Beyond Boundaries:

Regional Overview of Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Central Africa

2001

David S. Wilkie

Elie Hakizumwami

Norbert Gami

Bernard Difara

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

Chapter I. Introduction

A. What is TBNRM?

B. What this report is and what it is not

C. TBNRM: A component of landscape, watershed, and ecosystem management

D. Why is TBNRM important?

E. For whom is TBNRM important?

F. A brief history of TBNRM

Chapter II. Biological and Ecological Context

A. Geographic overview

B. Ecoregions and land cover

C. Distribution and extent of shared water resources

D. Biodiversity richness

E. Transboundary wildlife movement in Central Africa

F. Parks and reserves in border areas

Chapter III. Sociocultural Context and Role of Communities

A. Historical overview of human occupation of the Congo Basin

B. Who are the present managers of natural resources?

C. What is the likely outcome of increased community-based management?

D. Why are rural communities not already in control?

E. Does the size of a community matter?

F. Human land use and biodiversity conservation

Chapter IV. Political and Legal Contexts for TBNRM

A. National policy context for TBNRM

B. Regional policy context for TBNRM

C. International policy context for TBNRM

Chapter V. Institutional and Organizational Capacity

A. National level

B. Regional level

C. Role of international organizations

Chapter VI. Economic Rationale and Financial Feasibility

A. Economies of scale versus transaction costs

B. Financial feasibility: Lessons from protected areas

Chapter VII. Trends in Land and Natural Resource Use

A. Agriculture

B. Logging

C. Fisheries

D. Water resource uses and environmental impacts

E. Non-timber forest products

F. Transborder use of natural resources

Chapter VIII. International Transboundary Management Initiatives in Central Africa

A. Trinational park project among the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo

B. Transboundary biodiversity conservation in the zone connecting Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and Cameroon

C. Parks for Peace initiative in the countries of the Great Lakes region

D. Albertine Rift Conservation Society (ARCOS)

E. International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP)

F. Current initiatives for the management of water resources

Chapter IX. Existing National TBNRM Initiatives

Chapter X. Anticipated Developments

A. Virunga/Volcanoes Trinational Park

B. The Rwenzori/Virunga System

Chapter XI. Opportunities and Constraints

A. Potential benefits of TBNRM in Central Africa

B. Potential constraints to TBNRM in Central Africa

Chapter XII. Key Lessons Learned, Principles, and Recommendations

A. Work from the local level up

B. Two weaks do not make a strong

C. Management in the absence of the rule of law

D. The benefits from TBNRM need to be explicit and measurable to attract donor support

E. Is TBNRM new or a mere extension of protected area/landscape conservation within nations?

F. When are TBNRM activities not TBNRM?

G. Deciding when to invest in TBNRM

H. Overcoming jurisdictional and sovereignty barriers

I. National TBNRM may be more important in the short term

References

Biodiversity Support Program Transboundary Project Publications

References Cited in This Publication

Maps and Figures

Publication Credits

Authors: David S. Wilkie, Elie Hakizumwami, Norbert Gami, and Bernard Difara

Publication services: Grammarians, Inc.

Publication Manager: Aziz Gökdemir

Copyediting/Production Editing: Ian Norris

Design: Laura Hurst

Maps and Figures: CARPE, University of Maryland (1); David Wilkie (2); Defense Mapping Agency (3); Nadine Laporte (4); WWF-US (5); Rutgers University (6); WRI/Worldwatch (7); WCMC (8)

Cover Photos: African Wildlife Foundation (top); Kate Newman (middle), and Harry van der Linde (bottom)

Cover Design: Steve Hall and Chris Henke

Desktop publishing: Carol Levie

BSP Transboundary Natural Resource Management Project Director: Harry van der Linde

BSP Director of Communications: Sheila Donoghue

Director of BSP’s Africa & Madagascar Program and BSP Executive Director: Judy Oglethorpe

Please cite this publication as: Wilkie, D. S., E. Hakizumwami, N. Gami, and B. Difara. 2001. Beyond Boundaries: Regional Overview of Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Central Africa. In Biodiversity Support Program, Beyond Boundaries: Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Central Africa. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: Biodiversity Support Program.

About the Biodiversity Support Program

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The Biodiversity Support Program (BSP) is a consortium of World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy, and World Resources Institute, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This publication was made possible through support provided to BSP by the Africa Bureau of USAID, under the terms of Cooperative Agreement Number AOT-A-00-99-00228-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID.

© 2001 by World Wildlife Fund, Inc., Washington, D.C. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this publication for educational and other noncommercial purposes is authorized without prior permission of the copyright holder. However, WWF, Inc. does request advance written notification and appropriate acknowledgment. WWF, Inc. does not require payment for the noncommercial use of its published works and in no way intends to diminish use of WWF research and findings by means of copyright.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all Biodiversity Support Program staff who assisted during the development and publication of this review, and particularly Harry van der Linde. Thanks also to Amy Vedder, Bryan Curran, Paul and Sarah Elkan, John Poulsen, Connie Clark, Boo Maisels, Andre Kamdem Toham, Lisa Steel, Richard Carroll, Tony Mokombo, Olivier Langrand, Rob Solem, Laurent Somé, Steve Gartlan, Laurie Clark, Melissa Othman, Jim Graham, Fred Swartzendruber, Conrad Aveling, Lee White, Kate Abernethy, Caroline Tutin, Robert Nasi, George Boundzanga, Jake Brunner, J. G. Collomb, Allard Blom, David Hoyle, Roger Fotso, Philippe Auzel, Pauwel de Wachter, and others who provided invaluable background information for the review.

Executive Summary

Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) has become so fashionable among the donor and NGO communities that its benefits are in danger of being grossly oversold. TBNRM investments may be warranted where the primary threats to sustainable natural resource management and biodiversity conservation originate beyond a national or land-ownership border. At a minimum, they should promote land-use policies and practices that do not compromise natural resource management efforts beyond the border; ideally, they should produce a level of resource management that is more effective than the sum of the individual parts.

For TBNRM to be effective, at least one management authority within a shared ecosystem must have the capacity to regulate illegal resource use within its territory and ideally should have sufficient financial and human resources to reinforce the regulatory capacity of weaker management authorities within the ecosystem. Throughout Central Africa, however, the management authorities within a shared ecosystem typically lack the capacity to effectively regulate illegal resource use even within their own management areas. Where this is the case, and in the absence of additional financial and human resources, TBNRM would have little positive impact on resource conservation. Given the additional transaction costs associated with TBNRM, combining already weak management authorities would do nothing to improve resource management in a shared landscape and would most likely fritter away scarce monies that could be applied more effectively to on-site resource management. What is often less well understood is that TBNRM, inappropriately applied, can put in jeopardy natural resources that are overseen by a well-capitalized management authority. By requiring that management authority to spread its personnel, equipment, and cash more thinly to reinforce the weak capacity of a cross-border collaborator, TBNRM may not only do little to enhance the resource management capacity of the weaker partner but also may reduce the management impact of the stronger authority.

For TBNRM to be affordable and effective in Central Africa, it should start with local-level initiatives that address the tangible concerns of management authorities within the shared ecosystem. It should not in the short-term focus on developing formal bilateral and multilateral agreements between and among states, because national governments have a long history of signing natural resource management conventions and economic accords that have little impact on regional cooperation or on the harmonization of policies and practices. Regional integration and cooperation is predicated on the existence of real political will, comparable levels of development and volume of intraregional trade, and on available, affordable, and reliable forms of communication, none of which are assured in Central Africa at present.

In most cases in Central Africa, exogenous threats are more important within nations across land-ownership or land-use borders than they are between nations across international frontiers. Ensuring that land-use practices in areas zoned for economic development, such as timber concessions or coffee plantations, do not increase the threats to plant and animal populations and thus conservation costs in adjacent protected areas is a transboundary issue clearly within the management interests of national governments, and certainly within their capacity to influence. Moreover, the conservation pay-offs associated with improving TBNRM within nations may be easier to achieve and may affect a much larger land area than is likely to be possible with TBNRM between nations.

While TBNRM has the potential to improve resource management and enhance international relations, before nations engage in TBNRM they should ask four important questions:

• Does the threat to conservation come from across a border?
• What is the objective (i.e., desired outcome or outcomes) of initiating a formal or informal TBNRM process?
• What are the expected costs of establishing an informal or formal process for managing transboundary natural resources?
• How would the TBNRM planning and implementation process differ if the desired and expected benefits are primarily to regulate conflicting resource use across the borders of a shared ecosystem, as compared to achieving greater economic or political integration?

Chapter I. Introduction

A. What is TBNRM?

Transboundary Natural Resource Management is a process for reducing or minimizing conflicting resource-use policies and practices within ecosystems that are divided by international frontiers or by national property or land-use zoning boundaries. It can be both an international and a national process. TBNRM is advocated within the conservation and development community as a way to promote land-use policies and practices within a shared ecosystem that, at minimum, do not adversely impact management objectives elsewhere within the ecosystem. Under the best conditions, TBNRM should promote cross-border resource management policies and practices that maintain ecosystem productivity and resilience, species composition and persistence, and economic revenues and human welfare. It should generate positive ecological, economic, and sociopolitical benefits from the whole ecosystem that are greater than the sum accrued in the divided parts.

A TBNRM area is one in which “cooperation to manage natural resources occurs across boundaries.” The process of TBNRM can be defined as “any process of collaboration across boundaries that facilitates and improves the management of natural resources to the benefit of all parties in the area concerned” (Griffin et al. 1999; see also Box 1).

B. What this report is and what it is not

Transboundary Natural Resource Management in its broadest sense refers to the collaborative management of shared ecosystems that cross national land-ownership and land-use boundaries, and international frontiers. To retain comparability with the other regional reviews in this series (Southern Africa, West Africa, and Eastern Africa), however, this report is limited to discussion primarily of international collaborative efforts to manage protected areas with common borders. Examples of intranational TBNRM are included to highlight specific points made or to draw attention to relevant issues not illustrated by international TBNRM activities in Central Africa.

This regional overview is designed to summarize the state of TBNRM in the Central Africa region, to highlight the gaps in our knowledge that militate against the use of TBNRM, and to identify opportunities for and constraints against promoting TBNRM. It is intended to provide information to decision makers in government, NGOs, and donor organizations struggling with the challenges of natural resource conservation in an area that has few of the requisites for effective biodiversity conservation.

This report is part of a larger study covering all regions of sub-Saharan Africa. It does not presume to be the final word on TBNRM, but seeks merely to highlight the key issues, ongoing activities, and gaps in our knowledge in relation to TBNRM in Central Africa.

C. TBNRM: A component of landscape, watershed, and ecosystem management

TBNRM is a natural extension of the conservation community’s growing realization that investments focused solely on protected areas may not result in the long-term conservation of the full range of biodiversity extant in a particular region. Protected areas are often either too small or too few, and seldom encompass whole ecosystems. To ensure the long-term persistence of the assemblage of plants and animals that are characteristic of a particular ecosystem, it is essential not only to manage resources within those areas where biodiversity conservation is the primary land-use, but also to seek ways to conserve resources within the proximal and adjacent lived-in landscapes where resource consumption and economic development may be the principal land management objectives. Landscape-scale management that focuses on whole ecosystems (i.e., functional systems where nutrient and energy capture and cycling are largely endogenous and self-sustaining), of which protected areas are just one component, is increasingly advocated within the conservation community. Landscape management, watershed management, and ecosystem management all conceptualize the conservation unit as geographically large, and are characterized by interdependent processes that must be managed together if the area is to be productive, resilient, and biodiverse. TBNRM is that component of landscape management that explicitly addresses the possible need to reconcile conflicting natural-resource-use policies and practices within areas under different land-use regimes that share a common border.

D. Why is TBNRM important?

1. Increasing the area under natural resource management

TBNRM is important ecologically as a way to increase the area of land under resource management regimes that do not conflict with one another, and thus to ensure the persistence of natural resources within ecosystems shared by two or more management authorities. TBNRM works by removing the barriers, tangible and intangible, that partition the management of ecosystems, watersheds, and wildlife migration routes.

Potential Benefits of TBNRM

• Enhanced management of migratory species and shared water resources
• Cultural reintegration
• NRM capacity building
• Building trust amongst actors within nations and between nations

It has also been argued that TBNRM helps create larger areas for wildlife and plant populations, thereby reducing the extinction risk from stochastic events. This is seldom true. If the ecosystems that span international or national borders are not physically separated by fences, dikes, or moats, and if they already lie within areas managed for biodiversity conservation, the ecological payoffs of establishing de jure TBNRM arrangements may be slight. Where the flow of water, nutrients, and wildlife across borders and among adjacent areas is unimpeded, there is already de facto TBNRM.

Downstream effects within even relatively small watersheds may be severe and warrant remediation, but as a general rule the need for the establishment of transboundary areas decreases as the size of adjacent shared ecosystems increases. In Central Africa, protected areas tend to be large, with several exceeding 1,000,000 hectares; Salonga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, covers an area 1.5 times the size of Rwanda. The argument that TBNRM is essential in ecological terms to combine already large areas may only be convincing if the areas in question share resources of seasonal importance to wide-ranging animals. The seasonal migration of grazing animals from the Serengeti in Tanzania to the Mara in Kenya is an example of a long-distance, international movement of terrestrial wildlife, but few if any such mass migrations exist within Central Africa—although elephant and hornbills appear to travel relatively long distances in search of seasonally available resources.

Similarly, de jure TBNRM is much more likely to be important in ecological terms when the adjacent lands are outside of protected areas, are within areas not managed explicitly for resource conservation, or are in areas of cross-border conflict. In such cases, de jure TBNRM would help ensure that land-use policies and practices on one side of the border do not adversely affect ecosystem productivity and resilience and species composition and abundance on the other. Though TBNRM is unlikely to create larger areas for biodiversity conservation, it has significant potential for maintaining larger areas for conservation, because it helps reduce conflicting resource-use policies and practices across borders.

De jure TBNRM is also critical in cases where nations share a natural resource, the use of which is rival—i.e., use of the resource by one actor precludes the same use by another. Central African nations share many river systems, and upstream effects such as damming, water removal, water pollution, and unsustainable fishing all may conflict with downstream management concerns and practices. Growing demand for fresh water is likely to result in water being the most contested natural resource in the 21st century (Brunner 2000; Postel 1992). Groundwater aquifers, rivers, and lakes are seldom encompassed within political boundaries (Revenga et al. 1998), meaning that the transboundary management of water resources will be essential to help resolve future competing cross-border claims for water, to insure the health and welfare of nations that share water resources, and to avoid the escalation of conflicts over access to water.

2. Reducing cross-border illegal resource extraction

Improved communication and joint law enforcement activities between resource management authorities across national or land-use borders may decrease cross-border poaching and the transportation of illegally harvested resources. This, of course, assumes that at least one management authority within an ecosystem shared among nations or landowners has the capacity to regulate illegal resource use within its territory and potentially to provide financial and human resources to reinforce the regulatory capacity of management authorities in adjacent areas. If all management authorities within a shared ecosystem lack the capacity to regulate illegal resource use within even their own management areas and if additional financial and human resources are unavailable, TBNRM will have little positive impact on resource conservation.

3. Are migratory routes and flyways transboundary?

Managing migratory birds, butterflies, whales, turtles, and fish may require international or intranational agreements for the protection of breeding and feeding grounds and for the protection of migratory routes between the two. TBNRM may thus also be conceptualized as a linear series of bilateral and multilateral agreements between and among nations that contain landscapes that constitute migratory routes and flyways. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention) are international tools for the management of wildlife across borders and along migratory routes.

The migratory species concept for TBNRM is also relevant for federalist nations whose component states have resource management autonomy. The Lacey Act of 1900 in the United States, for example, was designed to control interstate commerce in game and thus to protect waterfowl along their migratory flyways (Trefethen 1975).

4. Political and human capital benefits

Its ecological payoff is often cited as the leading rationale for TBNRM, but introduction of the process may also be justified most importantly for its ability to serve as a tool to reconnect cultures divided by the establishment of nation states, to share natural resource management experiences and skills, to help resolve conflicts over shared resources such as water and migratory animals, or to provide a political forum to help build trust, promote trade, and foster peace among nations in regions of political and civil instability. According to Zbicz and Green, of the 136 existing and 85 potential TBCAs that straddle 112 international borders and 98 countries, the majority were established to increase cooperation and reduce conflicts between nations with tense or strained relations (Zbicz 1999).

In Central Africa, few areas receive resource management investments sufficient to conserve biological diversity, and policies seldom exist that would minimize natural-resource-use conflicts across property, land-use, and political boundaries. Both informal and formal TBNRM within Central Africa therefore have the potential to improve the conservation status of shared ecosystems. International agreements to establish transboundary resource management areas may also encourage nations to improve the management of biodiversity on their side of a shared border, and may discourage nations from allowing unregulated, industrial-scale resource extraction within conservation areas.

E. For whom is TBNRM important?

The realistic answer to this question is that it depends on the objectives of each specific TBNRM initiative. There is an enormous range of potential winners and losers in TBNRM; the following are a few hypothetical examples to illustrate how different individuals or groups might benefit or lose from the process:

1. Political leaders

If the goal is to improve political relations between warring nations, given that negotiations over the establishment of a peace park take place mostly between high-level political leaders TBNRM may be important as a status vehicle for heads of state, and may benefit the general population if bilateral or multilateral discussions result in cessation of hostilities.

TBNRM activities may also result in embarrassment to heads of state if they are unable, for technical, financial, or political reasons, to implement the mandated provisions of international conventions to which they are signatories.

