Chapter IV. Impact and Lessons to Be Learned from Regional Cooperation in Transboundary Resource Management in the “W” Park

A. Impact of regional cooperation on management of the “W” Park

Regional cooperation as practiced during the colonial era is too long ago for it to be possible to measure its impact. It will suffice to remember that horizontal cooperation was not kept up when FWA disappeared, which can lead one to believe that the system did not run smoothly enough for it to be long lasting.

As for efforts made to combat poaching, these were not regular enough to be effective. In fact, the park’s present condition is chiefly attributable to efforts having been made nationally for development and surveillance. Thus the “W” Park, insofar as it is an ecological whole divided among Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has hardly reaped any benefit from regional cooperation. In fact, the most significant effect of regional cooperation is the regional project for conservation of the park complex, which has just been started up.

B. Lessons to be learned from national approaches to park management (successes, failures, limitations)

The national systems of management set up in the “W” Park are similar in some ways and diverge in others. We will try to emphasize these points, while highlighting why they were successful, why they failed, or their limitations. It should meanwhile be remembered that during the colonial era, the “W” Park was considered to be a French overseas colony governed by a certain number of legal texts and regulations laid down by FWA—and park management was organized, as were all the colonial territories, by the Minister for Overseas Colonies, and on the authority of the Governor-General of FWA, then the Governor of Niger. Furthermore, the policies applied, as far as the management of forestry resources and protected areas were concerned, were French colonial policies.

The “W” Park was managed as a federal entity. All decisions taken at this time were valid over the entire complex, both in intensity and in severity. There was a single decision-making body, and the centers of enforcement all had the same approach for enforcing these decisions. The governor of the colony was the chief person responsible for enforcing texts. At a local level, it was the district commanders whose role was to implement federal and territorial decisions. For Niger, the District (nowadays referred to as arrondissement) Commander for Say, whose second-in-command was the head of the forestry district in the same locality, was responsible for managing the Niger sector of the park. He set up and ensured that all the operations for protecting and developing the park were carried out. Annual development work (such as creating forest tracks), which was carried out in collaboration with area commanders from neighboring territories, was planned and carried out at first using forced labor, then progressively using salaried workers.

Divergences in approaches appeared following the country’s independence, owing to differences in policies, legislation, regulations and diverging approaches.

1. The case of Benin

The park management system for the “W” National Park in Niger, on the Benin side, was chiefly based on the following:

• A basic system for developing tracks and creating water supply points;
• The creation of fire-blocks around the central point of the “W” Park;
• A system of protection and surveillance based on repressive and dissuasive measures enforced by 30 forestry officials and trackers, divided up into eight brigades under the supervision of a park warden; and
• Legal texts and regulations recognizing the exclusive nature of human activities other than leisure or scientific activities in protected areas, and the exclusion of local populations from park management and development.

The Benin sector of the “W” Park in Niger had never been managed as such since its creation in 1954. It had been left abandoned over a long period. This situation has led to (UICN 1998):

• The park being overrun with sedentary or itinerant cattle;
• Significant increase in agricultural practices;
• Intensive poaching, in particular of the last existing populations of wild ungulate animals;
• Widespread degradation of natural resources (water holes, soil, and vegetation), and of the ecosystem through frequent bush fires, extensive overgrazing, and mutilation of trees by itinerant shepherds from across boundaries;
• Threat of extinction of certain species of wild animal owing to poaching by local hunters or non-natives, with the aid of local natives. Also threatened are the woody species such as Pterocarpus erinaceus and Afzelia africana, which are frequently mutilated, and much sought after by hunters;
• Little attraction for tourists; and
• Little or no scientific information in ecological, hydrological, floristic, and zoological domains.

In order to counter this catastrophic situation in the “W” Park and other protected areas, Benin has launched into a process of reforms:

• Institutionally—with the creation of the CENAGREF (Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faune – National Center for the Management of Wild Fauna Reserves) by decree No 96-7 of April 2, 1996 and its decree of enforcement No. 024/MDR/DC/CC/CP of January 31, 1997, which has taken control of the management of protected areas, including the “W” Park; and
• Strategically—by drawing up a strategic plan of action nationally for the conservation of biodiversity, and a conservation project for national park management in which special emphasis is placed on a participative approach to natural resource management.

