| In this Chapter: | |
| A. Administrative and political international boundaries | |
| B. A historical overview of cooperation in the region |
A. Administrative and political international boundaries
The countries of Eastern Africa (defined here as comprising Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia, and Tanzania) have a number of features in common. First, most countries were colonies. While Burundi and Rwanda were colonized by the Germans and then by the Belgians, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were British colonial territories (Tanganyika was taken from Germany at the end of the First World War). Ethiopia was colonized by Italy but only for a short while. Eritrea was part of Ethiopia up to 1993. Djibouti was French, Somalia was Italian (though a part of it was colonized by Britain). Map 1 shows the countries and capital cities, and Table 3 summarizes their key statistics.
These countries’ boundaries were established by their colonial regimes, and are largely political constructs. Although they might appear fixed, international boundaries have been fluid and have gone through some adjustments over the past 150 years. Border conflicts are unfortunately still common in parts of Africa—witness the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict of 1998–2000. These adjustments have seriously impacted the inter-connectedness of cultural and natural systems. Borders resulting from the colonial legacy have split ecosystems as well as indigenous groups. Borders were decided arbitrarily by colonialists using simple geographic features rather than ecosystems’ structures and human and wildlife movements. Rivers, mountains, and straight lines such as longitude and latitude were used to demarcate national boundaries (Griffin et al. 1999). Box 4 describes this border demarcation processes. The Minziro-Sango Bay case study in this volume further details the origin of the Uganda–Tanzania border.
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Box 4. The Origin of East African Borders and Early TBNRM Agreements The three East African states are fortunate in possessing territorial limits that are remarkably stable and non-controversial. In virtually every instance the legal origins of the lines can be traced to an international agreement (McEwen 1971). There have been conflicts—e.g., the Kenya-Somalia border, with Somalia demanding all territory where Somali people are resident, and the Malawi-Tanzania border, which is on the edge and not the mid-line of Lake Nyasa and Lake Malawi. There are anomalies, such as the Karasuk area on the Uganda-Kenya border, whose difficulty of access led to its being administered by Uganda for 40 years up to July 1970—even though everyone agreed it was part of Kenya. An example of where boundary demarcation leads to a consideration of natural resources is that of Lakes, where it is not enough to say, “This line here is the agreed boundary”—there then needs to be transboundary resource management, i.e., agreement on fishing rights, travel rights, pollution problems, and so on. The Rovuma River border between Tanzania and Mozambique has a later agreement (Britain-Portugal agreement of 1938) that addresses local people’s rights. According to this agreement:
Land boundaries are clearer; however, issues of controlling fires, unlawful resource harvesting, and water abstraction are all potentially important, as is the movement of traditional pastoralists. McEwen (1971) states that boundary agreements affecting land occupied by nomadic people often have made provision for transfrontier grazing and watering. For example:
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B. A historical overview of cooperation in the region
Eastern Africa is not a homogenous region in physical, ecological, cultural, or historical terms. There are great differences, some of which are described below. But while there are prominent differences there are also many similarities. We bring out three major similarities here:
All of the countries in this region are dependent on their natural resources for national and for household survival. The region has little mineral or manufacturing wealth, and the countries depend on agriculture with wildlife and coastal tourism playing a significant role (in those countries that are stable).
The second common thread, and linked to the first, is that this is a region of great poverty. Some of the poorest countries of the world are here: Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Tanzania (see Table 3).
| Table 3. Summary of National Statistics | ||||||||
|
State |
Area |
Pop. |
Pop. |
GNP |
Life |
Forests |
Deforestation |
% PA* |
| Burundi |
28 |
7 |
255 |
140 |
42 |
3 |
0.4 |
3.2 |
|
Djibouti |
23 |
0.6 |
27 |
-- |
50 |
-- |
-- |
0.4 |
|
Eritrea |
118 |
4 |
38 |
200 |
51 |
3 |
0.0 |
0.0* |
|
Ethiopia |
1,104 |
61 |
61 |
100 |
43 |
136 |
0.5 |
2.1* |
|
Kenya |
580 |
29 |
51 |
350 |
51 |
13 |
0.3 |
6.0 |
|
Rwanda |
26 |
8 |
329 |
230 |
41 |
3 |
0.2 |
12.4 |
|
Somalia |
638 |
9 |
14 |
-- |
48 |
-- |
-- |
0.3 |
|
Tanzania |
945 |
32 |
36 |
220 |
47 |
341 |
-- |
13.8 |
|
Uganda |
241 |
21 |
105 |
310 |
42 |
64 |
-- |
7.9 |
Within the Eastern Africa area there are three distinct groups of countries:
These three sub-regions are discussed below, providing more detail in the case of East Africa, with which the authors are most familiar, and where a larger body of literature exists.
