects enjoyed high levels of access. For example, project #5 was very successful at accessing the domestic honey and fruit processing market. Project #8 was also very successful at accessing an international market for rattan handbags. In fact, this project may have enjoyed better access than any other project.
This result is hardly surprising given the observed weak relationship that conservation holds with financial success and the high association observed in the latter with access.
Summary of Market FactorsAs discussed above, domestic markets appear to be preferable to international ones to optimize conservation. This is certainly a trend in the case studies and is not an inconsequential observation. However, it may not be wise to avoid international markets entirely when planning enterprise based conservation programs. The weak association observed here may only reflect the inherent difficulties associated with accessing international markets. When program designers consider attempting to reach an international market, access issues should be considered. As project #20 has demonstrated, the ability to overcome these barriers is a potential windfall and has certainly contributed to conservation in this case. Market scope may only be important as one part of a larger market review to identify access issues which this analysis suggests is strongly needed.
The enterprise lessons to be drawn from this analysis define good business sense: that successful enterprises require good markets. Competition in a market requires a strong business plan. Green markets may best be understood as niches that provide opportunities along with many others. National markets are a safer bet since they are simpler and require fewer managerial skills to access, but the payoffs from international markets may be much higher. The most important lesson here is the necessity of a good business plan to identify and overcome access barriers and access an identified niche in the chosen market. Enterprise based conservation projects are not immune to enterprise based logic. If market access barriers are too large, the enterprise runs the risk of failing.
Regarding the conservation outcomes of interest, the projects that attained optimal conservation successes tended to market domestically, accessed their markets well, and enjoyed little competition.
3.5. Community of Stakeholders3.5.1. Stakeholder Composition13
BCN projects emerged in very different cultural contexts and incorporated different members of their respective communities. The make up of these communities influenced the evolving projects and their successes. The stakeholder group involved in enterprise activities was not always strictly representative of the general community population. Enterprise leadership followed traditional leadership patterns in some cases, while other enterprise leaders were non-traditional and even foreign.
In evaluating the issue of leadership, it is useful to know both who the leaders are and what their style of leadership is. The former is available in the case documents, but the latter is covered spottily at best. Many references are made to ‘strong' or ‘weak' leaders. However, the qualities of a ‘strong' leader do not appear to be consistently applied and in many cases, the qualities of leadership are not further elaborated. Strength may signify ruling with an iron fist for one writer, and empowering those below for another. As these are quite different styles, with very different impacts, an analysis of leadership style cannot be completed with the available data. What remains without the ‘how' of leadership is the ‘who.'
Ethnically homogenous communities were less challenging environments for enterprises than diverse ones, although this was not a barrier for some projects. Several of the Group D projects failed (#6 and #16) as organizations primarily due to strife between clans. Project #15 also had strong ethnic conflicts. However, while this may have minimized the successes of these 3 projects, it certainly was not a barrier for others such as #2. In this one, the community is well represented in the enterprise. The same may be said of projects #1, #10, and #12. However, these enterprises were based on a solitary activity of collecting NTFP's, as opposed to the others (#6, #15, #16), all of which were ecotourism enterprises and required a greater degree of cooperation among stakeholders. The latter may also have had preexisting conflicts of greater magnitude than #'s 1, 10, and 12.
This analysis suggests that successful projects may be more easily achievable among ethnically homogenous communities. However, communities containing several ethnic groups may be successful if there are not major preexisting conflicts and the enterprise does not aggravate the situation. This may mean that organizers should not expect high levels of cooperation among clans. Drawing on the discussion of benefit distributions, it may also be concluded that equitable distribution of enterprise cash receipts through a community development trust fund may be stabilizing in cases of preexisting clan conflict.
In general, the BCN projects for which the boundary between community and enterprise was less distinct fared better at conservation. For example, the community of project #20 is very homogenous ethnically, and nearly the entire community was involved in the enterprise at least through attendance at planning meetings, although men were better represented than women. Ethnic homogeneity while helpful, is not a necessary condition for success. Project #12 succeeded in expanding the ranks of existing community groups, making them more representative of the community. This may have helped the enterprise overcome existing rivalries between clans. Projects #2 and #14 also established very representative groups of participants.