2. Resource users

If the goal is to conserve fish stocks along a shared watershed, then clearly the fish benefit, as may fishers on both sides of the border. Fisheries managers may also benefit from the sharing of management experience with their cross-border collaborators, but this is more speculative.

Certain resource users also may be harmed by TBNRM. For example, poor farmers upstream of a shared watershed might be hurt economically if, to insure that river flow and fish movements downstream are not hindered, they were to be required to reduce their use of river water for irrigation.

3. Communities of place

Ethnic groups that share traditional territory that has been divided by an international border may benefit from TBNRM if it helps them to retain links to relatives or to continue their use of land and resources that lie within two or more nations. In reality, however, the porosity of international borders in Central Africa and the limited capacity of states to enforce immigration and customs laws means that there are few obstructions to cross-border movement, with the result that TBNRM may not produce substantial changes in traditional practices.

If two different ethnic groups that share a common but divided ecosystem have wildly disparate economic and political power, TBNRM may in contrast enable the more powerful group to achieve hegemony, and may cause the dispossession and marginalization of the less powerful group.

4. Resource managers and donors

Where TBNRM reduces the costs of biodiversity conservation by facilitating the sharing across borders of equipment and facilitities, donors and governments benefit by realizing greater returns on their investment. Resource managers similarly may benefit from TBNRM by learning, through collaboration with their cross-border colleagues, new skills and by gaining access to tools that help them improve their managment of natural resources on their side of the border.

By the same token, however, the better-funded and more capable resource managers on one side of a shared ecosystem may find their resources stretched thin if they are required to supplement the weaker capacity of the adjacent management authority. This can jeopardize the efficacy of resource management on both sides of the border.

F. A brief history of TBNRM

In 1925, the Belgian colonial regime established the Albert National Park across the nations of Ruanda–Urundi and the Congo. Established to conserve natural resources that span two nations, the park might be considered the first transboundary park. After independence in the early 1960s, the Rwandan part of the park became the Parc des Volcans (Volcanoes National Park), and the Congolese part, Virunga National Park.

Legislation in 1932 in the United States and 1936 in Canada established the Waterton–Glacier International Peace Park. The park was founded as an “enduring monument of nature to the long-existing relationship of peace and goodwill between the people of the Government of Canada and the United States,” and is often cited as the first de jure TBRNM area in the world. The two conjoined parks are managed separately, but both countries cooperate on nature tours, search-and-rescue operations, and fire management.

Prior to the establishment of the Waterton–Glacier International Peace Park, Poland and Czechoslovakia signed in 1925 the Krakow Protocol, setting the framework for international cooperation in the management of border parks (Thorsell 1990). The first park was not established until after the Second World War, and although the post-war period saw the number of transboundary parks grow it was not until the 1980s that most formal TBNRM areas were established. In 1988, there were 70 actual and proposed TBNRM areas; by 1997, this number had grown to 136 (Zbicz 1999).

In 1997 in South Africa, the Peace Parks Foundation was established with a donation from South African wine industry magnate Anton Rupert. The foundation is headed by John Hanks, formerly chief executive of WWF–South Africa. In May 1997, the foundation held an international Peace Parks conference at its Somerset West headquarters. During the conference participants endorsed efforts to establish peace parks in Southern Africa, in the mountain gorilla regions at the borders of Rwanda, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Uganda; plans were also endorsed for parks in the border forests of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and between the Republic and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Seven potential peace parks have now been identified in Southern Africa, as follows:

• Kalahari (South Africa and Botswana)
• Ais–Ais/Richtersveld (South Africa and Namibia)
• Gariep (South Africa and Namibia, centered on the Orange River’s Augrabies Falls)
• Pongola–Limpopo Valley (South Africa and Zimbabwe)
• Maputaland (South Africa, Swaziland, and Mozambique)
• Drakensberg/Maluti (South Africa and Lesotho)
• Kruger/Banhine–Zingave/Gonarezhou (South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe)

On 7 April 1999, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park was created when Botswana’s Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the South African National Parks agreed to collaborate in the management of Botswana’s Gemsbok National Park and South Africa’s Kalahari–Gemsbok National Park. The total area of the combined parks is almost 38,000 square kilometers. The area as a whole will be monitored by the Transfrontier Management Committee, with each nation continuing to independently manage its own sector.

In the Central African region, informal and formal negotiations are underway to establish transboundary conservation areas to: (1) conserve gorillas in the Virunga Volcanoes region of Rwanda, western Uganda, and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo; (2) reduce cross-border poaching within the Dzanga–Sangha, Nouabale–Ndoki, and Lobéké protected areas of the Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, and Cameroon, respectively; and (3) establish and maintain wildlife corridors between Odzala National Park in the Republic of Congo, Minkébé in Gabon, and the Dja, Boumba–Bek, and Nki reserves in Cameroon.

Chapter II. Biological and Ecological Context

A. Geographic overview

The scope of this review includes the countries of Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, and Rwanda. It also includes the border regions with Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Angola. The region under review straddles the equator, between approximately latitude 14 degrees north and south, extending between longitude 8 degrees and 32 degrees east. To simplify the compilation and presentation of background information, the report focuses on the eight nations wholly encompassed within this region (Map 1).

1. Climate

The countries of Central Africa constitute an almost exclusively humid or sub-humid enclave within a predominantly dry continent. This has not always been true. Central Africa has seen wide variations in rainfall in the past 100,000 years (Nicholson 1989), with some periods considerably wetter than today and others considerably drier. As Europe glaciated and deglaciated, air temperatures in Central Africa fluctuated. For much of the time between 20,000 and 70,000 years ago, temperatures in Central Africa were 4°C–6°C lower than at present; evaporation was consequently lower, and rainfall as much as 30 percent less than today (Bonnefille et al. 1990). The moist forest area was consequently diminished. Conversely, warmer periods associated with deglaciation in Europe resulted in increased rainfall and the recolonization of forest over Central Africa (Hamilton 1983).

Variations in climate have continued during the past 3,000 years, but they have not been of the same magnitude as observed over a more distant time scale. Africa was significantly more humid between the 10th and 13th centuries, when caravans traversed the desert along routes that are today impossible for lack of water. These conditions recurred during the 16th through 18th centuries, with the exception of several periods of severe drought in the 1680s, 1740s, and 1750s. At the end of the 18th century, marked desiccation commenced over much of Africa, and the decline in rainfall culminated in a period of severe drought in the 1820s and 1830s (all references Nicholson 1989). These historic droughts are analogous to those occurring today in the Sahel. Rains returned to produce a relatively humid period that persisted from the 1870s to the 1890s, and rainfall has continued to fluctuate to the present day. The unusually wet period between the 1950s and early 1970s may in fact have prompted the newly independent African nations to be overly optimistic in regard to agricultural production, resulting in the settlement and cultivation of areas that, while green at the time, had much lower long-term average rainfall prospects (Wilkie et al. 1999).

In Central Africa today, yearly mean temperatures vary little, averaging around 25°C. Annual rainfall in the region averages between 1,000 and 2,000 millimeters (Tchatat 1999). Most rain falls as convective showers in sporadic, localized rainstorms. Areas outside the tropical forest ecosystem, such as in northern Cameroon, northern Central African Republic, southern Democratic Republic of Congo, eastern Rwanda and Burundi, and the bordering zones in Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Angola receive less rainfall, while the areas around Mount Cameroon and on the southern edge of insular Equatorial Guinea receive as much as 10,000 millimeters annually as a result of the combined effects of orography and the Benguela current. Throughout the region, rainfall is generally sufficient for there to be a positive water balance (i.e., precipitation exceeds evapotranspiration) during most of the year (Map 2; Figure 1).

The most striking aspect of rainfall within Central Africa is the source of the water vapor that leads to the convective precipitation characteristic of the region. Although the South Atlantic Ocean provides considerable water vapor to the hydrological system, 75–95 percent of the rainfall is from recycled water generated by evapotranspiration within the region (Balek 1977; Brinkman 1983). The importance of this so-called “small hydrological cycle” is much greater than it is in the Amazon Basin, for example, where it is estimated that about 50 percent of precipitation comes from terrestrial evapotranspiration (Salati 1987). In Southeast Asia, more than 80 percent of precipitation is not recycled but returns to the oceans as runoff (Brinkman 1983).

No data are available on the role of Central Africa’s moist forested regions and the extent to which they contribute to extra-regional precipitation. It is probable that the region is mostly a closed system in regard to rainfall, with some areas, such as the highlands of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, receiving a somewhat larger proportion of the “small” hydrologic cycle rainfall as a result of orographic cloud formation.

2. Topography

Apart from Burundi, Rwanda, southwestern Cameroon, and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, which are characterized by montane landscapes, the region is dominated by relatively flat terrain of between 300 meters and 600 meters above sea level (Map 3).

The highest peaks in the region include the following:

• The Ruwenzori mountains range (5,109 m), shared between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda.
• The network of volcanoes in the east of the Congo Basin that are shared between the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. These include:

  • Kalisimbi (4,507 m), Muhabura (4,127 m), and Bisoke (3,711 m) in Rwanda;
  • Gahinga (3,473 m), shared between Rwanda and Uganda;
  • Sabyinyo (3,674 m), shared between the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda; and
  • Nyamulagira (3,055 m), Mikeno (4,000 m), and Nyiragongo (3,470 m) in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

• Mount Cameroon (4,070 m) in southwestern Cameroon, within the coastal zone near the border with Nigeria.
• Peak Basile (3,008 m) in Equatorial Guinea, on the island of Bioko.
• The Nyungwe–Kibira mountain forest range, shared between Rwanda and Burundi. Some peaks in the range exceed 3,000 meters.

B. Ecoregions and land cover

The Central African region contains the largest remaining contiguous moist tropical forest in Africa, and the second-largest in the world after the Amazon. The region’s forests cover about 2.8 million square kilometers, approximately 70 percent of which is dense forest of more than 60 percent canopy closure (Map 4). The country with the highest forest cover rate, of about 85 percent, is Gabon. Burundi, with forest cover of less than 5 percent of country area, has the lowest rate of cover (Table 1).

Source: Adapted from Mayaux et al. (1997).

Central African ecosystems are biologically diverse and support a wide variety of vegetation types—notably evergreen rainforests, deciduous semi-moist forests and woodlands, montane forests and moorlands, inundated or swamp forests, forest clearings or “bais,” peat bogs, mangroves, rivers, and lakes (Map 5 and Figure 2).

Montane systems: A special case

Montane ecosystems tend to be biologically rich, because within relatively small areas, changes in rainfall, temperature, and insolation associated with an altitudinal gradient result in the formation of a great variety of habitats and ecological niches. The mountainous regions of Cameroon and the highlands bordering the Albertine Rift in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda all reflect the high habitat richness typical of montane systems (Map 6). Though relatively low in taxonomic diversity compared to most lowland humid forests, these ecosystems harbor an important number of endemic species, such as Podocarpus usambarensis (Wilson and Catsis 1990).

Montane landscapes in Central Africa are typically volcanic in origin. Soils are highly fertile, although prone to erosion and mass slippage because of high rainfall and steep slopes. The high agricultural productivity of montane landscapes is reflected in the fact that they support the highest human population densities in Central Africa. Not surprisingly, given the level of demand for land and natural resources, montane habitats and species are under intense pressure; unspoilt montane landscapes are now rare outside of the national parks, and are being encroached upon even within the parks.

Of all landscapes in Central Africa, the montane areas are most at risk of habitat and species loss and are most in need of conservation investments.

C. Distribution and extent of shared water resources

1. Rivers

Central African hydrology is dominated by the Congo River Basin, the largest drainage system in Africa (Balek 1977) and the second-largest in the world. The Congo River drainage area covers 3.6 million square kilometers (Balek 1983) and includes almost all of the Democratic Republic of Congo, all but the southwest corner of the Republic of Congo, south and central Central African Republic, and southeastern Cameroon. The Songa, Ntem, Benito, and Ogooué Rivers form a basin that drains southern Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The northern Central African Republic is drained by the Chari River that flows into Lake Chad. Northern Cameroon is drained by the Bénoué that flows into the Niger and by the Logone that flows north to Lake Chad (Map 7; Boxes 2 and 3).

Average river runoff in Africa amounts to 2.1 million million cubic meters (2.1 x 10¹²) per year, of which 50 percent is generated within the Congo Basin. A mere 3 percent of annual stream flow is drawn off for human use. Water balance (the ratio of precipitation to evapotranspiration) is positive throughout most of the year within the region. Water stress nonetheless occurs in all but a few locations in Central Africa at some time during the year, with its length and severity increasing with latitude, and is a fundamental reason why the total flora of Central Africa is less than that of other tropical forest ecosystems. The region’s floristic diversity is nonetheless comparable to that of other regions (Richards 1952).

2. Lakes

There are eight freshwater lakes that border two or more countries in Central Africa. Of these, only Lake Chad lies outside the eastern rift valley region (Table 2). Lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu, and Tanganyika all support large numbers of fish species and are particularly diverse in Cichlids.

In addition to the lakes above, there are four more transboundary lakes in Central Africa: Mweru (shared by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia), Cyohoha and Rweru (both shared by Burundi and Rwanda), and Chad (Shared by Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria).

D. Biodiversity richness

1. Terrestrial biodiversity

The Central African region accounts for more than 60 percent of Africa’s biodiversity and ranks first in Africa for many taxonomic groups in terms of species richness. The numbers of plant, mammal, and bird species found in a sampling of Central African countries are presented in Table 3.

Source: WCMC database on global biodiversity (2000).

Many national parks and reserves lie along borders within the Central African region. Some are refuges of plant and animal species and are critical centers of endemism. These include:

• Korup National Park in Cameroon, contiguous with the Cross River National Park in Nigeria;
• Mount Cameroon National Park in Cameroon, bordering Nigeria;
• Campo and Ma’an reserves in Cameroon, bordering the Estuario de Rio Ntem Reserve in Equatorial Guinea;
• Altos de Nsok Reserve in Equatorial Guinea, bordering unprotected forests in Gabon;
• Conkouati National Park in the Republic of Congo, bordering unprotected forests and coastal landscapes in Gabon;
• Minkebe National Park in Gabon, bordering unprotected forests in Cameroon and the Republic of Congo;
• Nki forest reserve in Cameroon, bordering unprotected forests in the Republic of Congo; and
• Lobéké and Mongokele forest reserves in Cameroon, bordering the Dzanga–Sangha special reserve in the Central African Republic and the Nouabale–Ndoki National Park in the Republic of Congo.

2. Marine, coastal, and freshwater biodiversity

The Central African region is bounded in the west by a long Atlantic coast, extending from Cameroon to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and passing through Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, and Angola (Cabinda). This coastal area is a key breeding zone for marine turtles: more than 100 kilometers of beach, stretching from Mayumba in Gabon to the River Noumbi in the Republic of Congo, has been identified as the second most important site for marine turtle nesting in the world (Fretey 1998). The coast also is seasonally important for whales.

Mangroves additionally cover approximately 400,000 hectares in Gabon and 270,000 hectares in Cameroon. Mangroves harbor endemic flora and fauna, and are important breeding grounds for both marine and freshwater species of crustaceans, mollusks, fish, and birds (Mbog 1999; Makaya 1999).

E. Transboundary wildlife movement in Central Africa

In the absence of physical barriers to wildlife movement and plant dispersion, all species have the potential to cross political and land-tenure borders. In Central Africa, cross-border movement is most important for animals such as elephant, hornbills, mandrills, parrots, turtles, and cetaceans, which roam widely in search of scarce resources. Most other species are either highly territorial or do not require a large area to secure sufficient food, shelter, and mates to survive and reproduce.

1. Elephant

Central Africa constitutes the largest expanse of forest elephant range on the continent, and may harbor as many or more elephant as any other region in Africa (Table 4). Cross-border movements of elephant are common between the Central African Republic and Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad. Between 300 and 400 elephants additionally migrate between the Lake Chad region in Chad and Cameroon, spending most of their time in Cameroon (Tchamba et al. 1997).

Source: Said et al. (1995)

Barnes et al. (1999) confirmed the movements of elephant between the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda, tracking their movement from the Democratic Republic of Congo into the Queen Elizabeth National Park in Uganda and into the Toro/Semliki range in Uganda. Many of the animals may have used Queen Elizabeth National Park in Uganda as a refuge during the recent war. From the air, groups of elephant have also been seen moving from Toro/Semliki into the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is furthermore possible that elephant from Virunga National Park in Rwanda cross into the Democratic Republic of Congo.

High densities of elephant have been recorded in the forests that straddle the borders of southeast Cameroon, southwest Central African Republic, northern Republic of Congo (Turkalo and Fay 1995), and along the borders between Gabon and Cameroon and Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Elephant are known to cross the Sangha River between Cameroon and the Central African Republic and the Ngoko river between Cameroon and the Republic of Congo, and cross-border movements have been observed in the trinational zone between Congo, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of Congo. Elephant have been observed crossing the Sangha from Congo to the Republic of Congo, and cross-border movements are common between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon and between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, at the Ntem river. Elephant are also known to move between Cameroon and Gabon border across the Ayina river.¹

2. Marine fish

The coastal countries from Nigeria to Angola are characterized by the fact that they must share fish stocks, as most stocks extend beyond the exclusive exploitation zones of individual countries—individual stocks of species such as the horse mackerel may in fact be shared by all coastal nations in this region. Almost all stocks of marine fish are considered by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to be fully exploited or overexploited (FAO 2000).

3. Turtles

Five species of marine turtles are known to occur in the Atlantic Ocean near the coasts of Cameroon, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. These are the Loggerhead (Caretta caretta), Atlantic Green (Chelonias mydas), Leatherback (Dermochelys coriacea), Hawksbill (Eretmochelys imbricata), and the Olive Ridley (Lepidochelys olivacea) (Castroviejo et al. 1994). The Green and Hawksbill turtles are listed species by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). All five species of turtle are protected under Cameroonian legislation.

