There are a number of key principles and policy issues that emerge from this Regional Overview and two included case studies (on the Minziro-Sango Bay Forest across the Uganda-Tanzania border and on AWF’s Kilimanjaro Heartland). These issues are largely founded on the following overarching questions that we posed throughout the studies:
A summary of lessons and recommendations appears below.
(1) Problems drive TBNRM. Earlier we made a deliberate attempt to construct a conceptual framework for studying and analyzing TBNRM. One key point that we stressed is that the mere existence of a shared ecosystem does not stimulate TBNRM. It is the occurrence of common and shared problems associated with the shared ecosystem that is likely to stimulate common concern and action by those groups and/or countries sharing the ecosystem and associated resources. However, the reverse also applies—the absence of a shared ecosystem does not easily allow TBNRM. In the absence of common problem(s) and shared perception of that problem or those problems it is difficult to mobilize sufficient social and political interest to initiate and implement TBNRM. The Lake Victoria case clearly demonstrates this point. Until the water hyacinth invaded the lake the three countries of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) were less inclined to worry about the lake’s environmental management. The scale and impact of the hyacinth invasion on trade, communications, power generation, and livelihoods gave impetus to mobilizing political concern and financial resources. Without a pronounced and shared environmental problem, the management of Lake Victoria would have been left to technocrats without legislative authority to make management decisions.
(2) The importance of civil society involvement. The implementation of LVEMP also generates a lesson on the nature and extent of community and civil society participation in program design and execution. Reviews of the program concluded that there has been an ad hoc involvement and participation of the communities living around the Lake Victoria, both in the design and implementation phases. The program was conceived of and designed by governments, with considerable technical leadership of World Bank consultants. It was also based on the urgent need to do something quickly about the degradation of the lake. Limited, if any, time and other resources were invested in mobilizing communities around the lake to articulate their perception of the problems and play their respective roles in the design of the program. Even though there are activities and resources aimed at benefiting the communities, because of a lack of sufficient community ownership of the problems and the program, LVEMP has thus not been able to mobilize local knowledge and social capital to address the problems. In fact, tension has existed between program implementation staff and some of the local politicians, including local authorities in such areas as Kisumu in Kenya.
Successful TBNRM processes, be they national or bilateral or even multilateral, have a significant and growing measure of community ownership. TBNRM takes place at local levels in sociopolitical contexts occupied by local people. If these people are given resources and institutional space to contribute to the design and implementation of the TBNRM, programs and projects are likely to have more impact. TBNRM imposed on a particular community and area, by contrast, is unlikely to achieve the overall goal of sustainable development.
(3) The importance of policy compatibility. The Minziro-Sango Bay case study demonstrates the importance of harmonized policies, by-laws and institutional synergy for TBNRM. While there is a growing community constituency for the management of a shared forest ecosystem—the Minziro-Sango Bay forest ecosystem—there is a lack of harmony between Tanzania and Uganda’s policies. This is particularly true for forest policies and associated enforcement of laws.
(4) The importance of local long-term leadership and financing. The Regional Overview and case studies largely focus on projects with processes and activities that are tied to three- to five-year timeframes. We were not able to identify any cases of TBNRM that are not driven by project funds and short-term delivery expectations. This is not surprising because of the nature of natural resource management in the region. Many management efforts are conceived as and around donor-funded projects, and their life is often tied to financial flows. With no funds from donors, the initiatives often die. A key precondition for the long-term sustainability and impact of TBNRM is the extent to which programs and activities are driven by local financial and technical resources, and make the transition from projects to long-term processes.
(5) Linking to regional treaties. From the case studies and the Overview’s exploration it is clear that a major effort is being made to link programs and/or projects to policy and treaties. In a number of cases, international and regional conventions have been invoked to launch TBNRM. For example, the GEF-funded project on “Reducing Biodiversity Loss at Cross-Border Sites” is an explicit effort to invoke the Convention on Biological Diversity, particularly its Article 5. This project has found, however, a certain measure of political space and support from the revived East African Community. Its evolution can generally be tied to the resurgence of regional cooperation among the three states. It is unlikely that in the absence of the renewed regional cooperation and growth of EAC, the project would have acquired the administrative and technical support as well as interest of the three governments.
(6) The importance of enabling conditions. A key lesson from this project and the Minziro-Sango Bay case study is that the existence, growth, and sustenance of political cooperation are preconditions for TBNRM. As we stated in Chapter V, it is not possible for TBNRM to take place (and more important, for communities from two countries to partake in the management of a shared resource) if the neighboring states are not willing or capable of transferring some measure of their sovereignty to the bilateral and/or multilateral arrangement.
(7) Legislative legitimacy. Another important issue that emerges from the Minziro-Sango Bay case study is the need to provide policy and legislative legitimacy to local informal TBNRM efforts. As the study shows, in the Rakai and Bukoba districts, informal meetings of village leaders to discuss security matters have established a basis for TBNRM, though an implicit one. The GEF project, “Reducing Biodiversity Loss at Cross-Border Sites in Eastern Africa” is building on these informal arrangements to mobilize interest and support forest biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. These arrangements would, however, be enlarged and given legislative expression through the adoption of MOUs among the involved communities, and by the preparation of common management plans.
(8) Linkages to conventions. From the Overview and the case studies there is no clear indication that countries of Eastern Africa have been able to link the implementation of TBNRM to the regional and international conventions that they have ratified. This conclusion is based on our assessment of national reports on the implementation of CBD and CITES, as well as on national strategies and action plans developed as part of the implementation of CBD’s Article 6.