1. East Africa
East Africa is geographically (in terms of its geology, topography, and climate) and culturally diverse, with hunter-gatherers, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, and cultivators with banana, root, and grain cultures. It is interesting that the same range of diversity is found in each country and that the region is no more diverse than its separate components (see Rodgers 1998). Despite this diversity, the region is bonded together by a past administrative structure, common resource problems, and a belief that some level of regional cooperation can help alleviate these problems. East Africa’s common administrative structure derives from colonial history, i.e., British rule. Administrative structures, institutions, and laws are roughly the same as they were during colonial rule. Commonality of problem and approach have led to shared activities such as the East African Common Services Organisation in the past, which included many of the natural resources research agencies. This grew after independence to the East African Community, with increasing emphasis on service and commercial organizations such as the postal service, railways, airways, income tax regimes, currency boards, and customs.
But as political differences emerged within the three separate countries—socialism, capitalism, military rule—the community withered and collapsed. Despite all this, however, over the past few years the three East African countries have embarked on a political program to redevelop regional cooperation. In 1989 an “East African Cooperation Forum” began, 1991 saw formal recommendations for a revival of East African Cooperation, and by 1993 a new treaty was drafted. In 1999 the East African Community Treaty was signed. This treaty provides for considerable regional cooperation in environmental and natural resource-related matters, including specific instances of cross-border management. These provisions are set out in three Articles (see Box 5, which contains an abbreviated text of each Article).
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Box 5. Cooperation in Environmental and Natural Resource Management within the East African Community Article 111: Environmental and Natural Resources The Partner States recognise that development activities may have negative impacts on the environment leading to the degradation of the environment and depletion of natural resources and that a clean and healthy environment is a prerequisite for sustainable development. The Partner States therefore:
Article 112: Management of the Environment For purposes of Article 111 of this Treaty, the Partner States undertake to co-operate in the management of the environment, and agree to:
For purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, the Partner States undertake to:
Article 114: Management of Natural Resources 1. For purposes of Article 111 of this Treaty, the Partner States agree to take concerted measures to foster co-operation in the joint and efficient management and the sustainable utilisation of natural resources within the community for the mutual benefit of the Partner States. In particular, the Partner States shall:
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2. The other countries in the Eastern Africa region
Burundi and Rwanda belong to the Economic Commission for the Central African States. These two countries have a history that is distinct from other countries in the Eastern Africa region, in that after the First World War they were transferred from German to Belgian colonial power. They also have extremely high population densities and land pressure on relatively infertile soils, so issues of natural resource management are of great importance and are saddled with great difficulty. These two countries have a history of violent conflict that has left many natural resources degraded. The neighboring states have also had to deal with the issues of settlement of refugees fleeing from civil conflict (see Boxes 6 and 7). Burundi and Rwanda are also now looking to join the East African Co-operation, a move that will be greatly useful in the management of transboundary resources such as Lake Victoria and the Kagera River (as for example in the control of water hyacinth weeds).
The Horn countries belong to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).8 These countries have had different colonial legacies—some with Italian influence, some with British influence—and some, like Ethiopia, have never been fully colonized. The peoples of this sub-region have similar pastoralist ways of life; in fact most borders in the area have a common tribal resource ownership across borders (see Map 3). The region also has had a history of conflict over natural resources. The impacts of these conflicts on people resources and economies in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti have been enormous (see Box 6). The refugee settlement and repatriation problems have also been common in this sub-region (Box 7).