Three of the five species—the Olive Ridley, Leatherback, and Green turtles—have been known to nest in Cameroon, along the sandy shoreline between Equatorial Guinea and the Wouri Estuary. Local residents disagree as to the peak breeding season, but it is generally thought to be November to January. Four species—the Atlantic Green, Leatherback, Hawksbill, and Olive Ridley—come ashore to lay their eggs on the southern coast of Bioko Island in Equatorial Guinea during the dry season, November to February.

Between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon lies the Bay of Corisco, an area of approximately 1,570 square kilometers that has been identified as a year-round foraging ground for the Atlantic Green turtle and the occasional Hawksbill, Leatherback, and Olive Ridley. All species suffer heavy exploitation from local fishermen who use special nets, harpoons, and underwater guns to capture them. Hundreds of turtles are sold every year in the markets of cities such as Libreville and Bata (Bellini et al. 2000).

While Hawksbill nesting has not been confirmed at the beaches around the Bay of Corisco, more extensive surveys are still needed. Confirmed Hawksbill nesting sites in the region include Pointe Pongara, Gabon; São Tomé and Príncipe (Castroviejo et al., 1994); southern Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea (Butynski 1996); and the region of Gamba, Gabon (Bellini et al. 2000).

All marine turtles feed in quiet, low-energy areas—i.e., areas with gentler surf—but nest on high-energy beaches. Most follow long migratory routes between their feeding and breeding areas. It is thought that many Leatherback turtles follow a cyclical migratory route that goes north along the east coast of North America, east past Greenland and Iceland, and south past Britain, Ireland, and the Iberian peninsula to nesting sites in West and Central Africa, before turning west at the equator to head back to North America. A Hawksbill turtle tagged in Brazil within its feeding grounds in Fernando de Noronha was captured in Gabon (Bellini et al. 2000), having traveled 4,669 kilometers. Little is known about the feeding grounds and migratory routes for turtles that nest on the beaches of Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Gabon.

Sea turtles are subject to a wide variety of human influence, including the destruction of nesting beaches due to development; removal of eggs; the killing of juveniles and adults by incidental catch in shrimp trawls, in other nets, and on long lines; and death from pollution and collision with boats. Several potentially serious threats specifically affect the sea turtles in the Central African coastal area. Nest predation has not been well quantified but appears to be severe (Castroviejo et al. 1994). Humans, monitor lizards (Varanus sp.), and ghost crabs (Ocypode sp.) are all frequent predators of eggs. Some adult females are also taken by locals while nesting on the beaches. Another important, as yet unquantified threat is represented by demersal fisheries for shrimp, fish, and squid. It is unknown whether the trawler fleets use marine turtle excluder devices in their nets.

In Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, efforts are being made to increase awareness among fishermen of the importance of tag recoveries and to encourage them to turn tags over to researchers (Bellini et al. 2000). In addition, several small local projects, coordinated by PROTOMAC (Protection de Tortues Marines d’Afrique Centrale), have begun to implement sea turtle protection programs throughout the Gulf of Guinea. It is nonetheless recognized that conservation efforts in one region could be rendered useless by exploitation in another part of the range, and that only through the concerted efforts of all nations within the range of the turtle population can protection be fully effective (Bellini et al. 2000).

4. Migratory birds

European and Arctic migrants, particularly wading birds, visit the coasts, rivers, wetlands, and forests of Central Africa during the northern winter. Little information on numbers, spatial distribution, or threats is available.

About 177 bird species migrate to Africa during the European winter (Langrand 2000). Between 445 and 655 individuals of the species Sterna sandvicensis (Sandwich tern) are believed to reside in Gabon (Langrand 2000). European swallows (genus Hirundo) visit the Central Africa Republic during the European winter, and are often trapped and eaten by children using alate termites as bate (J. Marot, pers. comm.). At least one study of the long-range movements of hornbills has been undertaken, but to date (T. Smith, pers. comm.) no published information is available on the intraregional movements of birds such as hornbills and parrots.

5. Cetaceans

A range of whales, including humpback, right, sperm, fin, sei, orca, and dolphins, visits the waters off the coast of the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Cameroon, but little is known about their spatial distribution, movement patterns, or behavior.

F. Parks and reserves in border areas

Established in 1925 as the Albert National Park (809,000 hectares), the Virunga National Park was the first protected area in Central Africa. More than 300,000 square kilometers of national lands are now formally gazetted as parks or reserves, of which more than 50 percent abut international borders (Table 5; Map 8).

Though established ad hoc, the protected area network is surprisingly representative of the range of distinctive ecoregions (as defined by WWF–US) within Central Africa (Table 6).

Impact of armed conflicts on the management of border protected areas

Armed conflicts are increasingly degrading border protected areas and have often led to the suspension of management activities and a consequent decline in wildlife numbers. The lion (Panthera leo) has disappeared from the Akagera National Park in Rwanda as a result of the recent war, for example (Habiyambere 1999). The Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda, and the Kibira National Park in Burundi have all been degraded by refugee settlements and by the subsistence activities of refugees, such as firewood collection, hunting, and the collection of building material.

Mountain gorillas living in the contiguous landscape of the Volcanoes National Park, Virunga, and the Bwindi and Mgahinga National Park (Uganda) have all been affected by poaching, facilitated by the collapse of law enforcement and the emergence of armed militias during the civil wars there. Given this situation, it is remarkable that between 1992 and 1997 only 17 of the 620 extant mountain gorillas were killed (Table 7).

Source: Digit news (1998).

1. The author wishes to acknowledge Usongo, Nicanor, Mouncharou, De Watcher, Ndongo Allogho, and Huijbregts for the observations cited in this paragraph.

Chapter III. Sociocultural Context and Role of Communities

A. Historical overview of human occupation of the Congo Basin

During the last glacial period, rainfall in the Congo Basin was insufficient to support dense forest in all but a few remnant patches and river galleries, and the landscape was dominated by scrub savanna (Elenga et al. 1994; Jolly et al. 1998). It was not until 10,000–8,000 years ago, after the glaciers had receded and rainfall increased, that the savannas were fully recolonized by trees. By 3,000 years ago, the forest had reached somewhat beyond its present extent (Hamilton 1981; Hart et al. 1996). During this period the Congo Basin appears to have been primarily inhabited by small bands of hunter-gatherers that moved camp as resources were locally depleted (Mercader et al. 2000; Vansina 1986 and 1990).

Archaeological evidence shows that what are now the forest zones of Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon were occupied by farmers as long as 10,000 years ago. It was not until the Bantu expansion from what is now the Nigeria/Cameroon border, around 5,000 years ago, that agriculturalism spread thinly throughout Central Africa, however, (Vansina 1990), reaching what is now Uganda by A.D. 400. The ubiquitous presence of scorched oil palm kernels suggests that almost all of the forest has been cleared by subsistence farmers at least once, and thus should best be described as old regrowth forest (Oslisly 1995 and 1998; White and Oslisly 1999).

Although the forests have been used by humans as a source of food, medicine, construction materials, and agricultural production since the last glacial period, it was not until the last 100 years, when roads and railroads were constructed, that forest resources began to be exploited at an industrial scale for export to global markets. Between the 1940s and 1970s, export agriculture was an important component of the economies of Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, producing a pulse of deforestation. Low commodity prices and insufficient maintenance of the transportation infrastructure have since substantially reduced the economic viability of export agriculture, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, lowering the incentives for forest conversion. To national treasuries, timber constitutes the most important economic value of the forest, but to the household economy and to a few pharmaceutical companies, it is commercial trade in bushmeat and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) that has risen in importance.

Today, the countries of Central Africa can be divided roughly into two categories, based on their population density and level of urbanization. Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi are relatively densely populated and primarily rural; Gabon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea are more sparsely populated and more urbanized.

B. Who are the present managers of natural resources?

In Central Africa, natural resources are managed by households, clans, communities, the private sector, and government. Central African governments are the de jure owners of “unoccupied” lands. Governments—or more correctly, leaders in countries—typically allocate “unoccupied or unimproved” lands, in the absence of public debate, to timber exploitation, mineral extraction, agricultural plantations, or to parks and reserves, with the latter covering less than 6 percent of the landscape. Industrial-scale agricultural plantations cover only a small fraction of the landscape, with the notable exception of the Cameroon Development Corporation, which has huge land holdings in southwestern Cameroon. Once-extensive plantations of oil palm and coffee in the Democratic Republic of Congo have since the late-1980s largely been abandoned. Logging companies dominate the forest estate, accounting for 76 percent of Cameroon forests, 40 percent in Gabon, and almost 90 percent of northern Republic of Congo.

More than 12 million households, within communities of varying sizes, decide how to use the natural resources within their immediate vicinity. Rural people value and manage the forests and savannas as a source of agriculture soils and soil nutrients, construction materials, wildlife, and other NTFPs. In the past, extended families, clans, and tribes managed natural resources by restricting access to certain areas and to specific resources. Production of cash crops and an increase in literacy, labor mobility, and individual wealth have together with the superimposition of European laws and governance institutions altered these earlier systems of resource management, but have not totally destroyed them.

By customary law, households can extend their agricultural holdings through the process of mise en valeur, by cutting trees down and converting the forest to farmland. Household agriculture nonetheless today accounts for less than 10 percent of the forest zone, and seldom extends for more than 3–5 kilometers from the nearest road. The impact of hunting on wildlife populations, by comparison, can extend as far as 30 kilometers from human settlements.

Concentration of the responsibility for natural resource management in the hands of a few government officials and a few logging companies, neither of which are accountable to the citizenry, has resulted in considerable inequity in benefit sharing from natural resource exploitation, low compliance with resource management laws, and unsustainable resource use. Rural families have little, if any, formal authority over how natural resources located more than 3–5 kilometers from their settlements are used. They have no say in whether forests are allocated to logging companies or set aside as protected areas, and they receive little or no compensation for resources over which they have traditional claims but which they are prohibited from using. Unsurprisingly, local communities have typically responded by disregarding the law and participating in illegal “self-compensation” activities such as land encroachment and poaching.

C. What is the likely outcome of increased community-based management?

Granting local communities greater responsibility and authority in the management of natural resources has two primary desirable outcomes. The first is a more equitable share of the benefits that accrue from resource exploitation. The second is the more sustainable use of resources. In northern nations (i.e., nations in Europe and North America), high-profile lobbying by special interest groups, large-scale civil action, and most importantly the use of civil suits against government and the private sector have encouraged more open public debate, increased transparency, and greater accountability in the management of natural resources. More democratic decision making certainly reduces the risk that the resource practices of the minority will adversely impact the resource use concerns of the majority, and militates against rent capture by the few to the detriment of the many.

Natural resource conservation nonetheless tends to happen only when it either addresses the self-interest² of resource managers—i.e., those with the power and authority to regulate access to and use of resources—such as household heads, village elites, police, fishermen’s groups, or pitsawer teams, or when civil society deems that individual self-interest is undermining the interests of society as a whole.

In a global view of the drivers of deforestation, Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) reported that the effects of well-defined and secure property rights are ambiguous. In some cases where forest clearing is a means to obtaining property rights, the latter becomes merely an incentive for extensive clearing, and inadequate or inappropriate land management follows. This type of speculative land grabbing is common in Brazil and Central America but less so in Central Africa, despite the fact that mise en valeur remains the customary mechanism by which farmers privatize common-pool forests. Furthermore, holding formal rights to forest lands is no guarantee that communities or individuals can retain those lands. When the advent of Brazil nut production in Bolivia lowered the market price in Brazil, Brazilian community-forest owners cleared the forest instead for manioc (Assies 1997), the production of which had become 12 times more profitable than collecting Brazil nuts (Periera dos Santos and Lescure 1993).

The increased democratization of forest management can ameliorate inequities in benefit sharing from such resource exploitation. It should be noted, however, that it is less certain to result in increased conservation of natural landscapes.

D. Why are rural communities not already in control?

Centralized, paternalistic, and patronage-based political systems, inherited from colonial powers, characterize government–citizen relationships throughout Central Africa. When combined with the realities of limited access to education, the absence of legal and fiscal mechanisms to force public- and private-sector accountability, and government control of media and communications, this means that civil society efforts to make government more democratic, transparent, and honest are, at best, weak. This is particularly true for rural communities that have also experienced the erosion of traditional authority structures, and that are politically and economically marginalized.

E. Does the size of a community matter?

People share affinity with others based on kinship, proximity, social class, religious, ethnic and national identity, and special interests, such as profession, sports, or tastes. The greater the affinity within a group, the greater the social cohesion and social capital and the greater the likelihood that the group will act uniformly in any particular context. The less the affinity, the greater the disparity in interests and the more contentious will be attempts to come to group consensus. In broad terms, group affinity and social cohesion are likely to be strongest within communities of interest and weakest in communities of place, with communities of practice being somewhere in between. Unfortunately, in the past most community-based natural resource conservation efforts have focused on communities of place (such as villages), rather than on communities of practice (hunters) or communities of interest (banning whaling).

As group affinity and social cohesion decline, the more need there will be for a negotiation and conflict resolution mechanism that has checks and balances to ensure that powerful or vocal individuals or subgroups do not dominate group decisions on natural resource management. Put more simply, small, socially cohesive groups will be much more easily mobilized to work together for a common cause than will larger groups with less affinity. Larger groups will, however, have strength in numbers and thus may be more effective agents of change of government policies and private sector practices. The most effective way to retain the advantages of social cohesion and to achieve the necessary political stature in practice may be through coalitions of small groups.

F. Human land use and biodiversity conservation

When the access to and use of natural resources is not regulated, humans tend to transform wild lands to other land uses that provide greater tenure security and higher rates of return. Where trade increases the value of wild resources, there is a trend toward over-harvesting, on-farm production, and exclusion of resource users by resource managers. Agriculture almost always simplifies natural landscapes by removing the large variety of wild plants and animals that would compete for sunlight, water, and soil nutrients with the very few domesticated plants and animal that are valuable to humans.

Not all species of plants and animals are equally threatened by, or tolerant of, human use. Some species, like pigweed (Amaranthus spp.), thrive in human-disturbed landscapes, whereas others, like chimpanzee (Pan spp.), quickly disappear as human occupation and use of a landscape increases. Thus, although the genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity of human-occupied landscapes tends to be much lower per unit area than that typically found in even inadequately management-protected areas, not all species are equally at risk within anthropogenic landscapes.

Efforts to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources would be unnecessary if human use of these resources had no impact on their composition and abundance. Given increasing human populations and rising demand for resources, sustainable use and conservation typically means reducing the number of people who have access to natural resources and/or reducing the quantity of resource exploitation per unit area and time. Both of these solutions to unsustainable resource use will result in winners and losers. When New Zealand restricted access to its tuna fishery, many poor fishermen who were making a living from the unsustainable harvest of bluefin tuna lost their, admittedly short-term, source of living. Others who obtained individual transferable quotas saw their long-term access to tuna secured, the harvest of tuna decline, the quality and value of fish increase, and their livelihoods soar.

The challenge in sustainable resource management is to agree upon how much and what kind of change, if any, in the resource base is acceptable as a result of consumptive or nonconsumptive resource use. As all resource uses change the resource base in some way, the key is to legislate and to enforce observation of the threshold beyond which the change is considered unacceptable.

2. Self-interest in this context refers not only to the economic value of a resource, but also to its spiritual and cultural values. Preserving a patch of forest may be more important to an individual for its value as a family cemetery than as a source of timber, for example.

Chapter IV. Political and Legal Contexts for TBNRM

A. National policy context for TBNRM

The single most important national policy issue related to TBNRM is land and resource ownership. Inability to regulate access to and the use of resources leaves an open access system within which the actions of one resource user can impinge with impunity on the needs, concerns, health, and welfare of others. The absence of transparent, representative, and accountable systems of governance and of legal recourse that is available equally to citizens, companies, and government lie at the root of the struggle for more equitable land and resource tenure rights.

Barely 100 years ago, France, Belgium, Britain, Spain, and Germany carved up the Central African landscape into colonies. The vast majority of the area was claimed by France and Belgium and incorporated into French Equatorial Africa and King Leopold’s Congo Free State, respectively (Martelli 1962). In all of the colonies, large tracts of forest were assigned to concessionaires that were intent on extracting and exporting forest products such as ivory, antelope skins, feathers, and rubber (Copet-Rougier 1998; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1998 and 1999; Hardin 1997; Hochschild 1998).

French and Belgian control over forest resources was based on the colonial extension of the principles of Roman law, which holds that any “unoccupied” land for which ownership documents do not exist belongs to the colonial state. The most extensive application of this was the Torrens Title Act of 1902. The system takes its name from Robert Richard Torrens, who steered the measure through the South Australian Parliament in 1858. The principle was later adopted by most colonizing nations in Central Africa, where land settlement and tenure was the basis of their establishment. With passage of the act, colonial governments seized sole responsibility for registering and validating title, nullifying any previous title arrangements. By claiming all land for the colonial state, government was free to grant concessions and leases without concern for traditional tenure rights. As a result, virtually all forests were opened up to colonial control, and any formal recognition of the land rights of indigenous people was lost.

With loss of traditional tenure rights, Bantu farmers and to a lesser extent the hunter-gatherers were pressed into laboring for public work projects, such as the construction of roads and railroads, and for colonial plantations cultivating export crops such as oil palm, cotton, cocoa, and coffee. At this time, the traditional exchange relationship between farmers and foragers in the Belgian Congo was formalized and institutionalized by colonial administrators based on a system known as Circonscription Indigène, whereby farmers became the de jure political authority at the local level (Wilkie and Curran 1993).