Lessons learned from the management system in Benin are outlined below:

• A participative approach to management in protected areas must involve using precise methods that do not permit a vague interpretation, and greater effort must be made to change the attitudes of those involved;
• For participative management to be effective and long term, it must be beneficial to those involved at the ground level;
• It is impossible to maintain the integrity of the ecosystem if there is no long-term financing mechanism that can minimize the untoward effects created when external financing used up over projects dry up; and
• The lack of an appropriate institutional framework for park management means it is not possible to make the most of what has been achieved by different actions taken (projects in particular).

2. The case of Burkina Faso

The sector of the “W” Park located in Burkina Faso, despite its being ecologically and strategically of significance, and also in spite of its size and potential, has seen no noteworthy action taken since its creation. Management has concentrated on the following:

• Premature bush fires lit over the entire surface area of the park in the month of September (for high ground), and from January to February (for low ground);
• The setting up and maintenance of a network of forest tracks along the following axes: Kondio-Koudou Falls, Kondio-Kabougou-Tapoa-Djerma, Kabougou-Koudou Falls, representing approximately 235 km.;
• The creation of several salt marshes, through the introduction of licking stones;
• Police protection via patrols in the park who hunt down delinquent poachers who are illegally grazing cattle, or fishing; and
• The most important means of developing the park is through tourism, in particular in the south sector (forestry post in Kondio), thanks to Koudou Falls. This is further encouraged by opening the hunting season in the area of Kourtiagou.

With the exception of the daily visits made by forestry patrols, which try to ensure a minimum protection for the “W” Park (preventing fires, patrolling the forests, upkeep of tracks and salt marshes, etc.), this large complex has been more or less abandoned, unlike its counterparts in Benin and Niger. Thus, as far as improving the water supply system is concerned, not a single water supply point has been created, and the participation of the local population is more or less nonexistent.

The following lessons have been learned from the management system in Burkina Faso:

• The forestry patrols, through the use of repressive measures alone, cannot guarantee the protection of the “W” complex without involving local communities, whose individual interest must be encouraged so that they do not feel excluded from their home ground;
• Given the limited means made available by the State, the creation of a partnership “State – Development partners – Private sector – local population” is more than ever essential in order to ensure that sufficient resources are provided to save biodiversity within the park;
• The existence of administrative frontiers among different administrative bodies in the same country or among countries limits the capacity of development for the “ecosystem” approach; and
• The lack of harmonization of policies and legislation between the three countries concerned sometimes has a negative influence on national approaches.

The reform in the management of wild fauna ratified in 1995 should make it easier to determine which roles and functions are to be held by those involved (local populations, forestry commission, concessionary companies, hunting guides, etc.) and further encourage an approach by ecological zone. This reform recommends the creation of units for the conservation of wild fauna, such as the Conservation Unit of “W,” which includes (i) the “W” National Park, (ii) the partial wildlife reserve of Kourtiagou, and (iii) the game reserve of Tapoa-Djerma.

3. The case of Niger

The park’s national management system is based on laws and regulations that originate in the colonial era. Its characteristics are as follows:

• From a legal point of view, the park is still governed by texts dating back to the colonial era, even if its contiguous peripheral zones were created more recently. However, the park has benefited from or been obliged to respect clauses laid down by environmental laws and regulations, in particular those having led to the prohibition of hunting for several years, or the one encouraging a participative approach as a means of managing natural resources.
• The system of management and for development is still based on surveillance, protection, creation of lakes and water supply systems, ecological follow-up, and the creation and upkeep of forest tracks. Development techniques have evolved very little.
• Commendable efforts have been made to involve and help local populations to respect their environment and to develop it for their benefit.

The national management system has made it possible to:

• Conserve the landscape more or less as it has been since 1956 (Benoît 1998c, 1998d), at least within the park;
• Have a positive impact on the increasing number of wild fauna, in particular for certain species such as the African wild dog , leopard, elephant, or hippopotamus;
• Create jobs for local people who are involved in park management as tourist guides, or as labor force in development operations; and
• Create financial resources for local populations and for the private sector through touristic activities.

