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Figure 2.1 — Levels of Authority |
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| Note that not every level exists in every country. In some cases, there may be additional levels (for example, wards in Zimbabwe). |
Chapter 2
The Key Elements of the TBNRM Approach
This chapter outlines a number of elements that are key to the overall transboundary process. It covers stakeholder identification, consultation and involvement; roles of stakeholders; levels to be involved; the need for and type of agreements; organizational and individual capacity; communication; and enabling conditions and constraints for TBNRM.
Many of the issues covered are similar to those that arise in in-country natural resource management (NRM). The transboundary context adds additional challenges and complexities, which are outlined below. It is important to bear in mind that internal (in-country) NRM must still continue even if TBNRM is being added. “Going transboundary” merely adds an extra layer of complexity to an already complicated process. TBNRM takes more time owing to an increase in the number of actors and stakeholders; differences in policy, legislation, tenure and land-use systems; and political situations across borders.
How to Use This Chapter
People considering a new transboundary initiative may find most of the following sections useful.
People already involved in TBNRM may want to dip into sections where they need advice, have problems, want lessons from elsewhere, or want to know how to move on to the next stage. The conclusions at the end of each section provide a quick guide to what is covered.
2.1 Stakeholders and Their Interests
As in NRM, stakeholder participation is an essential element of TBNRM. Although initially it may require a considerable financial and time investment, it ensures that key individuals, groups and organizations are involved in an equitable, democratic and effective natural resource management process. Failure to establish stakeholder involvement risks losing the opportunity to ensure stakeholder ownership of the process, and undermines the long-term viability of the TBNRM initiative. It may ultimately undermine the resource base itself.
In a TBNRM process, the involvement of stakeholders occurs both in-country and across the border. In-country interests, and roles and responsibilities are defined in a parallel exercise in the participating countries. Cross-border exchanges involve key counterpart organizations as well as representatives of all stakeholder groups across the border meeting and establishing a common TBNRM vision. Both in-country and across-the-border interactions should be maintained throughout the process. Although cross-border interaction is somewhat an extension of national processes, differences in culture, language and policy environment, as well as the inevitable increase in the number of parties, may pose additional challenges to collaboration among countries.
2.1.1 Who Are the Stakeholders?
The natural resource base and system of land and resource tenure determine the players to be involved in a TBNRM process. Organizations and individuals laying claim to all or part of the land and resources in various ways (including historical, political, cultural, economical, spiritual) should be involved early in a TBNRM process, so that they have ownership of it. This includes local communities and private landowners. Although it would be ideal to involve all stakeholders, financial and other limitations dictate categorization of stakeholders into those that are critical to the process and others that may have direct or indirect impact on it. It is important to understand who the really important stakeholders are and to analyze the decision and power issues at play in a given situation.
Fowkes (1999) uses the following categories of stakeholder:
Stakeholder analysis for TBNRM is similar to that for internal NRM, though it is more complex. For information and tools on the latter see WWF (2000), Grimble and Chan (1995), MacArthur (1997) and Byers (2000).
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Box 2.1 Stakeholder Types in the Sangha River Trinational Initiative
The Sangha River Trinational Initiative is a collaborative effort among three central African countries [Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo, and Cameroon], and also comprises four projects located in the three countries. It is located in the Western Congolian lowland forest. The original people of the area are the pygmies (Bavska or BaAka and the Bangombe)—traditionally hunter-gatherer communities. Relatively new settlers attracted to farming, logging, ivory and other prospects have largely displaced the “pygmies” from the forest and are now settled in villages. They are hired by farmers, sport-hunting groups and logging companies and are often underpaid and disadvantaged. This transboundary initiative seeks to redress shared problems of unchecked hunting quotas and differences in hunting policies, and illegal activities such as diamond mining, hunting for ivory, and bush meat trade. Through the projects, and facilitated and supported by international organizations and joint agreements, the three countries set targets to stem poaching through joint patrols to establish ecological monitoring and research, and to improve communication. In this particular case, the general population needs to be kept informed; donors and international NGOs give input to the process; hunting-tourism departments, safari companies and customs officials are to interact with the initiative; and the protected area departments, government ministries and local communities are those that directly influence and are influenced by any outcome—they are the inheritors of the process. The BaAka and Bangombe, among others, are historically marginalized stakeholder groups that the process has to take into consideration (Steel and Curran 2001). Specific examples of stakeholder categories using other case studies are provided in Section 3.2.1. |