In the early 1960s, the newly independent nations typically adopted or copied the acts of their colonial predecessors. In Gabon and the Republic of Congo, for example, governments continue the colonial French policy of denying the validity of customary titles to land, on the grounds that undeveloped primary forests are “vacant” and thus the sole property of the state. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the General Property Law of 1973 abolished the category of “native lands” that had earlier been recognized under customary tenure (BSP 1993). Secure private titles or leases to land can be obtained only through written application to the state authorities. Individual titles are granted by the state for an initial five-year period; definitive title can be acquired only once the land has been shown to be “developed”—usually implying the conversion of primary forest to agriculture. This mise en valeur ownership requirement is a common feature of land tenure in Central Africa. Not only is this process contentious, it provides a strong incentive to clear idle land or forest, and has adverse environmental consequences in cases where it encourages speculative land clearing that is followed by poor management and unproductive land use (Kaimowitz and Angelsen 1998).

Throughout Central Africa, land use and ownership is far more complicated and contradictory than suggested by the legal principles codified in national law. In many cases, the state, despite its legal authority, has neither the ability nor the desire to exercise effective control over lands used by local people. The de facto authority over use and management of the region is a complex mix of customary-use practices and rules, modern statutes and laws, legal and business agreements with foreign timber and mineral companies, and a wide variety of culturally and socially mediated tenure arrangement between adjacent ethnic groups.

Contradictions between oral customary law and the various written codes, regulations, and statutes that concern tenure rights to forests and other natural resources are exacerbated by conflicting interests between local people and government authorities. Functionaries are charged with increasing government revenues, especially in the wake of recent economic crises. Local forest dwellers, on the other hand, depend on the forest resources for daily consumption. These conflicting interests often lead to a reluctance by local resource users and government authorities to work out equitable arrangements for managing primary forests for sustainable use and conservation, and militate against development of formal TBNRM.

The persistence of this dual system means that rational land management, such as zoning and land-use planning, is ineffective in putting into place resource management rules and sanctions. Confusion over ownership and authority has produced open-access situations in much of the region, paving the way for the exploitation of natural resources.

The recent establishment of community forestry laws in Cameroon and Gabon, although flawed and implemented poorly, has begun to provide a legal framework for positive change. In other countries, experience has shown that the first round of decentralization is typically marked by laws that are nonparticipatory, bureaucratic, poorly grounded in knowledge of local institutions, dominated by an elite, and politically controversial (Ribot 1999). Nevertheless, even these can open up—often for the first time since the arrival of colonialism—opportunities for local-level negotiation for greater right. This process takes time and is likely to be marked by political turmoil. Poor and marginalized communities and interests, including women and ethnic minorities, are also unlikely to see significant benefits until they are able to advocate and build alliances with more powerful groups.

Realistically, unless the public sector becomes more transparent, representative, and accountable to its citizens, and unless civil society grows in strength to counterbalance the power of its leaders, the capacity of citizens to negotiate improvements in resource management practices with corporate or government land managers in adjacent landscapes will continue to be exceedingly limited.

B. Regional policy context for TBNRM

1. Historical attempts at regionalization

Regionalization is a reality in Africa, as in most other parts of the world, and is a key factor in the evolution of national and intergovernmental policies. Forty years after independence, the boundaries of Central Africa states, inherited from the colonial period, remain unchanged despite their ecological, cultural, and economic arbitrariness. Worse, the break-up at independence of colonial federations such as Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF) and the Central African Federation has had a lasting effect on moves to revive regional cooperation and integration.

The Union Dounière des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) was formed by Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Central African Republic in 1964 to replace the AEF. In 1968 the poorest members, Chad and the Central African Republic, left briefly to join what was then Zaire in the short-lived Union des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (UEAC). Rebuffed by the former French colonies to the west, Zaire, with French and Belgian support, worked toward establishment of the Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) with Burundi and Rwanda, in 1976. Seven years later, the UDEAC and CEPGL nations, along with São Tomé, formed the Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC). None of these regional organizations originated from “an endogenous philosophy” or from an “internal will shared by all actors.” Rather, “the concept meant little more than France, its principle architect, was trying to find a formula to reorganize its former Central African colonies into the grouping that would be most suitable to its own interests” (Ropivia 1999). Not surprisingly, these regional organizations have failed to achieve any tangible results (Kennes 1999). Similarly, nine years after the member states of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) signed the Treaty of Abuja, there is no evidence that they are any closer to their goal of establishing a continental common market by 2035 (Bach 1999).

That said, the Franc Zone (CFA, or Communauté Financière d’Afrique), is one of only two African regional institutions where integration does exist. The decision to preserve the Franc Zone was not an active sign of regional cooperation by the newly sovereign states, however, but was more a passive renunciation of total independence, because monetary integration within the Zone is guaranteed and controlled by a foreign state, France, as opposed to the members themselves of CFA (Pourtier 1999).

In 1992, in an attempt to avoid devaluation of the CFA franc, the members of the Franc Zone created the Conférence Interafricaines des Marchés d’Assurance (CIMA), followed in 1993 by the Conférence Interafricaines de Prévoyance Sociale (CIPRES) and the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation des Droit des Affaires en Afrique (OHADA). These programs were launched to help harmonize insurance, social welfare, and business regulations. Though they failed to prevent devaluation, the intergovernmental relations that developed as a consequence may have helped avoid the break-up of the Franc Zone. In September 1993, the permanent security committee of CEEAC recommended the creation, by all member states, of specialized crisis management units and the adoption of a nonaggression pact. Neither of these progressed beyond mere signatures on paper, nor did they prevent the conflict that now continues between Rwanda and what was formerly Zaire.

Devaluation of the CFA franc was followed by a restructuring of the inherited colonial institutions. The Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) was replaced by the Central African Monetary Community (CEMAC, or the Communauté Economique et Monetaire d’Afrique Centrale) in a treaty that was signed in 1994 but which remains unratified. Both the CEMAC treaty and its West African Franc Zone counterpart (UEMOA) were based loosely on the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome. As such all have similar provisions, such as the institution of a common market, the elimination of internal customs duties, the establishment of common external tariffs and trade policies and of common rules of competition, the free movement of workers, the right of establishment and freedom of provision of services, and the harmonization and mutual recognition of standards. The treaties additionally touch on the harmonization of economic, agricultural, transportation, teaching and vocational training, and environmental policies. The CEMAC treaty furthermore provides for the creation of a judicial chamber (i.e., an interstate court) and an audit office.

Given that UDEAC fell short of its objectives, it may be unrealistic to expect regional integration to improve within CEMAC, which is built on the same foundation—i.e., was initiated by outside agencies (the World Bank and the French Ministry of Cooperation), with largely the same provisions, and without the inclusion of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pourtier 1999).

The reluctance of member states to harmonize their fiscal and customs policies is maybe not surprising. The assumption that international borders are costly impediments to the flow of goods, capital, and labor ignores the large number of people at the frontiers who depend on tax and price disparities among nations for their livelihood. For example, in the early 1990s the reexport by smugglers of commodities from Gambia into Senegal accounted for 85 percent of Gambian imports and a substantial percentage of the economy of the capital, Banjul (Sall and Sallah 1994). In direct contrast to regular trade, trans-state trade (smuggling) depends on the lack of harmonization of customs tariffs, taxes, and commodity price subsidies; far from being an incentive for regional cooperation, it therefore contributes to isolationism. Dissolution of the seven-year-old Senegambian Confederation in 1989 occurred largely as a result of Gambian traders lobbying against a customs union that would end their lucrative but illegal trade with Senegal (Sall and Sallah 1994).

Concerns about barriers to regional cooperation that trans-state trade represents are most valid when considering the relationship between the Franc Zone countries and other countries. Even within the France Zone itself, however, differences in forest policies and taxation of the logging sector encourage trans-state timber smuggling and relabeling.

In essence, regional integration and cooperation is predicated on the existence of real political will, on comparable levels of development and volume of intraregional trade, and on the availability of affordable and reliable forms of communication (Ropivia 1999). None of these are currently assured in Central Africa.

2. New regional natural resource policy initiatives

Aware of the threats confronting Central African ecosystems and biodiversity, especially in transboundary areas, the countries of the region, in collaboration with donors and conservation organizations including IUCN, WWF, the European Commission, GTZ, the Government of the Netherlands, ECOFAC, BSP, CARPE, WCS, and GEF have launched several initiatives to promote more collaborative management of shared ecosystems. With these initiatives, decision makers in Central Africa have clearly signaled their interest in taking a leadership position in the sustainable management of transboundary natural resources. Their vision is expressed in the Brazzaville Declaration that launched the Conference on Central African Moist Forest Ecosystems (CEFDHAC), created by nine Central African countries: Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tomé and Principe. This executive branch process, led by the Ministers of the Environment of the countries involved, has helped characterize the interests and concerns of Central Africans and has taken the preliminary steps toward identifying priorities for a concerted forest management action across the region. CEFDHAC meetings bring together government representatives, parliamentary representatives, field practitioners, and representatives of local and international NGOs to discuss issues related to the cooperative management of Central African ecosystems and to explore ways and means to harmonize resource use policies and management interventions.

The importance of the CEFDHAC process was confirmed during the Heads-of-State Summit on Conservation and Sustainable Management of Central Africa Tropical Forests held in Yaoundé in March 1999 (for the main points of the Yaoundé Declaration see the Annex in the Trinational Initiative case study in this volume). Each country representative at the summit affirmed the importance of forest resources to local and national economies, the importance of protected areas to conserve the region’s unique biodiversity, and the need for transboundary management of shared ecosystems. Neighboring countries were invited to join this initiative to accelerate the creation of transboundary protected areas (WWF 2000).

Commitments made at the Heads-of-State Summit—for example, to establish joint management by WWF and WCS of the trinational Park between Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of Congo, and to implement a landscape approach for the management by WWF, ECOFAC, GTZ, and SNV of the zone connecting Cameroon, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo—have already started to be implemented on the ground. Lack of financial resources is, however, limiting the extension of these principles to other critical transboundary sites for environmental conservation in Central Africa.

C. International policy context for TBNRM

The nations of Central Africa are signatories to a wide array of international conservation and international resource management treaties, including the following (see also Table 8):

• African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Algiers, 1968;
• Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), signed in Ramsar, Iran, 1971;
• Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the World Heritage Convention), adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization) in Paris, 1972;
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES Convention), 1975;
• Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention, or CMS), adopted in Bonn, 1979;
• Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention), Basel, 1989;
• United Nations Framework Convention on Global Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 1992;
• Convention on Biodiversity, Rio de Janeiro, 1992; and
• Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, Lusaka, 1994.

Note: Dates indicate the yearwhen a country accededto or ratified a convention.

These environmental treaties provide a framework for national-level management of natural resources and, in the case of CITES and the Basel and Bonn conventions, for formal discussions with neighboring states concerning the transboundary management of resources and resource uses. Because few if any international conventions mandate sanctions against signatories that fail to comply with convention provisions, however, the only mechanism that can promote effective implementation is adverse international opinion and the embarrassment of the head of state. For example, while UNESCO can bestow on a nation the prestige of establishing a World Heritage Site, it has no means of enforcing the effective management of the site—World Heritage Site status has never, in fact, been revoked for failure to effectively conserve the site’s resources. While establishment of World Heritage Site status signifies that an area has been recognized as being of global biodiversity or cultural importance, it does nothing to ensure the long-term persistence of the site.

Despite ratification by Central African nations of a range of different international and regional conventions, the text of these treaties often conflicts with or is countermanded by national resource management policies, laws, and regulations. For example, though all Central African nations are signatories to CITES, it is still legal in some countries to hunt, as trophies, wildlife species listed by CITES. Even the 1994 Lusaka Agreement— signed by the Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Swaziland, South Africa, and Zambia—that established an international task force to combat illegal trafficking in African wildlife, has, at least in the case of the Republic of Congo, done little to strengthen the implementation of CITES and the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Chapter V. Institutional and Organizational Capacity

A. National level

In 1993, AWF, WWF, and WCS conducted a review of protected-area management capacity in the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Cameroon, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). The focus of the review was primarily on the training needs of protected-area managers; little information was reported on the resource management capacity of the responsible ministries and institutes.

Rather than attempt to characterize the natural resource management capacity of each nation within Central Africa, it is more appropriate here to simply examine the single, arguably representative case of the Central African Republic. The Ministry of Environment, Water, Forests, Hunting, and Fishing is responsible for the management of all Central African Republic forests, rivers, lakes and protected areas. The ministry has 328 employees and an annual salary requirement of US$ 600,000, for which the government budgeted a mere US$ 71,000 in 1999. Worse, only 19 employees are assigned to field-based positions. The country has more than 62,000 square kilometers of protected areas, with each manager therefore responsible for regulating natural resource use in an area of more than 3,200 square kilometers. That area of responsibility would increase tenfold if the country’s entire land area were to be included. The ministry owns only five vehicles, all of which are stationed in the capital, Bangui, meaning the field stuff must police their area on foot. Realistically, the Central African Republic has negligible capacity to control access to and regulate the use of natural resources within its protected areas, forest reserves, and lived-in landscapes. Even if all 328 ministry employees were stationed in field positions they would be unable to cover the required area on foot, and with annual salaries of less than US$ 220 they would in any case be easy targets for bribery.

Each country in Central Africa has its own resource management capacity challenges, but the case of the Central African Republic is not qualitatively different to that of any other country. Gabon’s wildlife agency, for example, has only 13 staff members for a country half the size of France. In the Republic of Congo, the Ministry of Economic Forestry, Fishing, and Fisheries employs 722 people, but having lost all of its vehicles, radios, and computer equipment in the civil war has little capacity for resource management.

That said, although the absolute economic investment in conservation by Central African governments is extremely low relative to that of nations in the north (Europe and North America), their contribution relative to the size of their national economies is often comparable to that of wealthier nations (Table 9). On average, African nations spend 0.19 percent of their national budget on protected area management—more than twice that of the wealthy European and North American nations, which spend on average only 0.08 percent. In real terms, however, they spend only about US$ 373 per square kilometer of protected area (or US$ 117, if Kenya and South Africa are removed from the equation), compared to the US$ 2,768 spent by the European and North American nations. The pressures of population in some parts of Europe and North America may make protection of certain areas there more expensive, but these figures still suggest that the level of spending on protected areas in most of Africa is inadequate (Bell and Clarke 1984; Leader-Williams and Albon 1988).

A recent study in Cameroon by Culverwell (1998) provides the only detailed accounting of protected area management costs and financing within the Congo Basin. Cameroon has 14 protected areas, covering 20,644 square kilometers, and has proposals in place that would extend protected land to 42,574 square kilometers, or approximately 9 percent of the country’s landmass. Government expenditures on the present protected area network in 1996 were US$ 143,325, or 0.01 percent of Cameroon’s annual budget of US$ 1.2 billion. In terms of the percentage of government budget devoted to protected areas, Cameroon is near the bottom of the global league table: Bangladesh also invests 0.01 percent of budget in protected areas, India 0.03 percent, Papua New Guinea 0.09 percent, and Bhutan 0.29 percent, for example (Braatz et al. 1992) (see Table 9 for further comparisons). In purchasing power parity terms, Cameroon spends US$ 0.06 per capita on protected areas, compared to US$ 7.40 per capita in the United States. Even controlling for differences in per capita GNP, Cameroon spends proportionally less on protected area management than does the United States. A comparison made by Culverwell of actual spending on three of Cameroon’s 14 protected areas found that average government investment in protected area management since 1986 covered less than 20 percent of required operating costs (Culverwell 1998).

Source: James et al. (1997); ART (1998); CIA (1992).

With the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, Cameroon government spending on protected areas has fallen in dollar terms by 50 percent since 1993. In 1996, spending on all protected areas ranged from zero to US$ 9.00 per hectare per year (US$ 9.00/ha/yr), with a median of US$ 0.12/ha/yr. This compares poorly with the spending in other regions, such as Germany (US$ 8/ha/yr), the Netherlands (US$ 56/ha/yr), the United States (US$ 19/ha/yr), Kenya (US$ 27/ha/yr), and the private Monteverde reserve in Costa Rica (US$ 12/ha/yr) (Aylward et al. 1996). Culverwell (1998) estimates that the current protected area system requires US$ 1,901,874 per year to effectively cover all recurring costs, with the proposed expansion of the protected area system raising recurring costs to more than US$ 2.9 million per year. To achieve this, Cameroon would need to increase its per capita investment 20-fold, to 0.25 percent of its annual budget, a proportion equivalent to that of Canada.

B. Regional level

At least two regional-scale organizations exist in Central Africa that are concerned with natural resources management. The first is CEFDHAC, a ministerial-level organization supported in part by IUCN. The second is the CITES Bushmeat working group, established at the April 2000 CITES meeting in Nairobi.

CEFDHAC was established in 1996, and has since held three major meetings to strengthen and facilitate regional cooperation between Central African countries in the conservation and sustainable use of moist-forest ecosystems. CEFDHAC has commissioned and undertaken several projects, including the following:

• A comparative study of the forest laws and policies of five Central African states (Cameroon, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Rwanda) that is now in press.
• Identification of critical sites for biodiversity conservation.
• Development, in collaboration with the Interafrican Forest Industries Association (IFIA), of a code of conduct for the sustainable use of forest concessions. Once approved, this code of conduct will be signed by IFIA members, who will be bound to respect and promote it throughout their profession.
• A study on timber taxes and concession fees in the region.

CEFDHAC has also recently published a draft of its strategic action plan for natural resource conservation in the region. If formally adopted by the participating nations, this document will help guide the future transboundary resource management policies and practices of CEFDHAC members.