Not all of the projects contained information regarding the participation of women. Of those that did, most noted that women's voices were absent at meetings and men dominated the enterprises. This in itself does not appear to have had any effect on either enterprise financial success or conservation. Project #8 is almost entirely run by women is a financial success, and a conservation failure. Project #2 also heavily involves women in the enterprise and is successful on both counts. However, projects #10 and #20 are both successful financially and with conservation without substantial involvement of women.
In most cases, the leaders were local men. For several projects, the established leadership patterns were followed for the enterprise. This had a positive effect for Project #20 where community unity and stability allowed a committed local leader the power to make the project happen. However, project #18 also made use of traditional leaders at its expense. One project staff member reports that involving the chiefs did not ensure that information trickled down, and their leadership skills were adapted to different activities (not enterprise development). Several other projects also used traditional leaders in the enterprises (#1, #10, #19). No clear pattern emerged regarding enterprise utilization of traditional leadership patterns.
In a few cases, leaders were foreign. Project #14 is heavily reliant on the skills of one leader. Although a local, he had been US trained and brought substantial skills to the program that would have otherwise been unavailable. His presence and position has made that enterprise a successful one, but it is now weakened by its dependency on him. Project #10 had a number of foreigners in leadership roles prior to the most recent local director. This project too has been successful, but the recruitment of a local leader to guide the enterprise is likely to be favorable, by further giving the community a sense of ownership.
The involvement of women and the use of traditional leadership did not appear to have any influence on conservation effectiveness. However, this analysis suggests that stakeholder representativeness of the enterprise participants and ethnic homogeneity may catalyze conservation. Enterprises may overcome preexisting clan conflict through the establishment of a community development trust fund and/or by choosing an enterprise that does not require a high degree of cooperation between clans.
3.5.2. Control of Natural Areas14
All of the BCN projects were established with communities living in or near sensitive natural areas. In some cases, the nearby natural area was an established park or reserve while in others, the area was not formally designated. The ownership of these sensitive natural areas was not in question for all but one of the BCN projects (#11). In this case, the communities of the Padaido Islands enjoy a de facto ownership and manage the land and marine resources along traditional lines. The government is somewhat tolerant of this arrangement, but does not formally recognize community ownership, occasionally developing plans for the region that have not yet been implemented. Recently, the government has discussed turning the entire area into a tourist attracting marine sanctuary. The community sees this as a threat. The government has also talked with industrial fishing companies regarding the possible development of the region as a fishery. Although the Padaido communities currently enjoy de facto ownership and management, they do not have formal government recognition. This is a potential threat to their autonomy and the biodiversity of their natural area.
For the rest of the projects, ownership was well defined. The natural areas were clearly owned by the community in eight projects. In three projects, community ownership was clear and the government held no title to their resources. Four clans owned the Lakekamu basin of project #16. Clans of project #17 own and manage their forests. The community of Makira (#19) also owns their land and assigns user rights to family lineages within the clan. For the remaining five projects, the government retains a paper title to the natural area but has also clearly documented its recognition of traditional patterns of ownership. In these cases (#12, #14, #15, #18, #20), government ownership on paper is essentially meaningless and ownership can be seen to reside at the community level. In all of these cases, community management accompanied community ownership, although management committees like those of project #19 often granted rights to individuals and families. The above eight projects can be seen as having strong control over their respective natural areas.
At the start of all 11 remaining projects, natural areas were under express government ownership and communities had a variety of user rights, both recognized and de facto, to resources contained within. One of these projects (#13) has succeeded in obtaining formal government recognition of traditional ownership patterns. None of the remaining projects emerged with recognition of ownership by government. However, a number of them engaged in activities to improve their usage rights with varying success.
Usage rights granted to communities range in the degree of control relinquished by government. Project #3 had an extremely weak usage rights agreement with government. It looks good on paper, granting the community management institutions broad control over the management of village forests. However, any revenues generated by the forests (sale of wood and grazing rights to outsiders, fees) are the property of the government which returns only a small percentage to the community. Community members have expressed a felt absence of control.
In contrast, project #1 had a strong usage agreement with government. The project has helped nearly all of the communities in the area establish community forest user groups. These have been given comprehensive extraction rights, differing from outright recognition of ownership by stopping short of allowing settlement within the forests. The remaining 8 projects (#'s 2, 4-10) fell somewhere between these two extremes. Further rankings would be an exercise in splitting hairs.