2.1.2 Who Should Be Involved, When and How?
There are no hard rules on who should be involved in a TBNRM process since every situation is different. Stakeholder analysis should take into consideration the prominent and obvious players as well as those groups whose influence on the resource has historically been marginalized owing to their low level of economic power and cultural and political clout. Implementers should also recognize those individuals and groups that are likely to oppose the TBNRM process or components of it. Although it is difficult to ensure a win-win situation for all stakeholders, it is important to ameliorate perceived threats early on, and endeavor to establish constructive engagement with opposition stakeholders (WWF 2000). Many transboundary stakeholders are close to the natural resources, but others may be geographically far removed from them—for example, foreign donors, potential tourists, and so on. It is also key to avoid a simplified categorization of stakeholders—such as “the local community” or “the private sector”—and to recognize inter- and intra-dynamics within stakeholder groups.
The range of levels involved (Section 2.3) determines the levels of stakeholders to be involved in the process on both sides of the border (e.g., local, district, line ministry, etc.). In addition, each objective within a transboundary initiative should further dictate relevant categories of stakeholders. Some stakeholders can belong in different categories depending on the type of objectives. For example, an objective to reduce illegal trafficking of wildlife products across a border would place customs officers at the borders as stakeholders of “influence,” while an objective to improve communication among protected area managers would place these customs officers in the category of the “need to be informed” public.
Initiators of the TBNRM process will have to explore incentives with key stakeholders in order to promote the idea. Following an assessment and decision on the TBNRM approach, stakeholders should define and clarify individual roles and responsibilities early in the process (Section 2.2).
2.1.3 Establishing Partnerships
Fostering existing partnerships and working relationships is extremely important in the TBNRM process. This includes horizontal relationships, e.g., between villages or resource users across a border, and vertical linkages, e.g., between a village and its district government. In addition to existing relationships, new ones are likely to be required. Early in the TBNRM process, there is a need to determine historical and current relationships among the various stakeholders in-country and across the border. This will highlight any existing tensions and conflicts that may otherwise slow or stall processes.
Constraints to effective partnership building—such as overly centralized planning and decision-making systems, weak community organizations, precarious tenure systems, bad governance and mistrust between central and local government/communities—should be recognized and addressed wherever possible. They should be taken into account during planning to ensure realistic targets. Hidden agendas and vested interests also should be identified.
Interactions should be promoted among counterpart organizations of participating countries through collegial forums. Such forums should be planned with sensitivity to language, culture and established modes of interaction to explore common interests, set targets and review progress. Trust building, accountability, transparency and equity need to be established and exercised throughout the process (see Box 2.2 for an example of an equity issue). It is important to recognize that although creating and maintaining viable partnerships can be an expensive process, it is a necessary investment of resources.
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Box 2.2 Local Communities and TBNRM
An example of an equity issue caused by the existence of an international border comes from the Nyika plateau on the Malawi-Zambia border. It centers around conflict between traditional transboundary resource management and protected areas created later. Traditionally the local community used resources on both sides of the border, controlled by a chief residing in Malawi. When national parks were established on both sides of the border, community access to traditional resources became restricted. A few years ago the Malawi park introduced a community resource management program for local people living near the park boundary inside Malawi. The project was enthusiastically received by those people, but members of the same community living in Zambia—who, despite their traditional customs, were not allowed access to the benefits—threatened to undermine it. This prompted the consideration of transboundary management as a way to resolve the conflict: the Malawi-based chief initiated efforts (legally and at times reaching beyond what the law allowed) to enable community members on both sides of the border to participate in the utilization and management of park resources in Malawi. He also lobbied the Zambian park authorities to carry out a similar transboundary program. (John Griffin, pers. comm.) |
There are instances where exact or mirror-image counterpart organizations do not exist across the border, hence organizations with similar mandates or those that have the capacity to take on a role may have to be integrated into the process. Where there is a significant disparity between the capacity of an organization and that of its across-the-border counterpart, capacity building should be a priority in order to avoid major imbalances in input and decision-making power (see Section 2.5).