The CITES Bushmeat working group has established representation by each nation in Central Africa, and is in the process of developing a plan of action.

C. Role of international organizations

At present, international donors and NGOs are primarily responsible for the financial and technical management of resource conservation activities within Central Africa. They are supported in this by a growing cadre of young social and biological scientists from around the region, who are increasingly playing key roles in resource conservation projects throughout Central Africa.

Chapter VI. Economic Rationale and Financial Feasibility

A. Economies of scale versus transaction costs

One of the attractions of Transboundary Natural Resource Management is the belief that there are economic efficiencies to be captured that can increase the return on investment in biodiversity conservation. The lack of public access to information on capital investment and recurring costs related to protected areas in Africa (Wilkie et al. 2000a) unfortunately means that no data exist to confirm or confute the reputed cost savings associated with TBNRM.

Hypothetically, direct economic benefits can be expected when neighboring management authorities share the costs of purchasing and maintaining capital equipment and share research, training, and tourist facilities that would otherwise lie idle for much of the time. Where equipment and facilities are fully utilized by a management authority, no cost savings should be expected. Indirect economic benefits may also be accrued as a result of the free flow of information among neighboring management authorities. For example, the timely exchange of information about the activity of law breakers should enable neighboring authorities to reduce the number of law enforcement patrols they maintain.

As transboundary management moves from local collaboration between neighboring management authorities to the harmonizing of national resource management policies, the political and transaction costs are likely to increase, at least in the beginning. In the absence of firm data, the size of these costs in practice is hard to estimate. A couple of interesting questions emerge: if TBNRM generates such cost savings, (a) why have more TBNRM initiatives not been developed? and (b) why do the existing TBNRM efforts not document these purported cost savings?

B. Financial feasibility: Lessons from protected areas

In sub-Saharan Africa, conservation of biodiversity is increasingly predicated on finding ways to insure that the economic value of maintaining a landscape in its natural state meets or exceeds the expected returns from converting the area to an alternative land use, such as agriculture. Saying that African biodiversity constitutes a priceless national heritage will not result in these resources being conserved unless, as Richard Bell notes, we are willing to define the price and pay it (Adams and McShane 1996). Quite simply, if they are to remain wild and intact, Africa’s wildlands must generate, directly or from government and donor contributions, funds sufficient to cover both the operating costs of conservation and the opportunity costs of foregoing other forms of resource use. To understand the scale of fund raising required it is critical (1) that more information is made available on the actual capital and recurring cost expenditures on protected areas; (2) that we develop empirically based tools for estimating protected area management costs under different threat regimes; and (3) that we fully account for the opportunity costs of setting aside natural resources within protected areas.

Governments and donors spend approximately US$ 10 million per year on protected area management in Central Africa. Fully funding the staff and infrastructure needed to insure the long-term persistence of species within the present protected area network in Central Africa would cost three times this amount. The costs of biodiversity conservation are a function of the human pressure on natural resources, which in turn is related to the ratio of area to perimeter of a given conservation area, proximity to roads and population centers, and the price of forest goods. As a result, most protected areas in Central Africa are typically large and in isolated areas, where human pressure and the costs of management are relatively low. A system comprising a few big parks may not effectively represent the full range of biodiversity within a region, and some have argued for the creation of an additional network of small protected areas scattered throughout landscape that is dominated by human land uses. Such a network would cost more to manage than does a few large parks, however. Using a formula developed by the Africa Resources Trust for protected areas in Southern Africa, paying for conservation within five parks of 500,000 hectares each would require a total of approximately 350 staff, an annual investment of US$ 4 million (US$ 137 per square kilometer), and an initial capital expenditure of US$ 20 million. In contrast, a network of 500 much smaller parks covering the same total area would require 10 times as many staff, an annual investment of US$ 68 million (US$ 2,721 per square kilometer), and almost US$ 318 million in start-up costs.

The costs of biodiversity conservation outside of protected areas is much harder to estimate, as rarely if ever has it been quantified. Globally, spending on protected areas amounts to approximately 0.2 percent of national budgets. It might therefore be fair to assume that demand for biodiversity conservation is such that users of the landscape outside of protected areas would be willing to pay or forego 0.2 percent of the revenue they generate to minimize the adverse environmental impacts of land-use practices, and to conserve species and habitats on their land. In Cameroon, dense forest covers approximately 200,000 square kilometers, logging concessions occupy 80 percent of forests outside of protected areas, and agriculture occupies 14 percent of the forest landscape. Based on the relative contribution of the logging and agricultural sectors to GNP in Cameroon and on the area of forest occupied by each land use, the estimated cost to reduce environmental impacts on lived-in landscapes in Cameroon would be US$ 8 per square kilometer in logging concessions and US$ 95 per square kilometer in agroecosystems. The total costs for conservation-friendly land uses in forests outside of protected areas might be US$ 1 million per year in logging concessions and US$ 4 million per year in agroecosystems. Assuming a similar cost structure across Central Africa, the total costs for promoting more biodiversity-friendly resource use practices outside of protected areas might exceed US$ 40 million per year.

Conserving the full range of biodiversity characteristic of Central Africa will require investment in a network of protected areas and in efforts to minimize the adverse environmental impacts of economic land uses in the majority of forests that lie outside of protected areas. The estimated annual cost of this landscape approach to conservation in Central Africa would probably exceed US$ 70 million, or US$ 17 per square kilometer each year. This is a minuscule amount when compared to the US$ 1,200 per square kilometer per year that is spent on the management of national parks alone in the United States.

1. What are the likely sources of conservation monies?

Many authors have argued that, provided that most of the revenues collected from fees are specifically allocated for conservation, many protected areas in developing countries could substantially increase their revenues through a combination of tourism charges—to a large degree targeted primarily at foreign visitors to parks and reserves, but also including a sliding scale for national tourists—and fees and taxes that apply primarily to individuals or businesses resident in the nation. (Aylward et al. 1996; de la Harpe 1996; Dixon and Sherman 1991; Durban and Ratrimoarisaona 1996; Ferraro and Kramer 1997; Hannah 1992; Howard 1995; MacKinnon et al. 1986; Sherman and Dixon 1991).

Spergel (Spergel et al. 2000) notes that many nations have attempted to raise monies for conservation through: park entry fees, airport entry and departure taxes, road tolls, dive and tracking fees, hotel taxes, and hunting and fishing licenses and trophy fees (i.e., tourism fees and taxes); and property and sales taxes, logging and mining concessions fees, watershed protection charges (users of water are charged to ensure that upstream watersheds are protected, thus ensuring a regular supply of water), pollution and resource degradation fines, lottery revenues, and fuel taxes (i.e., individual and corporate taxes).

a. Tourism

The belief that tourism fees can contribute significantly to protected area management in the Congo Basin is optimistic at best. Tourism is typically economically viable only where charismatic species exist in “safe” areas that are not more than a few hours by four-wheel-drive vehicle from an international airport. On the face of it, this precludes the possibility of most of Central Africa ever engaging in economically viable tourism; unless tourists can easily visit Congo Basin sites, these sites are unlikely to attract large numbers of fee-paying visitors. (Wilkie and Carpenter 1999b).

Gorilla tourism in Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo was, however, a major source of finance both for protected areas and for the national economies until civil unrest scared visitors away (Adams and McShane 1996; Butynski and Kalina 1998). Dzanga–Sangha in the Central African Republic also has decent tourist facilities, and tourists can be assured of seeing forest elephant, lowland gorilla, and often bongo. While tourist fees are for the first time covering the recurring costs of providing tourist services (Blom 2000), however, the high travel costs relative to those of other destinations in Africa, a bone-shaking 8–12 hour drive on a dry day from the nearest airport, and civil unrest make it highly unlikely that tourism revenues will ever recover the costs of donor investment in tourist infrastructure, let alone contribute significantly to the recurring costs of park management. Similarly, La Lopé reserve in Gabon supports large populations of elephant, gorilla, and drills, and has direct charter flights and train access from Libreville, yet the air-conditioned tourist hotel loses money (Lee White, pers. comm.). In Odzala National Park in the Congo, projections for increasing gorilla tourism suggest that if annual visitation rose to 480 tourists, more than US$ 300,000 would be generated for park management and the national treasury—but after tax, the tour operator would only be expected to make US$ 19,000 in profit (Conrad Aveling, pers. comm.). If tourism is marginal in the best established and most accessible sites, with abundant and charismatic wildlife, prospects for a viable tourist industry in the more isolated, less well-endowed protected areas in the Congo Basin are not encouraging.

b. Sport hunting

Sport hunting, particularly of elephants, has proven an effective approach to raising local revenues and financing protected areas in southern Africa (Cumming 1989; Leader-Williams et al. 1996; Wilkie and Carpenter 1999c). However, governments, donors, and international conservation NGOs are uncertain as to the potential role that safari or trophy hunting could play in financing biodiversity conservation in the Congo Basin, because almost no quantitative information exists on (1) the number of safari hunters visiting the region, (2) the number of animals harvested by safari hunters each year, and (3) the revenues generated from safari hunting (Wilkie and Carpenter 1999c). Moreover, the average biomass (30,000 kilograms per square kilometer) and productivity (150 kilograms per square kilometer per year) of large mammals (i.e., mammals of greater than 1 kilogram adult body size) within tropical forests is only 10–20 percent of that typical of tropical grasslands (Robinson and Bennett 1999a). Thus off-take rates and possibly profits from safari hunting might be one-tenth that expected from savannas in Eastern and Southern Africa.

c. Marketing NTFPs

Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) are harvested by most rural families, are consumed by both rural and urban households, and are important as supplementary income and as an insurance safety net to smooth consumption during and after shocks. The most economically valuable NTFPs are also typically the most rapidly overharvested, resulting in the depletion of wild populations and a shift toward domestication and on-farm production (Sunderland et al. 1999; Wilkie 1999). If NTFP extraction were to be reduced to ecologically sustainable levels, harvester profit margins would decline and would possibly serve as an incentive to convert the forest to alternative, more lucrative uses, such as coffee or cacao plantation. More often than not, sustainable harvesting of wild resources is not economically sustainable, and vice versa (Freese 1997 and 1998).

d. Fees and taxes

Resource-use fees and taxes (taking lotteries to be voluntary taxes) on the citizens of Central African nations may not generate significant revenues for resource conservation because: (1) per capita income is typically low, and thus capacity and willingness to pay for conservation is extremely limited; (2) the size of domestic economies is typically small, as consequently is the tax base; (3) real estate markets are either nonexistent or are limited to urban areas; and (4) much of the economy and credit systems are informal. Similarly, though corporate taxes could be increased, or at least rigorously collected, it is doubtful that governments would earmark the additional revenues for biodiversity conservation when other, much more pressing issues, such as public health and education, are severely underfinanced.

e. Trust funds

If insufficient and unreliable funding is the primary constraint to effective management of protected areas, then trust funds are the holy grail of conservation financing. The World Wildlife Fund is investigating the possibility of developing a trust fund for the protected-area system in Cameroon and for Dzanga–Sangha reserve in the Central African Republic, and WCS is exploring opportunities for endowing the Nouabale–Ndoki National Park (NNNP) in northern Republic of Congo.

Culverwell (1998) estimates the recurring costs for effective management of the present protected-area system in Cameroon to be US$ 1.9 million. This would rise to more than US$ 2.9 million if all proposed areas were to be included in an extended protected-area network. To generate sufficient interest to pay all management costs of the network, a trust fund would need to be established at a level of US$ 30–40 million (Moye 1998). In the Republic of Congo, a trust fund of US$ 6–10 million would be needed to cover the estimated US$ 600,000 of recurring costs to manage the NNNP. Although several attempts have been made to establish conservation trust funds in the region, few have been adequately capitalized because donors appear resistant to relinquishing control and losing brand recognition. As a result, the trust fund concept needs to be revised to allow single donors to fully capitalize a fund that is designed to achieve specific measurable targets. In this way donors would retain sole ownership and would be explicitly aware of what they are “buying.”

2. Demand for conservation and unwillingness to pay

Global demand for protected areas (i.e., parks, reserves, and world heritage sites) is small relative to demand for the economic uses of natural landscapes. This is reflected in the fact the nations rarely, if ever, set aside more than 6 percent of their terrestrial landscapes for parks and reserves in which biodiversity conservation is the primary, or sole, land use. In most nations, more than 90 percent of the landscape is zoned for resource extraction and land-cover conversion. This is unsurprising as protected areas seldom pay for themselves—on the contrary, they usually result in substantial management and opportunity costs for the local, national, and international economies. Some conservation biologists nonetheless argue that 10–50 percent of the terrestrial landscape must be placed under some form of biodiversity management if we are to ensure the long-term survival of most extant plant and animal species.

If human land and resource use did not adversely impact biodiversity there would be no need for conservation investments, which most often require that existing levels of use are drawn down to ensure that options for use are retained for the future. So who is to pay for the resource management needed to ensure a drawdown in resource use levels, and who is to pay the opportunity costs of forgone benefits?

User fees are unlikely to generate revenues sufficient to cover the recurring costs of managing protected areas, international NGOs appear unwilling to attribute the profits from their substantial endowments to establish trust funds to cover the management costs of key protected areas in perpetuity, and national governments have more pressing uses for scarce capital. The onus thus falls to donors and international conservation NGOs, which must decide whether the global value of biodiversity within the Congo Basin is sufficient to warrant taking responsibility for financing its conservation over the long term.

The international community may argue that the global value of biodiversity in the region is significant, but given the community’s past performance it is unlikely that it will raise its financial commitments. Consequently, donors must prioritize their investments, and must decide which protected areas in the Congo Basin warrant increases in support to ensure effective biodiversity conservation and which areas are to be fiscally degazetted. If they continue to underfinance too many protected areas and fail to make the hard choices associated with prioritizing protected area spending, most, if not all, protected areas within the Congo Basin will exhibit continued gradual degradation and progressive loss of biodiversity.

Chapter VII. Trends in Land and Natural Resource Use

Rural populations, particularly those living in forest zones, rely almost entirely on the natural resource base for their subsistence. The forest is essential as a source of shelter, food, and energy. Most rural people extract a wide range of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), such as bushmeat, vegetables, fruits, saps, medicines, and mushrooms. For many people living in sparsely settled rural areas with limited or no access to agricultural markets, the revenues they generate from their use of forest resources continue to meet most of their needs.

Forest resources have been able to meet the needs of the indigenous population for hundreds of centuries, but the human population in Africa has increased eightfold since 1900 and is expected to double in the next 25 years. Even if consumption patterns of forest resources do not increase, harvesting pressure on most wild resources is likely to rise in the near future beyond sustainable levels. Harvesting of many NTFPs and of bushmeat is already unsustainable in many areas in Central Africa (Sunderland et al. 1999; Wilkie and Carpenter 1999a).

The human impact on forest and savanna landscapes takes the form of conversion to agriculture, settlements, or infrastructure, or of resource extraction. Agriculture, logging, fishing, hunting, NTFP harvesting, and water resource use all occur across national and land-ownership borders. In the Central African region, the most acutely felt impact is probably that of cross-border illegal hunting and transportation of wildlife.

A. Agriculture

More than 24 million people inhabiting the forests of Central Africa (Bahuchet and de Maret 1995) rely on shifting cultivation to meet their dietary needs. Assuming an average field size of 0.2 hectares per adult equivalent (Wilkie et al. 1999) and a conservative fallow period of 20 years (Bahuchet and de Maret 1995), Central Africa’s farmers need approximately 20 million hectares of land for sustainable cultivation. This is equivalent to 11 percent of the forest lands within all Central African nations, and matches the area of forest that is already degraded today, as estimated using remote sensing image analysis (Laporte et al. 1998) (Table 10).

Even were agricultural practices to remain largely unchanged, almost all forest in the Central African Republic might be converted to agricultural land by 2025. Even in Gabon, where 60 percent of the population of 1 million lives in cities, more than 20,000 square kilometers of forest might be degraded over the next 25 years (assuming that most food in Gabon is produced domestically). Both Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea risk seeing the percentage of degraded forest increase to more than 50 percent by 2025.

Source: Mayaux et al. (1997).

B. Logging

Logging is important as a source of employment and national revenue, and is a primary cause of degradation of the forest estates. In 1998, timber generated 28 percent of all nonpetroleum export revenues and millions of dollars in taxes in Cameroon. The logging sector is one of the largest employers in both Cameroon and Gabon, and often plays a key role in bringing roads, education, medical care, and electricity to rural areas (Bikie et al. 2000; Collomb et al. 2000). Logging companies are both the de jure and de facto managers of huge areas of forest in Central Africa. In Cameroon, 80 percent of the forest estate outside of protected areas is zoned for logging (Bikie et al. 2000); in Gabon, the figure is 50 percent (Collomb et al. 2000).

Unlike in the Diptocarp forests of tropical Southeast Asia or in temperate forests where timber companies fell most, if not all, trees in a given area, logging in Central Africa focuses on three to five primary species that may be sparsely distributed throughout the forest. Although as many as 80 species of trees are logged commercially, fewer than five account for the majority of wood exports. In Cameroon, Sapelli (Entandrophragma cylindricum) and Ayous (Triplochiton scleroxylon) comprise more than one-third of all logs exports; in Gabon, Okoumé (Aucoumea klaineana) accounts for more than 70 percent (Bikie et al. 2000; Collomb et al. 2000).

In northern Republic of Congo in 1989, the SFAC (Societé Forestiere Algero-Congolaise) concession removed, on average, one tree every 6.6 hectares. Sapelli (E. cylindricum) accounted for more than 75 percent of all trees felled. Comparison of inventory and logging records showed that more than 90 percent of all Sapelli trees within the SFAC concession that exceeded minimum statutory size limits were removed (Wilkie et al. 2000b).