The most important lessons to be learned from the national management system of the “W” Park are as follows:

• Significant results can be achieved even if the financial resources invested are modest, by using a system in which the development of the ecosystem, permanent surveillance and monitoring, a committed team of staff, and well-adapted infrastructures in the landscape units within the national park are associated;
• The threat of famine in the country is a major problem for the park in that it results in massive movements of populations into peripheral zones, which in turn causes the increase in illegal theft, which creates notable strain on the relations between park officials and local populations;
• Programs of awareness that are accompanied by programs for development in peripheral zones make it possible to minimize the effect of conflict on natural resources;
• The long-term effects of the participative approach in park management are associated with the capacity (financial, material, and human) to intervene effectively and on a long-term basis with local populations;
• Monitoring and surveillance systems on partial game reserves, despite the fact that within the park these have proved effective, appear to be less effective because the park manager does not have direct control over the forestry posts in partial game reserves, and these forestry posts have other missions to accomplish than that of controlling the protected areas;
• The lack of structure of coordination for those participating is a handicap for park management and adjacent game reserves. It is not the permanent worry of all those involved to conserve biological diversity; and
• The lack of an overall development plan that would make it possible to ensure a sustainable ecological balance, as well as the lack of policy for the development of grazing areas in the northern zone (from where the itinerant farmers come), allows for reducing the pressure of cattle grazing in the zone—points that are considered as elements that have limited the efficiency of the management system.

4. Partial conclusion

There is a certain similarity among the systems of management adopted by the different countries in question. They are all based on monitoring, surveillance, development, the combat against bush fires and illegal theft, the development of tourist attractions or hunting, and the gathering of data concerning the state of the ecosystem and biological resources. However, because different polices and different regulations have been adopted, and the commitment made by administrations responsible for park management is of a varying length in time, the park’s situation is very different from one country to another. It is true to say that the landscape and the wild fauna appear to be well conserved in Niger, and to a certain extent in Burkina Faso, whereas in Benin, the degradation in natural resources represents a real threat to ecological and scientific functions, even cultural ones, which the park should take seriously, both on a national and an international level.

It should suffice to say that there are many factors that limit the effectiveness of the system of management, regardless of the country. These factors are as follows:

• The limited capacities available to park administrations, be those in human, material, or financial resources, or the lack of staff available for monitoring and surveillance posts. This situation means that is very difficult to catch the delinquents, to fight bush fires, to undertake development schemes, and to gather the ecological information necessary to ensure effective management;
• The lack of autonomy in managing and organizing the parks, which often runs counter to development, investments, and even to the way in which the populations become involved;
• The isolated position of park administration in comparison with others involved in the rural development of peripheral zones;
• The lack of a development plan in each park, which would make it easier to ensure that the animal population is more equally distributed;
• The lack of recognition of protected areas in a plan for territorial development in which the peripheral zones of the park would be included, as well as the pastoral zones from where the itinerant shepherds come, in the case of Niger;
• The lack of ecological follow-up and information that would make it possible to have reliable data available concerning the dynamic of ecosystems, the evolution of biological diversity both in quality and in quantity, and the impact of efforts made in management; and
• The irregularity of financing, which may stall or make certain investments short-lived, and which may also cancel the considerable efforts made in monitoring and surveillance.

However, there are other, more positive elements when considering the future of the national management of protected areas. Among these, the following can be cited:

• The countries’ having adhered to various international conventions for nature conservation; and
• The recognition of the importance of involving local populations and at the same time enabling them to benefit from the protected areas.

C. Lessons to be learned from transboundary approaches (success, failures, limitations)

1. Comparison between national management systems and transboundary management systems

It is difficult to compare the national management system with the transboundary management system, since the first is still in its early stages. One should recall that basically, the system of management operating during the 1950s under colonial administration differed only slightly from the system used in the 1960s by the new administrations in the newly independent countries. They continued to prohibit, to organize forestry and game reserve police patrols, to combat illegal theft, and to develop the ecosystem while at the same time emphasizing tourist attractions.