Stakeholder analysis and establishment or strengthening of cross-border partnerships is imperative at the beginning of a TBNRM process. This step should not be viewed as a one-off activity, though; it should be a continuing process that takes likely changes in stakeholder composition into account. Changes could occur, for example, because of changes in the biological resource base, changes in the economic situation (e.g., discovery of minerals and resultant cross-border trade), and changes in the political environment (e.g., refugees moving across a border). New stakeholders should be identified and incorporated in rolling plans; the TBNRM process should remain adaptable and flexible to accommodate this.
| Conclusions on Stakeholders and Their Interests
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2.2 Roles in the TBNRM Process
Section 2.1 outlined the various types of stakeholders at many levels that need to be involved in TBNRM. Many stakeholders play important roles, contributing to the overall success of the process. This section looks at the roles that individuals and/or organizations fulfill in developing and implementing TBNRM. Five distinct roles have emerged from work done in Africa to date—leaders, facilitators, drivers, champions and implementers. These are outlined in more detail below, after some general points on roles.
It Is Important to Define and Clarify Roles and Ensure That They Are Fulfilled and Respected
Many players are drawn into the TBNRM process at many levels. Government organizations (e.g., government departments, parastatals, universities) have defined mandates and it is usually clear which organizations will need to be involved in TBNRM work and what their roles will be. When joining or being asked to join the process, an organization must examine why it is getting involved, what its mission is, and what it wants from the transboundary process. This allows an organization to define or clarify its role at the outset, which is important for four reasons:
Organizations such as national or international NGOs usually set their own mandate in that they define their areas of interest and where and how they work. In order to be supportive of government organizations, it is very important that NGOs understand the role they are fulfilling or being asked to fulfill in the TBNRM process—and that they do not usurp roles but rather fill gaps and provide capacity support.
Roles Are Not Always Fixed; They May Change over Time
TBNRM is a dynamic process; as various stages are completed and momentum builds or falls it may be necessary for roles to start, change or cease over time. In most cases the thrust of the input remains broadly similar but is tailored to respond to emerging issues or new challenges. In some cases, however, it may mean that an organization or individual ceases to fulfill one role and either drops out or moves into another specific role. If this is the case it is very important that the new role is clearly articulated and communicated for the reasons outlined above.
Roles Are Complementary and Implemented Simultaneously
If roles have been clearly defined there should be no conflicting overlap and they should be complementary. Complementarity includes the existence of parallel roles across borders, where partners on each side of the border play similar roles in their own countries. In a complex process the various roles are implemented simultaneously. The challenge here is for players to recognize which components of the TBNRM process are milestones—i.e., need to be put in place before other activities can flow—and to understand their role vis-à-vis these milestones. Only in this way can the TBNRM process proceed efficiently with players kept engaged in their roles. It is also worth noting that an organization or individual can fulfill multiple roles at the same time.
External Organizations Must Let National/Local Organizations Take over When They Can
Because the TBNRM process can cut across conventional lines in terms of thinking/mandates/roles and has the added dimension of needing to work across a border (or borders), in many cases external organizations are often heavily involved in the initiation of the process. An external organization in this case may be a donor or an NGO. While it is recognized that these external organizations have an important role initially, it is important that as soon as possible national or local organizations be given the roles that they can implement. This may also apply when a government department from one country works with its counterpart across the border, particularly in cases of unequal capacity (see also Section 2.5).
Creating a Process That Is Not Just Dependent on Individuals Presents a Challenge
In complex multicomponent undertakings often a few individuals emerge as key fulfillers. These players grow into a mutual-support group that holds the main “vision” for the TBNRM process. While this is an important mechanism for moving the process along, this group has to be very sensitive:
Only in this way can the roles of organizations be emphasized and not hijacked by individuals’ enthusiasm or professional interests.
Some of these general principles are discussed further in Margoluis et al. (2000).
Five types of role are outlined below. Note that not every type of role must be played in every TBNRM project for it to succeed. Especially in smaller projects, some of the roles may be merged, and one person or organization may take on multiple roles. Roles and responsibilities should be defined and clarified early on in the process.