Selective logging of tree species that occur at low densities within the forests of northern Republic of Congo typically removes or damages less than 7 percent of the canopy. The extent of disturbance at felling sites is in fact likely to be less than that of natural tree falls (Hart et al. 1989), as any attached lianas are cleared prior to tree cutting, thus reducing pulldowns of neighboring trees or tree limbs.

The reduction in canopy cover by logging in Central Africa (Struhsaker 1996 and 1997; White 1994; Wilkie et al. 1992) is considerably less than the 30 percent threshold estimated by Skorupa (1986) that would adversely affect primate species in a Ugandan forest, and is less than the 38 percent estimated by Thiollay (1992) to have caused a 25–30 percent loss of bird species richness in a Guyanan forest. Canopy removal as a result of one cycle of selective logging, typical of old-growth logging in Central Africa, may not therefore have a major adverse effect on forest primates and birds. This contention is further bolstered by the fact that commercially exploited tree species are primarily wind-dispersed emergents, and thus are not major food sources for frugivorous primates and birds. In fact, vegetation regrowth that occurs after a logged area is abandoned may increase the availability of food for folivorous species such as elephant (Fay 1991), gorilla, and duikers (Carroll 1996; McCoy 1995; Nummelin 1990). The near-complete removal of old-canopy-height Sapelli trees may, however, adversely affect species-dependent folivores and their predators, and may reduce the availability of some species of caterpillars that are seasonally collected by humans as a food source (Hladik et al. 1990).

The old-growth logging that is the characteristic practice throughout most of Central Africa progresses like a wave over the landscape as timber companies enter into unlogged areas in search of the few valuable trees that are scattered throughout the forest. Once these are logged the company quickly moves on to the next area. To find and harvest these trees, loggers must construct numerous survey trails and roads; this both heavily fragments the forest and opens it up to hunters. A hunting trip that might have taken days to undertake before the arrival of logging may be reduced to a few hours when the hunter can hitch a ride on a logging vehicle (Auzel and Wilkie 1999). With a ride from the logging company, the bushmeat hunter additionally no longer has to carry his catch on his back, and can kill many more animals on each trip. Logging companies thus not only directly increase demand for meat by bringing in a large workforce, they also greatly facilitate the entry of workers into the commercial supply of bushmeat to urban markets (Wilkie et al. 2000b).

C. Fisheries

Although most ethnic groups in Central Africa consume fish, only 11 are specialist riverine fishers, and 5 specialist marine fishers (Bahuchet and de Maret 1995). Fishers primarily use nets, traps, or long-lines, but poison fishing and dynamiting also occur throughout the region.

Coastal fish stocks from Guinea to the Democratic Republic of Congo are typically less abundant than those from Mauritania north, and Angola south. The large trigger fish stock (Balistes spp.) has now virtually disappeared in this region. Fishing of demersal stocks has been concentrated on inshore zones and on juveniles, and most demersal stocks are now fully exploited or overexploited, economically and biologically. The state of deep shelf and slope resources is not well known, however. Small pelagic species (Sardinella aurita, S. maderensis, Scomber japonicus, and Engraulis encrasicolus) are important, and constitute a shared but highly variable resource. Those in the western Gulf of Guinea are considered fully exploited, but the biomass of those in the southern Gulf of Guinea may actually be increasing (FAO 2000).

The management of tropical stocks seems to favor species assemblages and communities rather than individual species, aggravating the difficulties of stock assessment and therefore the adoption and implementation of appropriate management measures (FAO 2000).

Lack of information on the abundance, recruitment, and movement patterns of most riverine and lacustrine fish species makes estimates of the sustainability of riverine and lacustrine fishing and the value of transboundary fishery management mere speculation (Robin Abell, pers. comm.). Massive illegal overhunting of hippopotamus in the Rwindi region of the Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo to supply meat to refugees in Goma and Bukavu is likely to have substantially reduced the nutrient flows into Lake Edward (Lac Idi Amin Dada), and consequently the production of the algae and algal-eating cichlids that form the basis of a substantial regional fishery.

D. Water resource uses and environmental impacts

The high volume of river flow and the fact that the underlying geology of the area has led to the formation of steep falls or rapids near the coast means that the rivers of Central Africa have tremendous hydropower generating potential (Revenga et al. 1998). Dams on some shared rivers for the production of hydroelectric power or irrigation water have been constructed or are under consideration, including the following:

• Inga Shaba dam on the Congo River. The Inga Shaba dam supplies electricity to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Angola. At full capacity (i.e., continuous operation 24 hours per day, 365 days per year) the 1,800 megawatt powerstation could generate 15 billion kilowatt hours per year, or twice the total energy consumption of all Central African states.
• The Rusizi I and Rusizi II dams on the Rusizi River between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These two dams produce electricity for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi.
• Lake Lagdo in Cameroon was created in 1986 with the construction of a dam on the Benue River. The dam reduced peak riverine discharges (measured at Yola, Nigeria) by 44 percent, from 3,330 to 1,870 cubic meters per second.
• Studies are underway for the construction of a dam at Rusumo on the Kagera River, with the intention of supplying electricity to Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda.
• Waza-Logone irrigation dam in the far north of Cameroon, close to Lake Chad.

Hydropower delivers 80 percent or more of all electricity consumed in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia. With the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon has the greatest potential in Africa for hydroelectric power generation. More than 110 possible sites have been identified, with a combined potential capacity of 500,000 megawatts. If Cameroon develops its electricity generating potential, it could become a net electricity exporter (See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/cameroon.html).

Hydropower generation in the region is a mix of run-of-river and reservoir-cascade systems. At present the impact of dams across the region on river flow, upstream sedimentation, and fish movements is relatively low (Shumway 1999). Widespread use of the Schneider HydroEngine low-dam hydropower system could enable the low-cost, low-environmental-impact electrification of population centers near major rivers.

Water pollution

Levels of pesticide and fertilizer use for agriculture are extremely low throughout the region. Runoff and downstream pollution are typically not problems, with the possible exception of areas surrounding the few remaining industrial-scale rubber, coffee, banana, and oil palm plantations.

Oil prospecting, drilling, and refining occur along the Atlantic coast where oilfields are being exploited. Countries engaged in this business include Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, Angola (Cabinda), and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Oil prospecting and drilling produce large quantities of mud, which can pollute coastal waters. Water pollution by oil waste has been observed in Limbe and Edea in Cameroon (Mbog 1999) and in Conkouati in the Republic of Congo (Makaya 1999).

The absence of or incomplete sewage treatment means that urban waste is dumped into rivers and coastal waters, contributing to riverine, lacustrine, and marine water pollution and to a decline in aquatic diversity (Makaya 1999; Mbog 1999). In some coastal areas, mangroves are heavily exploited for wood to smoke fish and for firewood. According to Nkéoua and Nkombo (1999), overexploitation of mangroves for fish smoking has in some areas caused the degradation of the natural habitat of aquatic species.

Some activities linked with marine, river, and lake transportation also constitute a source of water pollution. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that leaching of the copper antifouling coating on ship hulls can cause pollution of ocean waters and sediments, causing detectable inhibition of photosynthesis in marine microalgae and bioaccumulation in zooplankton (Mbog 1999). Small boats also introduce invasive species that can threaten local ecosystems and species. The Water Hyacinth (Eichoniea crassipe), for example, is spreading throughout the region, reducing navigation capacity and fish production, accelerating evapotranspiration, and degrading the biodiversity of lakes and rivers

E. Non-timber forest products

Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) are frequently touted as important to household consumption, thus enhancing the value of standing forest and discouraging deforestation. While recent research confirms that NTFPs provide sources of food, medicine, and income to many households in Central Africa (Sunderland et al. 1999), however, these studies also confirm that the contribution of NTFPs to local and national economies is typically small relative to agriculture. In four forest villages in southwestern Cameroon, NTFPs contributed 9 percent to the household economy, compared with the 43 percent contributed by agriculture (Vabi and Tchamou 1999). Joiris (1996) reports similar figures for households in southeastern Cameroon (NTFPs 1.2 percent; agriculture 31 percent) and southwestern Central African Republic (NTFPs 10 percent; agriculture 51 percent). Harvesting of wild NTFPs is most important for poor families that have limited or no access to agricultural markets. Wealthy households or those with access to agricultural markets (i.e., those that can sell cash crops) often consume NTFPs, but seldom harvest them for sale (Ambrose-Oji 1997).

In the southwest and northwest provinces of Cameroon, the total value of NTFP production and marketing exceeded US$ 19 million in 1999, and contributed 2.8 percent to the regional economy. Timber, in this predominantly logged-over area, contributed 5 percent, and agricultural crops 27 percent (Abwe et al. 1999). In areas of Cameroon where old-growth trees have yet to be harvested the value of logging is considerably higher.

Harvesting of wild NTFPs is dirty, arduous, and at times dangerous work. Wild harvesting and processing of NTFPs is usually labor-intensive and is typically economically feasible only when the opportunity costs of labor are low or when prices for NTFPs are high. As a result, harvesting of wild NTFPs is typically a symptom of poverty rather than a cure for it.

The relatively small contribution of NTFPs to household economies in Central Africa is mirrored by results of a recent review of global forest valuation studies (Costanza et al. 1997). Average worldwide values (converted to 1994 US dollars, with an additional correction for purchasing power) of tropical forests for food production, raw materials, and intangibles such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, and ecological services were US$ 32, US$ 315, and US$ 1,660 per hectare per year, respectively. Estimates of the direct (i.e., tangible) value of the forest may, however, be exaggerated, given the short duration of most studies. When Godoy and his colleagues (2000) directly measured and valued forest resource consumption patterns of 32 indigenous families in Honduras continuously over two and a half years, the direct value of the forest to local communities was in the range US$ 18–24 per hectare per year—considerably lower than the global average of US$ 347.

These studies suggest that tropical rain forests are worth more for their global than for their local values (Chomitz and Kumari 1998), and that NTFPs may be less likely than previously thought to provide economic incentives to conserve tropical forests.

NTFPs do provide critical supplies of food during periods when agricultural crops fail or are otherwise scarce, but one must be cautious before attaching too much weight to the insurance value of the forest. Rural people can protect themselves against mishaps either by taking precautionary measures before shocks take place, for example, by intercropping or plot scattering, or by relying on reciprocity, tolerated theft, or out-migration after shocks strike (Godoy and Wong 2000).

Many have argued for the increased commercialization of NTFP use as a means of increasing the relative contribution of NTFPs to household economies, raising the value of intact forest, and discouraging forest clearing. The following paragraphs review the evidence for the sustainability of commercial NTFP production in Central Africa.

While NTFPs have been used for millennia, the human population of the forested regions of Central Africa is higher now than it ever has been in history, and is likely to double to more than 60 million within 20 years. As with any wild plant or animal, if harvesting exceeds annual production, resources will progressively be depleted and will become locally extinct.

NTFPs prized for their leaves, roots, or bark are particularly prone to unsustainable use, because harvesting either damages or kills the parent plant. Commercial demand for Gnetum and harvesting practices that destroy the parent plant have driven wild populations of this leafy vine to local extinction in Nigeria and much of southwestern Cameroon. Cameroon can supply approximately 200 tons of Prunus africana bark sustainably each year, but in 1999 more than 3,500 tons were harvested and exported. Worse, for both Prunus africana and Pausinystalia johimbe, “sustainable” harvesting practices that partially strip bark from live trees exposes them to stem-boring insects that can result in 50–90 percent post-harvest tree mortality (Cunningham et al. 2000).

There is growing evidence that as NTFPs increase in value there is a trend toward the overharvesting of wild resources, increased on-farm production, and exclusion of resource users by resource managers. Of the 20 most economically valuable NTFPs in Central Africa, 11 are unsustainably harvested and 12 are now cultivated (Wilkie 1999). This trend suggests that few if any commercially valuable NTFPs can be harvested sustainably from the wild, given the existing resource access and ownership laws.

Two major options are available for the management of NTFPs. The first, domestication and on-farm cultivation, is appropriate when wild resources are being overexploited and are at risk of local extinction. Several NTFPs, including Irvingia, Dacryodes, Ricinodendron, and Piper, are already grown within farmers’ fields, and field trials are demonstrating the potential also for on-farm cultivation of Gnetum and rattans. The second option involves putting in place systems to define who should have access to wild NTFP resources in a given area, and to regulate harvest levels. This would require the privatization of forest resources at the household or community level—a complex political process that has barely begun in Central Africa.

Without reform of access to NTFPs, most commercially valuable NTFPs will be overharvested in the wild. On-farm cultivation will increase the economic value of NTFPs to landowner families, but will decrease NTFP access for landless families. And while on-farm cultivation of high-value NTFPs may reduce pressure to harvest from the wild, it may increase the incentive to clear forest to cultivate these new crops.

In summary, recent evidence strongly suggests that NTFPs contribute little to household economies relative to agriculture, and are thus unlikely to provide an economic incentive for conserving intact forests.

F. Transborder use of natural resources

The high porosity of international borders and the absence within nations of impediments to resource use across land-tenure borders means that timber exploitation, oil prospecting and drilling, mineral extraction, agricultural settlement, livestock grazing, fishing, and wildlife hunting often occur across political and land-use boundaries.

The single most critical factor threatening the conservation of forest resources across borders is the hunting of wildlife for meat, medicines, and the live animal trade (Bowen-Jones and Pendry 1999; ECOFAC 1998; Robinson and Bennett 1999b; Wilkie and Carpenter 1999a).

1. Bushmeat

The major threat to the sustainable management and conservation of wildlife in the Central Africa region is the commercial hunting of wild animals for meat. Bushmeat is highly appreciated by many people in the area, primarily because it is often less expensive and more readily available than domestic alternatives such as beef or chicken. For instance, a 10-month study by Kornelia Ioveva-Baillon indicated the annual flow of bushmeat into Yaoundé, Cameroon, by train to be about 816,710 kilograms. Steel (1994) estimated the annual quantity of bushmeat received by the Mont Bouë, Oloumi, and Nkembo markets in Libreville, Gabon, to be about 500,000 kilograms. The quantity of meat sold annually in Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of Congo is estimated to be about 400,000 kilograms. In total, it is probable that more than 1 million metric tons of bushmeat is harvested each year from the forests of Central Africa (Wilkie and Carpenter 1999a).

Cross-border hunting is common in Central Africa. It is indiscriminate and involves species recorded in the IUCN Red List of threatened species. The transboundary forest between Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of Congo is open to the local communities, who use them mainly for hunting, fishing, gathering, and cultural ceremonies, regardless of administrative boundaries. Zouya-Mimbang (unpublished report, 1998) found a group of hunters from the Central African Republic settled in Molongodi, southeast Cameroon, where they practice hunting and fishing throughout the year. Camps of Central Africans are also established along the Koumela–Libongo road in southeast Cameroon.

Usongo and Curran (1986) reported a trade of bushmeat from the Lobéké region of Cameroon across the Sangha River to the Central African Republic, and also overland to internal Cameroon and other centers. Cameroonian hunters sell their bushmeat at Ouesso town (Republic of Congo) (Zouya-Mimbang 1998); Congolese cross the border with bushmeat to sell in Kika in Cameroon, in exchange buying manufactured products to take back home. In most cases, the bushmeat trade is facilitated by logging activities, with middlemen hitching rides on logging company trucks to transport their bushmeat.

According to Sournia (1998), Manovo–Gounda–Saint Floris National Park in the Central African Republic was for a long period the target of poachers sponsored by the APLS (Armée Populaire de Libération du Soudan, a Sudanese rebellion movement). Well-organized groups of poachers crossed the border seeking ivory, trophies, and bushmeat that subsequently were sold to help finance the war. Cross-border bushmeat hunting by Sudanese and Chadian poachers is also common in most Central African Republic-protected areas bordering Sudan and Chad (Damio and Sélébangue 2000).

Inadequate policing permits Congolese poachers to cross the Ngoko River that separates Cameroon and the Republic of Congo for game hunting in southeast Cameroon. According to reports by local communities, wildlife in the area between Socambo and Mongokélé has become scarce due to excessive hunting (Zouya-Mimbang 1998).

Local authorities in Gabon are similarly concerned that cross-border poaching is depleting wildlife stocks in the Minkébé reserve. While acknowledging the historic links between the population of southern Cameroon and the Minkébé, they believe a solution must be found to the problem of excessive poaching. Lacking the resources to address the problem alone, they are seeking the cooperation of Cameroon and the Republic of Congo. (Ndongo Allogho, pers. comm.)

2. Trade in ivory, skins, and other animal parts

In addition to bushmeat, wildlife is also hunted for secondary products such as ivory, rhino horn, and skins for trade on the international market. Between 1990 and 1998, 1,700 kilograms of ivory was seized at the Douala International Airport in Cameroon (Bello 1998). In 1997 alone, more than 200 elephants were killed for their tusks in the Sangha region of the Republic of Congo.

The trade in ivory culled from the Minkébé Forest is highly visible in the villages of southern Cameroon, particularly in Lélé and Alati in the Cameroon–Republic of Congo–Gabon region (De Watcher, Huijbregts, Ndongo Allogho, dir. comm.). A single hunter may have as many as 400 traps in the Minkébé Forest, and at least one elephant is killed every three days. The ivory hunters are believed to come mainly from gold mining camps near Minkébé and Menvé, and the Haut-Ivindo, Gabon, where a well-organized network of Baka and West Africans trades via Alati and Lélé in Cameroon, Makokou and Mvady in Gabon, and Garabizame in the Republic of Congo. (Ndongo Allogho, dir. comm., 2000).