Several projects actively tried to improve community tenure to the resources with a range of impacts. As discussed above, project #13 was the only one to emerge with a substantially different arrangement although most improved their control. Project #14 has had government recognition of community's land ownership since 1974, but the agreement was temporary. They have been able to secure permanent recognition to a much larger area through project tenure promotion. The Bukidnon communities (#12) have always had control of their natural area, but the project secured official recognition for them, allowing them to limit outsider access legally. As mentioned above, project #1 improved access to forest resources substantially. Project #7 has spent substantial time obtaining use agreements from the government and at the time of evaluation appeared to be nearing success. Project #2 has secured access to resources in the park buffer zone as well as royalties from park receipts.
Control of land and resources is clearly a big issue for these communities. Tenure improvements have repeatedly been listed as a non-cash benefit. At least one community has pursued better tenure rights outside of project activities. Disagreements over the contracts that established the Arfak Mountain Nature Reserve (#10) have led community members to challenge park authority by ignoring its boundaries.
Using the above descriptions, control over resources may be roughly assessed. A rating of strong control may be given to communities with clear ownership of their natural areas. Those without ownership, but with usage rights have comparatively weaker control over resources. As discussed above, project #11 falls into a gray area by this categorization. The categories of ownership discussed above are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 – Ranking of BCN Projects by Type of Ownership
Natural Area Owner
Project number
Stronger
Community
16, 17, 19
Control
Government w/ recognized community control
12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 13**
Government w/ unrecognized de facto community control
11
Weaker
ControlGovernment w/ recognized community user rights
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13*
*at t=0; **at t=f; Underlined projects engaged in tenure promotion
A quick inspection of Table 3 reveals that ownership patterns differed primarily by region. Governments retained explicit ownership and granted specific user rights to communities in Projects #1-10. Project #11 had unclear ownership. Projects #12-20 had a variety of arrangements leading to strong local control or outright ownership of the natural area. It is clear that ownership patterns have mirrored the East to West system used to number the projects. Western projects maintain high local control and eastern projects possess less local control.
Initially, this may seem to be a confounding factor in the analysis. However, it may instead point to an analytical strength. By sampling projects in a range of cultural environments, the range of potential conditions is increased. Had BCN funded programs only in Nepal and India, there would be no data regarding community ownership of resources. Likewise, funding projects just in Fiji and the Solomon Islands would blind the analysis to the possibility of government ownership with community user rights. In fact, expanding the range of projects may have strengthened the analysis and it should be no surprise that there are regional differences to some of the factors in BCN's analytical framework.
Control over resources does not appear to be related to financial success. Financially successful projects were found among those with strong control (e.g. #14, #19, and #20) and weak control (e.g. #1, #2, #3, #5, #8, and #10). Likewise, financially unsuccessful projects were found among those with strong control (e.g. #12, #15, and #16) and weak control (e.g. #6). However, a weak relationship was observed between resource control and conservation. All of the Group A projects had clear ownership of their resources at the start of the project, representing half of the 8 that fit that description. However, two of the others (#15 and #16) belonged to Group D. All of the projects with moderately good conservation (Group B: #1, #2, #10) lacked ownership of their resources. This suggests that strong control over the resource is neither necessary nor sufficient for optimal conservation outcome, but may be a not insignificant weak catalyst.
3.5.3. Community enforcement of conservation policy15
Effective conservation may require some way to enforce established conservation policy. The examination of this category can be broken into 3 smaller conditions: Presence of threats, conservation policy, enforcement of policy.
ThreatsTo expect community enforcement of conservation policy, the area's biodiversity must be threatened either by members of the community, external pressures, or both. All of the BCN projects experienced threats to their natural area as measured biologically. This was an unstated selection criteria for inclusion in the study. However, there were notable differences in type of threats.
External threats included land development pressures produced by recent immigrants, resource depletion and poaching by neighboring communities, and large scale destruction by industrial resource extraction (mining, logging, oil drilling). These three categories captured all but one identified external threat in the cases. Project #14 faced the government construction of a highway through their natural area. The most common external threats were industrial resource extraction (eight cases had this threat).
Internal threats included land conversion for agricultural purposes, and resource depletion or poaching by community members. These two categories captured all but one identified internal threat in the cases. Project #16 faced small scale gold prospecting carried out by community members. The most common internal threat was resource depletion or poaching by community members. Only five projects did not identify this as a threat.
There were few clear trends regarding threats and conservation outcome. However, it should be recognized that of the four projects neglecting to report the presence of any internal threats, three were in Group A (#12, #17, #20), and the fourth was project #7 which has had a very slow start. However, moderate conservation success was also seen for project #1 which boasted no external threats and is meeting its internal ones well. Therefore, if internal threats represent a barrier to conservation, it is a surmountable one.