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Box 6. Transboundary Natural Resource Utilization and Conflict in the Horn of Africa We hesitate to use the words resource “management” or “conservation,” as there has been no such real input in the past decades, but the resources have been used—and often abused. The Horn of Africa—Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, all parts of Somalia, the northern areas of Kenya, as well as parts of Sudan—have an abundance of dryland biodiversity values, but also a long history of cross-border conflict and environmental degradation. The Ogaden Desert bordering Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya is a major center of diversity and endemism for species of Acacia and Commiphora; with perhaps 40 plant species restricted to this area alone. Desert-lands are typified by nomads—both wildlife and pastoralists with their livestock. A transfrontier migratory movement has existed as long as the area has been inhabited. Dolal (1992) described the Ogaden human population as being over 70 percent pastoralist; primarily mixed livestock keepers, with some cultivation in rain-fed areas and along river lines. Hussein (1992), discussing the Afar-Ogaden area in Ethiopia stated that the adverse political atmosphere of the Horn victimizes pastoralist peoples more than the rest of the population. As a result of hostility large numbers of refugees crisscross the national boundaries, increasingly despoiling the productive environment and making impossible any form of sustainable resource use by local people. For example there were (and still are) a million Ogaden refugees from Ethiopia in Somalia. Past Ethiopia regimes viewed pastoralism as a backward mode of production. Administrative insistence on poll tax, even in drought periods, marginalized many pastoral people, forcing them into both charcoaling (and so further degrading the fragile dryland tree resources) and cross-border barter. In Somalia, pastoralism was accepted as a major mode of production; and therefore was supported, not marginalized; consequently inflows of people continued until gross instability in Somalia made immigration less attractive. The move back to Ethiopia continues. Underscoring much of the conflict is famine—famine based on mismanagement of an already harsh arid environment. Famine brings conflict, and war, which worsens famine. Those who are starving, move—often crossing borders again. Food security, the counterpart to famine, allows nation building and peace. Food security is needed at local as well as national levels, and is needed on both sides of a border. War causes two levels of impact on pastoralists—the direct threat of livestock confiscation, destruction of fodder and spoiling of water sources; and the less direct impacts of disrupting well-adapted grazing strategies and movement patterns including transboundary movement. If the basic problem is war, then a cessation of hostility will allow recovery. But if the problem becomes one of environmental decline, then recovery will not be automatic, and lowering population pressures will have to be part of the solution. Implementing this is extremely difficult—especially in times of conflict. The Southern Sudan Conflict. The conflict in southern Sudan is one of the most prolonged conflicts in Africa. From as early as 1983; the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) have been fighting for greater autonomy for southern Sudan. A Christian and animist population inhabits southern Sudan while the North is Arab and Muslim. The conflict in Sudan has always been described as a religious conflict where the Islamic regime in Khartoum wishes to rule the whole of Sudan under the “sharia” law. This has led to resistance by the people of southern Sudan against forced Islamization on the one hand, and for the right to self-determination of the southern Sudanese people on the other. This conflict has resulted in a wide range of problems, including the loss of at least 500,000 people, destruction of economic assets, the displacement of several thousand households, and the degradation of parks and range and forest resources. While this conflict is typically framed around religious issues and differences, its roots lie in competing for access to and control of key natural resources, particularly minerals. Southern Sudan is rich in minerals, especially oil. In 1981, huge quantities of commercial oil deposits estimated at about 236 million barrels were discovered in the south of Sudan. Confirmed oil reserves are estimated at 2,000 million barrels, enough to earn Sudan some US$10,000 million or cover its estimated energy needs for about 10 years. Southern Sudan is also more adequately supplied with water compared to Northern Sudan, and very rich in terms of biomass. The fertile savanna plains of acacia trees and tall grass as well as more predictable rains make southern Sudan suitable for the growing of sorghum, millet, maize groundnuts, and cotton. The expansion of agriculture into the areas that were traditionally occupied by the Nilotic nomadic tribes is a potential threat to the cattle economies predominant in these areas and a breeding ground for possible confrontation. Potential Successes? The above paragraphs make depressing reading. However, not all is doom and gloom. The Annual Meeting of the Resource Management Somali Network (RMSN) was held in October 2000, in Hargeisa Town, Somalia. The Pastoralist and Environmental Network (PENHA) in the Horn of Africa was prominent. RMSN networking is based on seven principles:
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The issues of refugees is a serious one in Eastern Africa, including both refugees fleeing from armed conflict and refugees fleeing from climatic adversity, usually drought. In times of conflict drought and famine support systems break down, as governance9—both traditional and modern—collapses. The issues of Somalia and Ethiopia in the past bear witness to that. Recent massive refugee movements have occurred as a result of genocide and civil war in Rwanda and Burundi. The scale of these refugee movements has added an extra TBNRM issue: environmental degradation in the host country (see Box 7).