Cross-border poaching by Nigerian hunters has been reported in Cameroon’s Korup National Park (Culverwell 1998; Vabi and Tchamou 1999), and by Nigerian and Chadian poachers in the Waza and Faro protected areas, also in Cameroon (Ngantou, pers. comm. 2000). Campo Ma’an National Park in Cameroon is also subject to cross-border poaching by hunters crossing the Ntem River from Equatorial Guinea (Ngouadjio, pers. comm., 2000). Cameroonian poachers, in their turn, are reported to hunt elephant in Rio de Campo in Equatorial Guinea (Nicanor, pers. comm., 2000).

3. Live animal trade

Some animal species are trapped and sold alive in domestic and foreign markets for ornamental or research purposes. This trade involves, among others, primates (Cercopithecus, gorillas, and chimpanzees), birds, including parrots (WCS 1996), and reptile and fish species. The extent of the cross-border trade in live animals within the region is not documented.

4. NTFPs

The international trade in Gnetum (leaves), Prunus africana, Garcinia lucida, and Pausinystalia johimbe (bark), and Laccosperma secundiflorum and Eremospatha macrocarpa (rattans) is resulting in overharvesting in Central Africa, and in many areas closest to the centers of demand, such as the border of southwest Cameroon and Nigeria, the local extinction of these plant species (Cunningham et al. 2000; Shiembo 1999; Sunderland et al. 1999).

Chapter VIII. International Transboundary Management Initiatives in Central Africa

The 1979 inauguration of the Mountain Gorilla Project of the African Wildlife Foundation and other conservation organizations saw the authorities in Rwanda and Uganda establish contact, although generally on an informal basis (Weber and Vedder 1990). Later, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Frankfurt Zoological Society and the WWF later initiated ad hoc bilateral meetings, primarily between Rwanda and Uganda and between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to deal with the development of regional tourism or with specific problems linked to tourists that hoped to visit the gorilla groups that move along and across the frontier zone between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

It was only in 1989, however, that the conservation of afromontane forest ecosystems became the subject of a regional forum, with the organization of a seminar and workshop at Cyangugu in Rwanda. Other conferences subsequently were organized at Bujumbura (Burundi) in 1992 and at Mbarara (Uganda) in 1994. These workshops provided the opportunity for countries with afromontane forests to forge links and for some to initiate, or reinforce, contacts with the objective of improving the management of transfrontier protected areas such as Kibira–Nyungwe, the Virunga massif, Mount Elgon, and the Ruwenzori massif. The conferences provided the opportunity to formally bring together protected-area managers and the national authorities of a number of African countries, but they were organized sporadically. Follow-up after the different sessions of the workshops was generally superficial, and was limited to the drafting of reports of each session and the organization of the next workshop. There was no monitoring or supervision of the implementation of recommendations.

In response to government concern about illegal cross-border use of wildlife and other protected-area resources, a number of other transboundary resource management activities have since been initiated in Central Africa. These include the following:

• Trinational park project between the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo;
• transboundary biodiversity conservation project in the Gabon–Republic of Congo–Cameroon interzone;
• Projet Parc pour la Paix (Parks for Peace project);
• Albertine Rift Conservation Society (ARCOS); and
• International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) in Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

A. Trinational park project among the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo

This informal initiative, initiated by international conservation NGOs working in the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, and Cameroon, is designed to help reduce elephant and bushmeat poaching within a group of three contiguous protected areas in the Western Congolian lowland ecoregion forest. Where possible, the initiative seeks also to reduce management and training costs by sharing project resources. The protected areas addressed by the initiative are the as-yet ungazetted Lac Lobéké in Cameroon, the Dzanga–Sangha Special Forest Reserve that includes the Dzanga and Ndoki National Parks of the Central African Republic and the Nouabale–Ndoki National Park in the Republic of Congo. Management of this trinational area is facilitated by the international organizations WWF, WCS, and GTZ. Park managers collaborate informally on antipoaching patrols and in sharing capital equipment and training facilities.

As this region of the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and Gabon is relatively sparsely populated and as no physical barriers to wildlife movements exist, the trinational protected areas are also connected by lived-in corridors to the Boumba–Bek and Nki (Cameroon); Odzala (Republic of Congo), and Minkébé (Gabon) protected areas. These corridors do not, at present, receive any formal resource conservation investments, although local communities may have self-regulatory systems in place.

B. Transboundary biodiversity conservation in the zone connecting Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and Cameroon

This informal initiative has been promoted by Pauwel de Wachter of WWF–Gabon, and aims to preserve the biological diversity and the ecological process of the transboundary landscape, estimated at 160,000 square kilometers, in northeast Gabon, southeast Cameroon, and northwest Republic of Congo. The region encompasses the Dja Faunal Reserve and the Nki and Boumba-Bek Forest Reserves in Cameroon, the Odzala National Park in the Republic of Congo, the Minkébé Reserve in Gabon, and the lived-in corridors that interconnect these protected areas. The relative remoteness and sparse human population of the region mean there is little human influence on the landscape, and as a result large populations of elephant, buffalo, and primate thrive in the area. The protected areas included in this landscape receive financial support from external donors including the EC, WWF, GTZ, the Government of the Netherlands, and GEF. GEF—the Global Environment Facility of the United Nations Development Programme—recently committed substantial funds, to be jointly managed by ECOFAC and the WWF–Minkébé Project, to pilot a landscape approach to management of this transboundary area (de Wachter, pers. comm).

C. Parks for Peace initiative in the countries of the Great Lakes region

The Parks for Peace project (Projet Parc dans les Pays de la Région des Grands Lacs) covers two groups of contiguous protected areas. The first group comprises Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda. The second group comprises the Kibira National Park in Burundi, which is contiguous to Nyungwe Forest Reserve in Rwanda. The overall objective of this initiative is to promote the conservation and the sustainable use of biodiversity during armed conflicts by setting up a network of protected areas for peace; the project also aims to contribute to improving the welfare of local communities in a region that is plagued by armed conflicts. Financial support comes from the McArthur Foundation; the initiative is implemented by the IUCN Regional Office for Central Africa (IUCN–ROCA).

D. Albertine Rift Conservation Society (ARCOS)

The Albertine Rift, which extends through the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, contains a biologically diverse and endemic assemblage of species. Its montane forests constitute part of the headwaters of two of the largest river systems in Africa: the Nile and the Congo. The legal status of some of these forests remains unknown.

ARCOS is a pilot project to promote networking, information sharing, and the raising of awareness of the need for the conservation and sustainable use of Albertine Rift montane forests. The objectives of ARCOS are to:

• improve knowledge of the biodiversity and natural resources of the Albertine Rift region;
• promote awareness of the need for conservation action and for better sustainable use of the fragile natural resources of the region;
• work for the conservation and protection of key biodiversity features of the region, to maintain the integrity of the regional ecosystem, and to preserve the ecosystem for future generations; and
• promote regional collaboration and exchange for better conservation action.

ARCOS was founded in 1995, originally as the Organization for Biodiversity Information and Conservation in the Albertine Rift (OBICO). The name was changed in 1997 to reflect more clearly the regional focus of the initiative (http://www.wcmc.org.uk/arcos/whattop.html).

The project is coordinated by Sam Kanyamibwa of the World Conservation Monitoring Center (WCMC) and Nature Uganda (Makerere University, Kampala), under the auspices of IUCN. It has established a network of individuals and institutions interested in Albertine Rift montane forest conservation, and actively seeks dialogue and collaboration between local conservation initiatives. Some early collaboration was achieved through a regional priority-setting workshop held in Kampala in July 1999. ARCOS works with local NGOs and other institutions involved in conservation in the region, including Nature Uganda, the East Africa Natural History Society, the Uganda Wildlife Society, Wildlife Clubs of Uganda, the Association for Nature Conservation in Rwanda, and others.

E. International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP)

The International Gorilla Conservation Programme was established in 1991 by a coalition of the African Wildlife Foundation, Fauna and Flora International, and the WWF. The program builds on the Mountain Gorilla Project started by the African Wildlife Foundation and the Wildlife Conservation Society in 1978. The goal of IGCP is to ensure the protection and long-term conservation of mountain gorillas and their habitat across the entire region in which mountain gorillas are found. The program is working toward this goal in close collaboration with the protected-area authorities in the three range states: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda.

To date, IGCP has had to work in unusually difficult circumstances, as its conception coincided with the beginning of the “Great Lakes crisis.” It has nevertheless made a number of achievements at the regional level, including the following:

• Organization and facilitation of bilateral and trilateral meetings between the protected-area managers of the four national parks included in the program (Mgahinga Gorilla National Park, Volcanoes National Park, Virunga National Park, and Bwindi National Park).
• Development of a communications network and system for regular information exchange between the three countries involved.
• Organization and facilitation of the first joint patrols of field-based staff in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
• Development of a number of independent, but common activities in the three countries. These include the development and monitoring of tourism and the initiation of a training and ecological monitoring program.

F. Current initiatives for the management of water resources

A few water resource management initiatives are underway in the region. ECOFAC is sponsoring a program for the protection of marine tortoise in Central Africa (PROTOMAC); the OAU is seeking ways to control water hyacinth throughout Africa; and GEF is financing development of a convention on fishing in Lake Tanganyika that is soon to be adopted by Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Tanzania as a component of a five-year project entitled “Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect the Biodiversity of Lake Tanganyika.” The objectives of the GEF project are defined as follows:

[To] improve understanding of the ecosystem function and of the effect of stresses on the lake system; to take action on all other measures necessary to maintain the health and biodiversity of the ecosystem; and to coordinate the efforts of the four countries to control pollution and to prevent the loss of the exceptional diversity of Lake Tanganyika. This will be done by establishing a regional framework for cooperation, including endeavors to harmonize legislation; investigating pollution including sources, effects, and control; and investigating biodiversity and conservation measures leading to the setting up of protected areas as underwater parks. Activities will closely involve government environmental ministries and agencies and sectoral departments; a major objective is to strengthen national capabilities and community participation. The project will be supported by international and local staff and contractors. NGOs will be involved particularly through community education and conservation, and the private sector through promotion of tourism and the control of industrial pollution. Provision will be made to continue the work of the project after its life by a regionally cooperating organization. (http://www.ltbp.org)

Chapter IX. Existing National TBNRM Initiatives

If we accept the broader definition of TBNRM that includes harmonizing resource-use policies and practices within ecosystems that are divided by national property or land-use zoning boundaries, then there are numerous past and ongoing examples of intranational TBNRM. National TBNRM typically has and continues to be motivated by protected-area managers or conservationists working in protected areas who seek to minimize the adverse environmental impacts of either local communities or private sector enterprises in adjacent lands. This is not uniquely so, however. In Cameroon, passage of a 1994 forestry law provided for the establishment of community forests, mandating profit sharing between the timber industry and local residents. As a result, local communities are beginning to demand more information from timber companies about land-use practices in logging concessions adjacent to community lands.

National TBNRM activities, like their international counterparts, have primarily focused on reducing illegal hunting of wildlife within protected areas. Clearly not exhaustive, the following brief case studies are intended to illustrate the range of past and current national-level TBNRM activities:

In northern Republic of Congo, the national government and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) are seeking ways to ensure the long-term persistence of biodiversity within the Nouabale–Ndoki National Park. One approach has been to develop a working relationship with the timber company, Congolaise Industrielle de Bois (CIB), that has the rights to log in the three concessions directly adjacent to the park. This informal relationship was promoted by park staff to minimize the adverse environmental impacts of nearby logging. WCS and CIB are working cooperatively to eliminate the hunting of protected animal species, to designate “no-cut” zones for sensitive wildlife areas, to establish local hunting regulations for non-endangered game, to minimize the extent of road development, and to close down roads following logging.

In the mid-1990s a graduate researcher, Emmanuel de Merode, worked with a senior chief of the Zande ethnic group in northern Democratic Republic of Congo to confiscate firearms and reduce poaching of wildlife on community lands and in the adjacent Garamba National Park (de Merode 1998). The chief was concerned that the land-use practices of his subjects were adversely impacting the park and the populations of trophy animals that potentially could generate safari hunting revenue for his communities.

In March, 1996 the government of Cameroon signed a decree creating the Banyang–Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary—the first such protected area in the country. Unlike national parks, local communities are allowed to sustainably use nonprotected resources within wildlife sanctuaries. Establishment of the Banyang–Mbo sanctuary has provided the opportunity to develop and test an alternative forest resource management system within Cameroon that actively involves the participation of local communities. WCS is providing technical assistance to Cameroon’s Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MINEF) to develop a pilot program, financed by the Dutch Spearhead Program on the Environment (DGIS), that will promote local community involvement in the management of this new protected area. The long-term goal of the project is to “conserve the forest’s exceptional and unique biological diversity and to develop a conservation approach modeled on community participation.” The five-year objective of the project is to put in place a process for establishing the baseline information and human capacity needed to design and pilot community-based natural resource management systems within a set of villages that have traditionally used the resources that are now within the Banyang–Mbo sanctuary.

The Mount Cameroon project in southwestern Cameroon has helped hunters to form user groups with the legal authority to regulate who hunts within “their” forest, and to enforce hunting regulations developed by the hunters in collaboration with MINEF. These user groups have successfully excluded outsiders from poaching their wildlife, and have sanctioned members for infringing the group’s hunting regulations. Formation of hunters’ groups is a step toward reducing unsustainable wildlife exploitation within community lands and within the Bambuko Forest Reserve on the northwest flank and the Mokoko Forest Reserve on the lowland western fringes of Mount Cameroon.

Chapter X. Anticipated Developments

A. Virunga/Volcanoes Trinational Park

The Virunga Volcanoes region encompasses three protected areas in three neighboring nations: Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda, Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mgahinga Gorilla National Park in Uganda.

The national borders in the region are not demarcated and there are no physical impediments to animal movements within the area and between neighboring countries. The region is important because it harbors the rare and endangered mountain gorilla, Gorilla gorilla beringei, whose total population worldwide is approximately 600 animals. Slightly less than 50 percent of these are within the Virunga/Volcanoes region (Hall et al. 1998; Omari et al. 1999). This area not only is home to the few remaining mountain gorilla but also supports large numbers of montane plant and animal species endemic to the Albertine Rift.

Human population density in the region is high, exceeding 300 persons per square kilometer; pressure on natural resources consequently also is high. Moreover, since 1990 the region has been in gripped in a horrifying genocidal civil war, and continues to be entangled in cross-border military and civil conflicts (Box 5).

B. The Rwenzori/Virunga System

Three Ugandan Parks are included in the Rwenzori/Virunga transboundary system: the Rwenzori National Park, Semliki National Park, and the Queen Elizabeth National Park. These parks are home to about 50 percent of the remaining mountain gorillas. Genetic studies of those gorillas furthermore suggest they may be a different subspecies to those found in the nearby Virunga/Volcanoes area (Plumptre et al. 1999).

The Semliki River is part of the upper drainage of the Albert Nile. For part of its course, it forms the boundary between Semliki National Park and Virunga National Park. In the long term, there is considerable potential for the cooperative joint development of ecotourism, focusing on the Semliki River and the biological wealth of the Congo/Ituri Forest. The number of tourists to the Semliki/Virungas is currently low, mainly because of access difficulties but also because of concerns about the war nearby.

Chapter XI. Opportunities and Constraints

Given the general constraints that exist across the region of a shortage of personnel and inadequate funding, there are three primary opportunities for TBNRM in Central Africa: site-level cooperative management of established protected areas; collaboration between protected-area managers and private sector companies; and collaboration between protected-area managers and local communities. In all three instances, it should be understood that while the harmonization of policies that directly or indirectly influence the use of natural resources is important, without the institutions and resources to implement and enforce those newly harmonized laws and regulations, their impact will be, at best, minimal.

A. Potential benefits of TBNRM in Central Africa

There is much wishful thinking regarding the value of TBNRM. Potential benefits range from the sharing of knowledge and the improvement of ecosystem management all the way to the outbreak of regional peace and prosperity. High expectations certainly encourage bold thinking, but overoptimism that is not reflected in tangible short-term results also risks a donor or practitioner backlash against “ineffective” TBNRM. This chapter addresses a number of critical questions and seeks to provide possible answers.

1. Ecological benefits

In the Central Africa region, there are few physical barriers impeding the movement of animals, seeds, and water across national and international borders. TBNRM is therefore unlikely to alter or enhance the flow of resources across borders.

TBNRM is not an ecological process, but is a sociopolitical process designed to reduce or minimize the resource-use behaviors of private, public, and communal landowners that conflict with the resource management needs and interests of landowners in a shared ecosystem.

2. Regulation of illegal wild resource exploitation

Local-level collaboration between or among neighboring management authorities, given Central Africa’s limited experience with these initiatives, appears to have the potential of reducing the level of poaching of elephant, apes, and other threatened and endangered species. The collaborative patrols undertaken by park staff of ICCN (Democratic Republic of Congo), ORTPN (Rwanda), and the Uganda Wildlife Authority along the borders of the Virunga/Volcanoes trinational area, and by ecoguards of the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo along the border of the Dzanga–Sangha Special Forest Reserve and the Nouable–Ndoki National Park, are two examples of cooperative antipoaching TBNRM activities.

TBNRM may help reduce threats to species that either cross borders or are the targets of cross-border exploitation. It may help reduce the overexploitation of shared fish stocks and reduce downstream environmental impacts that cross international or property borders. In areas prone to destructive fires, TBNRM may also help enhance fire management and minimize the adverse effects of fire on plant and animal communities.

3. Local management authority benefits

The sharing of experience, skills, and attitudes between the staff of neighboring management authorities can build staff confidence and aid the development of more professional management. The sharing at the local level of expenses associated with the purchase and maintenance of capital equipment and with research, training, and tourism infrastructure may also reduce the recurring and capital costs of adjacent resource management areas.