In comparison with the 1960s, two major improvements were made, one during the 1980s and the other during the 1990s. The first was the result of the states’ realizing that they had to combine their efforts to preserve wild fauna. The second was that the states concerned recognized the vital necessity of encouraging local populations to participate in the management of natural resources, including those within the park as well as those in the peripheral zones.

However, simply becoming aware of this is not enough, if certain measures are not carried out effectively on the spot. If there is sufficient political determination to combine efforts for managing natural resources, this should not stop with the signature of an agreement and with meetings. It must be accompanied by the setting up of appropriate mechanisms and means at a political level, and also through the adapting of legal and even institutional texts.

So, given that the mechanisms and means for implementing the antipoaching agreement had not been organized, cooperating in transboundary management did not reach an acceptable level. Worse, each country then kept to itself as far as the monitoring and surveillance, development, and enhancement of its own part of the park was concerned.

Generally speaking, those persons responsible for running the parks, be it at the national or regional level, were only interested in wild fauna and their habitat for reasons of visual tourism, i.e., as a means of making money. The agreement signed in 1984 only concerned the protection of wild fauna, and in the national reports, the main preoccupations were the policing of game reserves, the inventory of wild fauna, the development of the forest for wild fauna, and touristic activities.

In light of these limitations, the current trends as defined in the regional program financed by the European Union, and the program being prepared by IUCN appear to be judicious, since a regional approach brings added value to the national management system as concerns conservation of protected areas and long-term utilization of natural resources. This means:

• Carrying out, in common or in close cooperation, certain activities that go beyond State intervention alone, in particular the control of information concerning delinquency and the combat against illegal theft, the overall development of the complex, and the ecological follow-up of natural resources;
• Harmonizing policies, legislation, and environmental regulations; and
• Educating, that is, making the population aware of the importance of preserving the ecosystem, while not forgetting their common cultural background and the massive migratory movements owing partly to transhumance.

2. Factors that have encouraged regional cooperation

Depending on which period is being considered, the factors that have contributed to the improvement of transboundary management in the “W” National Park complex are of different natures.

During the colonial era, transboundary management was possible because the park was a French domain run by the WFA federal administration, supported by territorial administrators and local forestry services. All the decisions made at the federal level were valid and applicable over the entire complex. However, initiatives could be taken in common by the administrators in neighboring territorial districts who were responsible for the management of their particular part of the park Thus, during the colonial era, transboundary cooperation found justification vertically in an integrated administrative system and horizontally through concertation with district managers.

During the 40 years of independence, transboundary management was mainly a necessity for preserving the ecosystem and biological resources, more and more threatened by anthropogenic factors. The main efforts were spent nationally in guarding the national parks and trying to prevent poachers from stealing elephant tusks, hunting trophies, and wild animal meat, which was particularly sought after.

Since the agreement signed in 1984 between Benin and Burkina Faso, and which Niger signed much later in 1987, even more good reasons have been found for reinforcing the combat against poaching and arguing in favor of transboundary management. One of these was illegal grazing, which had not been taken into account in the said agreement.

Furthermore, given the lack of specific clauses relating to the means of enforcing the agreement, it was the human, material, and financial resources mobilized at a national level that made it possible to fight against illegal extraction. As long as these resources were available, the agreement could be enforced indirectly, but on the other hand, when no finances are available, monitoring and surveillance becomes problematic. Thus, in the case of Benin, it was thanks to the existence of the Support Project for National Parks (SPNP) that made it possible to slow down the degradation of the ecosystem. Hence, as a general rule, regional collaboration depends on the extent to which the administrations concerned assume their responsibilities.

Furthermore, it should be remembered that it is due to the international status held by institutions such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN) that such bodies have felt increasingly concerned by the importance of preserving the integrity of the park complex—and the recent setting up of a regional bureau of this institution in Ouagadougou is without doubt a supplementary factor that will encourage the transboundary management of the largest complex of protected areas in West Africa.