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Box 7. Transboundary Refugees in Eastern Africa and Impacts on the Environment Terence Ranger (1996) summed up a major workshop on problems of returning refugees in Northeastern Africa “as humanitarian institutions searching for a cross border mandate, which will go across: sectoral, geographical, disciplinary and institutional borders.” Refugees can be those escaping from repressive political regimes or those fleeing from major environmental problems. Refugees do create enormous demands on the environment, and we are increasingly learning that degraded environments create competition for scarce resources and therefore conflicts. Those fleeing ethnic cleansing or tribal clashes (as in Kenya) are also refugees. Impacts can be in areas of origin or refuge. Refugee movements can be across national borders (e.g., the million Hutus who fled Rwanda for western Tanzania, see below), or across administrative and ethnic borders within a country in times of drought (e.g., the Borana of North Kenya invading the Isiolo district and moving south to Mount Kenya forests). This invasion has caused major political conflict among owners of local resources, leading to violence as well as degraded resources. Conflict in two countries can lead to refugees entering a third—witness the recent Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, leading to refugees from both sides entering the Sudan. Refugee problems need attention at several different levels, and within several different contexts. The context of environmental protection and natural resource management is difficult to pursue when people are under enormous stress and facing starvation. But there are great linkages—populations are driven to flee when resources are degraded. Scarce resources cause competition and conflict, which are, again, processes that cause weaker elements to move out. And finally, refugee processes further degrade natural resources. It is a vicious cycle. When refugees go across political borders, this becomes a transboundary issue— an issue of concern to populations, local and national governments, and the international refugee support movement. Rwandan Refugees in Tanzania: Impact on the Cross-Border Environment The 1994–95 genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath led to well over a million Rwandan refugees, initially Tutsi, then mainly Hutu, fleeing across the boundary to the Kagera region of western Tanzania. While the world humanitarian agencies provided help, the impact on Tanzania and Tanzanian natural resources has been tremendous. Although most refugees have since returned (some 50,000 remain, mostly in the Karagwe district) the impacts continue to be felt. Negative impacts on Tanzanian society included the great influx of firearms and subsequent banditry, leading to an increase in local theft—of everything from plantain bananas to vehicles. (Note that bananas are an important part of the Rwandan diet, rarely found in relief foods. Refugee camp rules prevent the growing of perennial crops, and as a result banana theft from villages grew during this period.) The needs of incoming refugees directed scarce developmental aid and social services in Kagera away from local needs. Impacts on the environment are equally varied. Refugee gangs overran the Burigi Game Reserve, some 40 km. from the border. Most gregarious ungulates were hunted for food. Large carnivores are still scarce. The woodland vegetation around the many large refugee camps has been greatly degraded. Luckily the Combretum-Terminalia savanna is relatively robust, and given time will recover from burning and repeated cutting of stems. The Kagera River papyrus and reed swamps harbored armed opposition groups, reducing access to the area for normal fishing purposes and reed harvesting. Large ungulates’—buffalo and sitatunga (the marsh antelope or nzohe, and hippo—numbers were greatly reduced. Camps occupied areas with water springs and easily accessible sub-surface water; springs were polluted, and became inaccessible. The scale of the problem led to agencies designing stronger environmental guidelines for camp and refugee management. These included choice of campsite—some camps on the Kagera-Kigoma border blocked elephant movement between Moyowosi and Biharamulo game reserves—and suggestions to keep camps away from sensitive environmental sites. Suggestions were for many smaller camps rather than fewer larger camps. Fuelwood management systems were needed, with specialist forestry expertise. However, the speed of the refugee influx meant that camp placing was largely ad hoc. Long-term refugee camps need the support of perennial tree crops for fuelwood, shade, and soil conservation processes. Some UNHCR rules prohibit perennial crops, seeing this as an incentive for refugees to stay in situ. Therefore, during relief efforts, greater attention needs to be paid to environmental concerns. |
TBNRM changes have affected traditional pastoralist coping strategies as well, with artificial intra-state borders preventing access to traditional drought grazing such as on Mount Kilimanjaro. Transboundary movement of pastoralists does take place, however—see Box 8.