4. National-level benefits

National-level efforts to increase transparency, representation, and accountability in land-use management decisions and to protect citizens against illegal acts by other citizens, companies, and government have great potential to promote effective TBNRM. The success of such efforts should enable resource managers in one sector of a shared ecosystem to halt illegal, environmentally damaging practices by resource users in abutting lands.

5. International-level benefits

International initiatives to reconcile conflicting immigration, customs, and forestry policies could do much to inhibit smuggling and the cross-border trade in threatened and endangered species. International discussions to remove barriers to the comanagement of natural resources could energize latent constituencies for reform, undermine the position of those who have a vested interest in protecting the status quo, and raise the profile of resource management within the public sector. International agreements to establish binational or multinational transboundary parks may also insure that parks are not subsequently degazetted or their resources turned over to commercial interests. Given that heads of state tend often to be more inclined to honor commitments made to other heads of state than those made to their own citizens, it can also be argued that international laws carry more weight than national laws.

B. Potential constraints to TBNRM in Central Africa

As with the potential benefits of TBNRM, the constraints against the successful application of TBNRM can best be divided into those constraints that affect local-level collaboration and those that limit attempts at the national or international level to reform policies that would promote or facilitate cooperation to manage natural resources across boundaries.

1. Constraints to local-level TBNRM

From a local perspective, the key constraints to TBNRM are: (1) the absence of rapid, affordable, reliable, and legal forms of communication between or among neighboring management authorities; (2) immigration and customs policies that prevent the flow of people and goods between neighboring management authorities or that dramatically increase the costs of that flow; and (3) the absence of systems of recourse that would allow a management group on one side of a shared landscape to take a group on the other side to court to prevent the latter’s land-use practices from impacting the resource base of the former.

Throughout Central Africa, there is typically little access to telephones, cell phones, or email, and communication is often easier with Europe than it is within nations and between bordering nations. While the situation is improving, government intervention in the telecommunications marketplace continues to stifle competition, keeping prices higher than they need to be, service quality low, and access to telecommunications difficult. Additionally, most Central African nations consider short-wave radio transceivers to represent a national security risk, consequently maintaining severe restrictions on intranational radio communication and often prohibiting international radio traffic. The shortage of telephones in the isolated regions where national parks are most common and the prohibition of short-wave radio communications is a severe constraint to the collaborative management of shared natural resources.

Similarly, although most Central African nations have signed treaties to harmonize customs and trade regulations and ease the flow of goods and labor across international borders, any traveler will confirm that there are little or no provisions made to do so in reality. On the contrary, international travel—even between Franc Zone nations that supposedly have the most integrated economies—is anything but easy, requiring visas, passport stamps, military checks, letters of permission to travel, and prolonged customs searches and frequent seizures or levies. The general ambivalence in Central Africa toward international visitors does nothing to ease the exchange of staff for training and experience sharing, and is a major impediment to the sharing of capital equipment and the movement of tourists within an international TBNRM area.

Finally, if managers of a section of a shared landscape do not have legal authority over the land and its resources, they have no legal standing to complain if others directly or indirectly degrade their resource base. Even if resource managers had clear and free title to the land and its resources, in the absence of national and international systems of recourse they have no way to stop the owners of abutting land from exercising land-use practices that degrade the quality or quantity of their resource base, nor can they seek compensation for such cross-border environmental impacts. Only when resource managers have the capacity to take transboundary resource degraders to court can national environmental standards be upheld—assuming first that such standards exists and that governments are willing and able to enforce them.

2. Constraints to national- and international-level TBNRM

At the national level, the main constraints to effective TBNRM are weak environmental governance and a lack of respect for and trust in government. More specifically, three conditions militate against TBNRM: (1) unclear, informal, and insecure land tenure; (2) the absence of an independent and effective judiciary that applies the law equally to all citizens, private sector enterprises, and government officials and departments; and (3) natural resource policy and law making that is neither transparent nor democratic, and typically does not represent the interests of the majority.

Resource managers with informal and insecure tenure have typically responded to the absence of transparent, representative, and accountable systems of governance by disregarding the law and participating in illegal “self-compensation” activities such as land encroachment and poaching. Even those with formal tenure have little incentive to minimize their downstream or transboundary environmental impacts, as there are no provisions for civil suits to be brought against them and government enforcement capacity is weak or nonexistent.

At the international level, the two most important factors militating against greater integration are (1) the economic value of smuggling and reexportation that is made possible by international disparities in tariffs, taxation, and commodity prices; and (2) jingoistic nationalism that views foreign workers, enterprises, and investments as a threat to the national economy. The former is clearly a major impediment to harmonizing customs regulations and commodity subsidies in instances where the smugglers are politically influential, but the latter is more pernicious. Anti-foreign sentiment undermines the flow of expertise and capital to where it is most needed, and in the extreme, xenophobia can result in the expulsion of non-nationals and the loss of their technical skills, the jobs they create, and their often disproportionate contribution to the domestic economy. Notable examples of this are the expulsion by Idi Amin of Indians from Uganda, and the expulsion by Laurent Kabila of West Africans from Kinshasa.

Nationalism and the desire for control over economically valuable minerals and natural resources such as ivory and timber has since the 1990s fueled a series of internal and interstate wars within the Central African region. Wars create a political vacuum within which international TBNRM negotiations are unlikely to proceed; they also diminish the capacity of nations to regulate the use of natural resources and therefore risk the loss of endangered plants, animals, and habitats to poaching and encroachment.

A further significant potential constraint to both national and international TBNRM is the absence of clear, proven, and assured benefits. Without firm evidence of such benefits, which are important to offset the transaction costs and the perceived or actual loss of sovereignty or ministerial authority associated with the process, it will remain difficult to persuade policy makers to embrace the principles of TBNRM.

Chapter XII. Key Lessons Learned, Principles, and Recommendations

A. Work from the local level up

The only long-term TBNRM initiative in the Central African region is the International Gorilla Conservation Programme. It is therefore difficult to characterize with any confidence the lessons learned from the process. The one element that all attempts at TBNRM within the region have in common is that they all started with local, informal communication and collaboration between project managers facing conservation challenges on the ground. Only after these local, tangible attempts at TBNRM were initiated did the process begin to creep up the jurisdictional ladder toward more formal, governmental discussions and agreements. Another important observation is that local TBNRM appears to not necessarily require the formal approval of government to function effectively, often needing no more than the go-ahead from the appropriate minister, permanent secretary, or chief of the local gendarmes. That TBNRM can proceed in the absence of upper-level governmental approval and oversight is particularly good news for the Congo Basin, given the instability of many national governments and the ephemerality of many government officials and institutions.

In addition, experience from community-based conservation efforts, that like TBNRM must often reconcile jurisdictional ambiguities and conflicts in land-use practices, suggests that starting TBNRM at the site level and building constituencies for conservation may generate a social and political dynamic that spreads beyond the natural resource management sector. It is likely that, as a result of their experiences and of the knowledge they gain from involvement in local-level TBNRM activities, some public sector and civil society actors will become advocates for larger political changes, that in turn will feed back into the improved management of natural resources within the transboundary area. This further reinforces the message that TBNRM in Central Africa should start at the site or local level and only progress up the jurisdictional ladder when upper-level constraints prevent the effective implementation of lower-level efforts.

What is particularly telling in the context of Central Africa is that national governments have a long history of signing bilateral and multilateral natural resource management conventions and economic accords, but that few if any of these have had a significant impact on regional cooperation and the harmonization of policies and practices (Box 6). For TBNRM to be effective in the short term, it would appear that the best advice for donors, governments, and NGOs would be to focus on local-level initiatives that address the tangible concerns of management authorities in adjoining nations that share a common ecosystem.

B. Two weaks do not make a strong

One major concern about attempts to implement TBNRM in Central Africa relates to the weak capacity to manage natural resources (i.e., to regulate access to and use of land and resources) and to the limited additional resources available for TBNRM. It is clear that, given the additional transaction costs associated with TBNRM, merely combining already weak cross-border management authorities will do nothing to improve resource management in shared landscapes, and will most likely expend scarce monies that could be applied more effectively to on-site resource management. What is often less well understood is that TBNRM may also put in jeopardy the natural resources that are overseen by a well-capitalized management authority, by obliging that authority to spread its personnel, equipment, and cash more thinly to support a weaker collaborator. While this may do little to enhance the resource management capacity of the weaker partner, it may reduce the management impact of the stronger authority, thus resulting in a net decline in management effectiveness and in the conservation of natural resources.

The critical lesson is, if any management authority within a shared ecosystem lacks the personnel, legal, or economic capacity to regulate resource access and use within its own management area, TBNRM, in the absence of additional financial and human resources, will have little positive impact on resource conservation.

C. Management in the absence of the rule of law

Given the historical failure of Central African nations to effectively implement international trade, banking, and environmental treaties it is doubtful whether formal TBRNM contracts can be any more successful in changing government policies, practices, and investments. Moreover, in the absence of rule of law, all agreements from national legislation down to individual business contracts are effectively unenforceable, making it difficult to formally prevent the illegal use of natural resources. In many cases in Central Africa where the rule of law is weakly implemented by national institutions, it is external organizations such as relief agencies, peacekeeping forces, international NGOs, and private sector companies that impose the law, at least within their zone of influence. This is typically accomplished by providing national law enforcement agents with salaries, equipment, training, and transportation, or by creating autonomous law enforcement forces. The political and state-building ramifications of this process of distributed, externally financed and motivated law enforcement are unclear.

D. The benefits from TBNRM need to be explicit and measurable to attract donor support

Too often in the past, conservation organizations have requested support merely on the grounds that conservation is a “worthy cause;” donors in turn have responded with funding merely because this is what their political constituencies expect. It is no longer sufficient, however, to argue that the underlying goal is worthy. Conservation organizations should be prepared to state explicitly what they expect to achieve, and to characterize how they intend to track and evaluate their progress in attaining their stated objectives. To attract donor financing and maintain donor interest and commitment in TBNRM, conservation collaborators should be able to characterize what their investments are designed to achieve (for example, a 50 percent reduction in cross-border commercial hunting of wildlife) and how they plan to track their progress (for example, through baseline surveys of bushmeat along key transportation axes, or through random monitoring of bushmeat transportation in areas that are and are not receiving conservation investments). The challenge for TBNRM, in other words, is to make explicit what is too often mere arm waving, and to demonstrate that investments in TBNRM will have tangible and measurable impacts that exceed the transaction costs and that produce an outcome that is greater than the sum of the project’s constituent parts. If TBNRM collaborators cannot demonstrate that the additional costs of TBNRM would generate more benefits than would continuation of the status quo of funding of individual cross-border projects, why should donors make the additional investments? Donors should be skeptical of two or more weak management authorities soliciting funding for TBNRM activities when they lack the infrastructure to insure even the basic management of their respective portions of a shared landscape. A demonstrable impact and tangible returns on investment are particularly an issue if the rationale for TBNRM investments is political (for example, to improve relations among the collaborating authorities), as few direct or proxy measures exist to effectively track the impact of such efforts over the short term.

E. Is TBNRM new or a mere extension of protected area/landscape conservation within nations?

Lanjouw and colleagues (Lanjouw et al. 2000) list nine key requisites for effective TBNRM (Table 11). When these are compared with a summary of the criteria for successful management of protected areas (Hockings et al. 2000; MacKinnon et al. 1986; Margoluis and Salafsky 1998), it becomes clear that the challenges to effective TBNRM are largely comparable to those of protected-area management in general. This begs the question as to whether or not TBNRM is, in fact, a new and innovative approach or merely an extension of intranational to international cross-border conservation.

F. When are TBNRM activities not TBNRM?

The IGCP case study includes both a trinational area, encompassing protected areas in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda, and a noncontiguous block of land, the Bwindi National Park, that is solely contained within Uganda but which has a narrow common border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. The cross-border incursion of interhamwe militia into Bwindi and their massacre of tourists is an extreme example of policies and practices on one side of a shared border that had a profound social and economic impact on the other side. Whether or not the joint training and collaborative patrols of ICCN, ORTPN, and the Uganda Wildlife Authority fall within the rubric of TBNRM warrants debate, however. If they do constitute TBNRM, then site visits across continents and multinational field training sessions might also be characterized as TBNRM. To be meaningful, TBNRM must focus on that work that is specifically undertaken to counter cross-border threats, and should avoid including generic capacity building in the catchall of TBNRM. If TBNRM just becomes another buzzword for conservation and a new tool for maintaining donor interest, it will lose the core rationale that makes it a potentially useful component of a national or regional conservation strategy.

G. Deciding when to invest in TBNRM

Lanjouw and colleagues (Lanjouw et al. 2000) note that “effective conservation involves the abatement of threats to natural resources, ecosystems, or species. When those threats come from more than one side of a border, it is necessary to focus on threat abatement at a regional level.” TBNRM activities in Central Africa accordingly should only be initiated when there is compelling evidence to suggest that threats to natural resource conservation are exogenous to the area of interest.

TBNRM has the potential to improve resource management and enhance international relations, but before nations engage in TBNRM they should ask four questions, as follows:

• Does the threat to conservation come from across a border?
• What is the objective (i.e., desired outcome or outcomes) of initiating a formal or informal TBNRM process?
• What are the expected costs of establishing an informal or formal process for managing transboundary natural resources?
• How will the TBNRM planning and implementation process differ if the desired and expected benefits are (1) primarily to regulate conflicting resource use across the borders of shared ecosystems, and (2) to achieve greater economic or political integration?

In most cases in Central Africa, exogenous threats are more important within nations across land-ownership or land-use borders than they are between nations across international frontiers.

H. Overcoming jurisdictional and sovereignty barriers

Assuming that ecosystem management is the most effective approach to long-term biodiversity conservation, the most significant constraint is the contrary land use and land management philosophies, policies, practices, and regulatory capabilities of the separate management authorities that have jurisdiction for resource management in different areas of a shared landscape. For example, where a national park abuts a forest reserve, the land management practices and policies of the forest department might conflict with those of the parks department. Competition for scarce government and donor resources furthermore may inhibit collaboration between the two departments, making collaborative management of a shared ecosystem difficult. At the same time, the department of agriculture may advocate the use of inorganic inputs to boost nearby crop production, and the department of transportation may finance a road to provide market access to enclaved farmers. Both actions could lower estuarine water quality and increase mangrove felling within the national park. For an ecosystem to be managed effectively, at the minimum a consultative process must be put in place to help reduce the unexpected and often perverse impacts of the resource management policies and practices of the various management authorities that have jurisdiction within a shared ecosystem.

Coordination and cooperation—in effect, de-balkanization—among the different jurisdictions is essential to harmonize resource management across property or land-use boundaries (i.e., between parks and forest reserves, plantations, and private game reserves); it is similarly essential within particular land-use zones. For example, when a forest reserve is a primary wet season haven for wildlife, it is often unclear if management of the haven should be the responsibility of the forest department or the parks and wildlife department. Similarly, where there are dense woodlands within a national park, should the forest department assume responsibility for those trees? Without clear jurisdiction, implementing a coherent strategy for biodiversity conservation can be exceedingly difficult.

Conflicts between management authorities and jurisdictional ambiguities within a nation are common; between nations, they simply become more complex and potentially less tractable. For example, if one nation adheres to a free-trade capitalist philosophy and the other does not, harmonizing the movement of goods and services associated with cross-border tourism in adjoining national parks will not be easy.

When ecosystems cross national property or land-use boundaries or span international borders, the key challenge is to build coalitions among the management authorities whose jurisdictions with overlap. It will otherwise be almost impossible to attain a common vision for managing the ecosystem that will provide the benefits desired by each management authority without unacceptably diminishing biodiversity.

I. National TBNRM may be more important in the short term

In Central Africa, TBNRM may be more relevant and of greater conservation significance across national land-use or land-zoning borders than between nations across international frontiers. At present, jurisdiction for natural resources management within the public sector is divided among several ministries. Typically, each ministry is in competition with the others for scarce treasury resources, and isolationism and interministerial strife is not uncommon. Moreover, as all ministries have their own priorities and implementation policies, it is not surprising that many of these conflict with those in other ministries. For example, road construction into once-isolated old-growth forest blocks promoted by the department of forestry may undermine attempts by the parks department to minimize commercial bushmeat hunter access to remote areas. Similarly, safari hunting quotas set by the department of parks may undermine investments by the department of tourism to expand photo-safaris, or may undermine the department of forestry’s attempts to promote more local control of resource use within community forests.

Both jurisdictional ambiguity and the contrary policies of ministries with authority over access to and use of natural resources can undermine efforts to conserve biodiversity. In Central Africa, more than 50 percent of the forest is allocated to logging companies for timber extraction (in Cameroon, the figure is 80 percent), and almost all protected areas are surrounded by or abut logging concessions. Ensuring that land-use and resource-use policies and practices of the forestry ministry and the timber companies do not undermine the conservation efforts of adjacent protected-area authorities may be the most important TBNRM effort in which to invest in Central Africa.

Similarly, if building a civil society constituency for conservation is a key step to improved natural resources management in Central Africa, TBNRM efforts may be more productive if focused on reconciling local community and park conflicts and local community and logging concession conflicts, rather than on international resource management.

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van der Linde, H., D. Zbicz, and J. Stevens. 2001. Beyond Boundaries: A Bibliography on Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: Biodiversity Support Program.

Wilkie, D. S., E. Hakizumwami, N. Gami, and B. Difara. 2001. Beyond Boundaries: Regional Overview of Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Central Africa. In Biodiversity Support Program, Beyond Boundaries: Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Central Africa. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: Biodiversity Support Program.

All listed publications are available online at www.BSPonline.org. Publications marked with an asterisk [*] are also available in French.

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