2.2.1 Leaders
Leaders are vanguards—they show the way and anticipate progress. Leaders need to “hold the vision” for what a TBNRM process is trying to achieve and to develop a strategy that moves toward this goal. To be successful, leaders need to be proactive and they need to get buy-in—i.e., gain acceptance—from a critical mass of stakeholders in order to get the momentum for the process underway. They may also need to have an official mandate to play their role effectively (See Box 2.3). Leaders need to have commitment to the process and be prepared to be involved over a long time period. They need credibility within the sector. Most importantly they need to recognize that TBNRM will need a team of players. They should build this team with players that bring relevant skills and expertise to the process. They should identify where there are gaps in the team and fill them, either with new players or by providing the input themselves. And finally they should foster team spirit and encourage individual team members, tracking progress and ensuring communication within the team.
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Box 2.3 An Example of a Lead Role Undertaken by a Government Agency
In Mozambique the Forestry and Wildlife Directorate was named the lead agency in the development of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA). The Directorate worked at getting the concept of a TFCA on the political agenda, and getting international agreements signed. It also managed to re-establish a field presence in the protected areas within the TFCAs, and assist with some important policy and legal work in terms of forestry and wildlife regulations and policy, and policies for communities and the private sector. The fact that there was a dedicated process for TFCAs was very important. However the Directorate did not really have a mandate for broader ecosystem-based planning and the associated sustainable development needed for creating the TFCA, as this falls within a number of different government agencies. In response, the establishment of a TFCA Secretariat is proposed, and it is under consideration to bring this secretariat under the Ministry of Tourism to lead the development of inter-sectoral planning frameworks. (Rod de Vletter, pers. comm.) |
Regional institutions are well placed to be leaders in the TBNRM process—their regional mandates can often help to overcome some of the complexities of working across borders. Regional protocols can in theory provide an umbrella for TBNRM, though from the project case studies, it appears that regional organizations have taken very limited advantage of opportunities to instigate TBNRM under regional protocols. National organizations are less well placed, in part because of their more limited mandates, but also because of the problem of perceived status or lack of parity that a national organization has with others within the system. This can be a very big stumbling block when needing to work across sectors.
At a local level, leaders interested in promoting TBNRM may be in place—their primary interest often being in resurrecting traditional resource use and trading agreements among communities that have been disrupted through the imposition of national borders. There is, however, a limit to the extent local leaders will be able to influence the bigger picture.
At present much of the leadership in promoting TBNRM is coming from external organizations that are also fulfilling the roles of facilitators and drivers. This may not be a problem in the early stages of the process but at some point internal leaders have to emerge if the whole process is to root itself more sustainably.
2.2.2 Facilitators
Facilitators make things go more easily. Facilitation can cover a wide range of activities from originating the concept, through initial coordination and neutral brokering, and then fulfilling a continuing neutral role—mediating, brokering of conflict resolution and ensuring fair and equitable treatment by all players. Facilitators can also bring to the table technical capacity, capacity-building support and financial resources. They can often make meaningful contributions to developing climates (national and international) conducive to investment in TBNRM.
In order to fulfill their role, facilitators need to have a strong and varied network of partners to be able to catalyze participation. They need to recognize the relevance of establishing strategic (often non-traditional) partnerships. Facilitators need not necessarily have been long-term players—in some cases already knowing many of the players can help but in other cases it can constrain innovation as players are mindful of the partnerships already built up over many years. However, to be effective, facilitators must be able to provide sufficient time and flexibility to build trust; and they should maintain neutrality. Facilitators need a certain degree of independence to be able to work effectively but this should of course be within the overall agreed-upon larger context of the TBNRM process. Good facilitators should have good networking skills, good communication and interpersonal skills, good listening skills and open-mindedness, good analytical skills, good vision but also attention to detail, good technical understanding of the subject matter, and uninflated egos.
To date this role mainly has been fulfilled by NGOs and international projects (see Box 2.4 for examples). This is primarily because these groups have broader than national-level mandates and are thus in a position to be able to create platforms or venues that bring various national organizations from several countries together. National/local institutions are constrained by their mandates and have to go higher up to get authority formally to instigate such activities.