However, tribute must also be paid to the park administrations and to the European Union, which have untiringly maintained their determination to fulfill their ambition, born 15 years ago, to carry out a program that would succeed in the progressive harmonization of policies and environmental regulations, and in the monitoring, surveillance, and enhancement of contiguous protected areas in the countries in question. Their force of opinion and determination to succeed in fulfilling their ideal was certainly an essential factor leading to the setting up of regional cooperation for transboundary management in the “W” Park.

3. Factors that have delayed cooperation

According to the commissioners successively in office, the antipoaching agreement signed was scarcely put into application. Numerous clauses of the said agreement were never implemented. Thus, the wildlife reserves and contiguous game reserves were never part of a harmonized policy of protection set up among the states signatories. Even worse, despite the uniqueness of the ecosystem, the three countries involved—Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger—often adopted strategies, approaches, and programs that were not only different but sometimes in total contradiction, and this sometimes seriously perturbed local populations living in the transboundary areas. This was particularly true for policies and legislation concerning hunting and fishing in and around the park.

Furthermore, the joint and sporadic combing of the areas concerned was rarely carried out, and the Inter-State Committee for the combat against poaching was never actually set up.

The reasons for this failure to apply the legal texts were numerous; we can cite some of them:

• National policies for rural development and the protection of the natural environment have always remained mute as far as sharing the management of natural resources is concerned. The same goes for regional politics within institutions in which the countries concerned are implicated (Council of Alliance, Inter-State Committee for the Combat against Drought in the Sahara, ECOWAS), and which have only recently addressed the question of transboundary management after the conference in Rio, in the application of certain conventions.
• Legal texts and regulations concerning the forests do not mention transboundary management of natural resources. For this reason certain measures do not always take into account the interest of neighboring countries.
• Legally speaking, the agreement signed in 1984 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the countries concerned did not specify the means for its implementation. Thus the agreement does not mention how the Inter-State Committee should be formed.
• Measures taken for surveillance and monitoring of the ecosystem often come up against national reasoning. Thus, article 8 of the agreement puts a block on its application, specifying that “delinquents arrested on the territory will be handed over to the competent authorities for the country concerned if they come from this country. These said authorities will take the necessary repressive action for the crimes committed in accordance with national texts.” In practice, offenders arrested outside their own country are not legally pursued by their compatriots—at least, this is what the commissioners have led us to believe.
• The current layout of the entire park does not make safeguarding it easy, and the problem is even greater since in each of the countries concerned, the forestry commissions responsible have very little means—be these human, material, or financial—to be able to carry out their work satisfactorily.
• The agreement only concerned the combat against poaching, and did not cover other aspects of managing protected areas—such as the development of open spaces and water supply points, the control of transhumance and the combat against illegal grazing, the combat against illegal fishing, the control of agricultural expansion, fighting illegal clearing, ecological follow-up, the development of tourism, and the involvement of local populations.

Even though the regional conservation project for protected areas financed by the European Union has been finalized, it is still true to say that it required a full 15 years for this to happen. This was not only due to the financing bodies hesitating, but also because the political decision makers could not make up their minds, and these last-mentioned, according to certain commissioners, were more interested in the financial income for their country generated by the project than by the transboundary management aspect for the park.

There are several other negative factors, such as:

• The limited means available to the State and to the administrations of the protected areas that prevent them from assuming their share of responsibilities. Often, management of the protected areas in the three countries relies on outside funding. All good management plans function correctly as long as the necessary funds are available. When these dry up, and the project comes to its end, lethargy sets in, and this obviously encourages petty delinquency within the park.
• Institutional instability, that is, frequent changes made in the staff responsible for managing the parks and in political decision-makers. During the past 10 years, this has become very common in most of the countries, meaning frequent changes in persons responsible at a regional level, lack of continuity in initiatives taken at the management level, and loss of memory (even more so since park administration’s system for storing information is in great need of improvement).

The need for collaboration, for dialogue, and for cooperation is also seriously hindered by decisions made in the context of common, institutional, and organizational weaknesses; the lack of communication systems and resources available to park management; lack of recognition of transboundary management in national environmental policies; and lack of a development plan taking into account the problems of neighboring countries.