Conservation policyA community must have a conservation policy to counter threats. This policy may not be expressly written, but it should be clearly understood by the community. Further, conservation policy should reflect biologically identified threats if it is expected to meet them. Most of the BCN projects fulfilled this condition, although several had inferior conservation policy.
The community of project #5 did not appear to have a well defined conservation policy. Family lineages have control over user areas which they manage and patrol. However, the file suggests that there is not a uniform policy that families are responsible for implementing. Rather, families are primarily concerned with the single activity of guarding beehives once they are found. If they do not guard them, the hive will be harvested by somebody else. Projects #8 and #16 appeared to suffer similar problems with weak traditional rules and no formal conservation policy (although the files for these projects were not specific).
Project #11 had a different policy problem. Many large and government licensed fishing boats are depleting fish stocks off the coast of the Padaidos. This problem is a lack of government support for community desired policy.
Communities of the other sixteen projects appeared to have clear conservation policy with a closer link to the biologically identified threats (although the file for #17 is brief on this issue). It should be noted that all four of the projects for which a policy problem was identified were also in Group D, suggesting that effective policy may be a necessary condition for conservation success.
EnforcementWhen conservation policy is not respected, enforcement of that policy becomes necessary. Communities dealt with enforcement at several levels ranging from the use of armed patrols to a modified ‘neighborhood-watch.' There was not a depth of data for many cases regarding this issue.
Although projects usually reported their enforcement successes, they sometimes omitted the method used to achieve success. For example, project #12 succeeded in stopping two companies from extracting rattan and mahogany, but it is not clear how this was done. Project #14 has had success dealing with the internal threat of NTFP extraction and there are "numerous examples of reduction of illegal activities." However, it is not clear how this reduction occurred. In addition to these two examples, data regarding the method of enforcement is missing for projects #4, #8, #16, #17, and #19. Despite these data problems, several things may be observed regarding enforcement.
Organized patrols require substantial support to operate well. Project #18 in the Arnavon islands used conservation officers to patrol the reefs. The number of officers needed to effectively guard the reserve is higher than available funds. Salary money has been spotty for the few already employed. This has curtailed the effectiveness of patrols since poachers are reported to have adapted to officer routines, poaching in different locations after officers leave them.
Organized patrols are not always necessary. Project #20 in Fiji relies on a neighborhood-watch type system with good success. When residents see fishers from neighboring communities on their reefs, they jump into boats and confront the violators, confiscating their catch and often yelling loudly. This has worked even to catch violators at night. Clearly, this system is best adapted to a shoreline community.
In a variation of the above theme, project #1 uses a social control method to police each other. In this case, external threats are essentially non-existent. Harvesting is performed in groups at designated places and times, and the groups keep an eye on each other. This appears to be successful.
Efficient enforcement requires a functional system of applying consequences. In the Fiji example (#20), consequences included being yelled at, thrown overboard, and losing the catch. Project #11 also relies on a neighborhood watch system to enforce conservation of their reef system. However, they turn violators over to a court system where at least one fisher walked away due to corruption. Project #13 had a similar experience when a violator bribed his way out of prosecution.
Project #18 also has had trouble with bankrupt and paralyzed courts that are unable to deal with the violators that conservation officers catch. These prosecution problems have weakened enforcement activities. Early in the program's history, violators showed shame and remorse. More recently, conservation officers have been confronted by poachers grown confident, possibly due to the lax enforcement of the court system.
Perhaps just as important is the psychological effect of this type of failure. The project manager for #13 suggests that one community was understandably frustrated by the bribery that rendered their enforcement useless. In contrast, the members of project #11 were empowered through community involvement in policing. After realizing that 68 concrete blocks had been placed on the reef by scientists, the community worked together to remove them, thus asserting their control over the natural area.
SummaryThree of the four projects in Group A were also three of the four projects to report no internal threats to biodiversity. This suggests that projects may have a better chance of success if there are few or no internal threats, although this is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for conservation success. The possession of a clear conservation policy based on the biologically identified threats does appear to be a necessary condition for conservation success.16 Organized patrols while not necessary in all cases should be well supported when implemented. The alternative neighborhood-watch approach is effective in some circumstances. Regardless of the method used, an efficient system to distribute penalties is needed both as a deterrent and to promote confidence in community ability to enforce policy.