Pastoralists add a special dimension to transboundary processes, with cases of resource sharing and cases of well-institutionalized transboundary stock raiding, as Box 8 shows.
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Box 8. Transboundary Pastoralist Processes In Times Of “Peace” Box 6 above suggested that transboundary pastoralist processes are dominated by conflict. That has been common-place in Northeastern Africa, where arid transboundary zones have been sites of national hostilities, or areas of refugees fleeing such hostilities (see also Box 7). But other variations do occur. We describe two examples here that involve neighboring countries at peace: Kenya-Tanzania boundaries and the Maasai; and Kenya-Uganda boundaries and the Turkana-Karamojong. The Kenya-Tanzania boundary is an artificial straight line cutting across what is now informally called “Maasailand” in both countries (Kajiado and Narok districts in Kenya and adjacent districts of the Arusha region in Tanzania). There is some suggestion that the Maa10 peoples on either side of the border are different (e.g., Kisongo in eastern Tanzania and Matapato in Kajiado, Purko in western Tanzania and Loita in Kenya); a century of colonial separation may have accentuated differences. The artificiality of the border is described eloquently in McEwen (1971). In the book the Anglo-German Boundary Commission in 1898 informs a Maasai warrior, somewhere near Loitokitok, that this is now the border: “People on that side with problems have to go to Machakos and see the English authorities, those on this side have to go to Moshi and see the German authorities.” said the Commissioner. “Oh no,” said the Maasai, “You are wrong, all this land is under the control of Lenana—our traditional leader. If we have problems, we go to him.” One hundred years later the Maasai can be said to have benefited from their cross-border unity. People with livestock to sell gained from differential prices and availability of trade goods on either side of the border—usually more capitalist Kenya offering a better trade environment than past-socialist Tanzania. Traditional drought-year grazing reserves were often in Tanzania, on the slopes of Ngorongoro (which was still available for use to Maasai in Kenya, but in theory only for resident Tanzanians.), and of Mount Meru and Kilimanjaro (not available because of the existence of parks and cultivation). Changing availability meant that Kenyan Maasai during 1999–2000 (an extreme drought year) moved as far south as Tanga in coastal Tanzania seeking pasture. The Turkana-Karamoja conflict across the Kenya-Uganda border is a case where countries are not hostile, but the tribal peoples have centuries-old conflicts, which continue just as strongly today—see Gufu Oba (1992) and Niamir-Fuller (1998). The Turkana invaded their present lands from the north in the 1700s displacing resident Pokot, Rendille, Merille, and Karamoja groups. Turkana is an extremely arid basin surrounded by higher and slightly wetter hilly tracts, which offer better dry-season grazing. But these peripheral grazing areas border antagonistic tribes—there are good grounds for pastoralist conflict. As Oba states: “The Turkana like their pastoral neighbours, have a cattle raiding culture. Memories of past raids are commemorated by song and dance, shaping emotions of younger warriors. Raiding was a traditional way of expanding herds and gaining access to grazing lands and water. Each raid is followed by counter raids. However perpetual enmity rarely occurs, alliances between conflicting groups (and both the Karamoja and Turkana have at least four geographically distinct sub-groups) are forged and broken, depending on relationships, resource availability, marriage linkages, etc. When relationships are good there is reciprocity in access to resources such as grass and water. (Note, for example in 1999–2000 many Turkana were grazing several tens of kilometres into Karamoja). However broken relationships can lead to massive cattle rustling and loss of human life. |
8. Kenya and Uganda are members of IGAD as well.
9. We note here with concern the breakdown of famine support systems in Kenya during the serious 1999–2000 drought, one of the most severe on record. The breakdown here was not due to conflict but just poor governance and a disregard for pastoral life.
10. The Maasai are those peoples who speak the language “Maa.” The Maasai recognize some 14 separate peoples or sub-tribes, including the Wa-Baraguyu, but not the Wa-Arusha (Homewood and Rodgers 1992).