The primary lesson learned from this analysis is that the provision of substantial non-cash benefits is essential for optimal conservation outcome among enterprise based conservation projects. Essentially, this is a lesson that enterprises must be supported by complementary development work. In fact, this analysis calls into question what the primary role of these projects should be. Due to the sample selection criteria, nearly all of BCN's projects centered on a core enterprise activity. However, one very successful project recognized that this one activity would not be sufficient to attain conservation goals and adapted its strategy toward development. In fact, a case could be made that project #12 is now a conservation and development organization with an enterprise component. To a lesser extent, several of the more successful projects also took this approach (#2, #20).
The analysis of non-cash benefits also produced another interesting observation. All three of the projects collecting revenues in a community development trust fund were financially successful and saw at least moderate conservation success (#1, #2, and #20). This method transformed cash benefits into non-cash benefits and may avoid potential conflict over the individual distribution of cash benefits. This analysis suggests that a community development trust fund be a catalyst for enterprise based conservation projects.
Several necessary conditions and catalysts were identified that together may promote effective conservation among enterprise and conservation projects:
Necessary Conditions
- Substantial non-cash benefits
- Existing clear conservation policy based on the biologically identified threats
Catalysts
- Community enterprise ownership and management
- Community control of resources
- Stakeholder representativeness of enterprise participants
- Few internal threats
- Community ethnic homogeneity
- Low market competition
- Domestic market
- Enterprise financial success
Factors with no apparent direct link to conservation are enterprise profitability, distribution of cash benefits, and market access. This analysis could not draw strong conclusions regarding enterprise perceived linkage.
What can be made of regional conservation successes? The top four were in the west, and many projects with the worst conservation records were in the East. However, all three of the second tier projects (Group B: #1, #2, #10) were also located in the East. This suggests that there may be identifiable characteristics of successful programs that are more prevalent in Western cultures than in Eastern ones, but also suggests that success in the east is not impossible. That Group A was west implies that we should examine those settings to determine what combination of factors best catalyze conservation and try to reproduce similar conditions elsewhere. It also suggests that success may need to be measured differently in different contexts. For example, in India where communities may never receive outright ownership of natural reserves, success may need to be measured on a different scale. It may also suggest that different approaches are required for different regions. Further analysis may conclude, for example, that an enterprise-based approach is well suited to one range of cultures while a stronger community development approach is called for in others. These issues require further study.
1. Forthcoming analysis not presented in this draft (7/23).
2. This section wrestles with the issues raised by LE3 and LE6/Y5.
3. This is GB1
4. This is GB2.
5. This is GB4.
6. This is GB5.
7. Forthcoming analysis not presented in this draft (7/23).
8. This is LE1.
9. This is LE2.
10. This is LE3.
11. This is LE5.
12. This section has occasionally diverged a little from the exercise of qualitative analysis. Sticking to just the research, it may be summed up by 'the data was inconclusive.' However, I include it and this note because I feel strongly that devoting further BCN attention to an analysis of green markets here may be a waste of time especially now when time is scarce for the organization. My opinion may be summed up as follows: Green markets are important at a macro level since their analysis suggests that market economies may be incorporating a sustainability feedback mechanism which are effecting conservation through capitalist channels. However, the beauty of this potential phenomenon is that the market signals it utilizes are a no-brainer for enterprises. From the enterprise perspective, a green market merely represents an angle on the market and is no different than any number of other angles. If you exploit all the angles, you have established a niche. Seen in this way, an analysis of green markets from the enterprise perspective (as we are doing) should hold no more import than an analysis of product quality, distribution of points-of-sale, or child safety concerns. It is a subset of market analysis, which is all about getting the upper hand on the competition. At the micro level, it seems very unimportant. As one of many many many factors that influence product sales, it is far removed from the different conservation logic that BCN is testing which does operate at a micro level: regardless of why the product sells, its sale alone will provide community incentive to conserve if the enterprise is linked. But don't take my word from it - I just have a B.S. Call up an ecological economist and get their take on this one. - GW
13. This encompasses CS2 and CS3.
14. This is roughly CS4.
15. This is CS5; Forthcoming.
16. There is slight redundancy here: the TRA measures threats and it is concluded here that policy based on threats is needed. However, this conclusion tells us that not all conservation policies are equal and conservation is unlikely to occur without this type of policy.
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