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Box 2.4 Examples of Facilitators
The International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP)—which at the request of the protected area authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda fulfills the central role in establishing a framework for regional collaboration toward the goal of conserving the mountain gorillas and their habitat in the Virunga-Bwindi region (Lanjouw et al. 2001). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Cross Borders Biodiversity Project working to conserve the Minziro-Sango Bay Forest Reserves across the Tanzania-Uganda border—which is primarily implemented through national agencies but which also has a regional component (agreed on by the respective natural resource management agencies) that specifically supports studies and fosters regional linkages (Rodgers et al., 2001b). In both these cases the project regional director is the prime facilitator supported by national-level project staff. These two organizations have a very clear mandate to work as facilitators.
In some cases an NGO may originate the TBNRM process and then foresee itself continuing |
2.2.3 Drivers
A driver provides resources or exerts pressure to promote TBNRM, without necessarily becoming directly involved. Drivers can play a very important role in ensuring that TBNRM processes are initiated and move forward. A politician could be a driver by exerting pressure without becoming visibly directly involved, for example. NGOs and donors can be drivers, providing funding for TBNRM projects. Financial inputs are needed for TBNRM and can greatly fuel the process.
Occasionally the agendas of the governments, donors or NGOs may not dovetail exactly to the aspirations of the primary stakeholders—instead they gain prominence or even distort the process. Facilitators can be very important in encouraging donors and NGOs to fulfill their roles so that they are perceived as positive partners in the TBNRM process.
2.2.4 Champions
Champions promote a cause. They are people who can pick up an idea (sometimes originate it), advocate for it and continue to support it once it gets going. Champions need to have a high profile, be charismatic, operate in a sphere of influence, be respected and see the big picture. They do not necessarily have to be technically involved in implementation.
Players involved in TBNRM processes talk about the role for champions at all levels as a crucial one. Interestingly, however, this is the one key role that has been least well articulated or described in the project case studies. There may be several reasons for this:
In the case of TBNRM, champions are particularly important in influencing potential players that have not traditionally linked the importance of sound natural resource management to their arenas. (Other sections of this document will discuss the importance of mainstreaming natural resource management and biodiversity conservation into broader development planning—which is where champions have a major role.)
2.2.5 Implementers
Implementers carry out the detailed work of the various steps of the process. The bulk of the effort involved in TBNRM processes includes collecting and analyzing data, identifying threats and opportunities, planning, piloting and implementing responses, monitoring and evaluation, creating strategic alliances, etc. These activities are described in greater detail in other parts of this document.
Implementers often work on component parts of the process at certain levels. They do not each need to understand or keep track of all aspects of the overall picture—but they do need to recognize that their activities are important steps in achieving the overall picture. For example a park warden will ensure that a ranger in the Virungas National Park in DRC is assigned to collect data about gorilla movements, that the data are fed into a regional database allowing the warden to make management decisions to meet the objectives of a regional gorilla conservation strategy. The chairman of a committee might establish a working group to tackle the specific task of reviewing policies with a view to harmonization. The director of a protected area authority would ensure that a minister has all the appropriate information and a briefing before a meeting that will discuss TBNRM progress. A researcher will work with communities to design a monitoring program and then train individuals to be data collectors. These are all pieces of the group effort.
In the initial stages, organizations that work as the facilitators of a TBNRM process often fulfill also the role of implementers—and in some cases continue in these dual roles. This is particularly the case when an initiative is specifically designed to work on TBNRM and an organization is appointed to coordinate and implement the many facets of it.
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Conclusions on Roles in the TBNRM Process
Different roles for successful TBNRM (for individuals or organizations):
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2.3 Levels in Transboundary Collaboration
2.3.1 The Different Ranges of Levels
There are many different possible ranges of levels of TBNRM collaboration, each appropriate for different situations. At the simpler end, collaboration occurs purely at a local level. For example, two protected area managers and their staff across a border may collaborate over fire management programs, joint surveys and limited joint law enforcement activities (e.g., exchange of information about illegal resource use). Similarly, a community that is divided by an international border, but whose traditional management systems have not been eroded by international politics, may continue to manage natural resources across the border at a local level with no need for higher-level intervention.
The amount that can be achieved at the local level is limited, however. For more ambitious TBNRM goals, a wider range of levels of collaboration is necessary, along with the involvement of multiple levels of authority (see Figure 2.1). For example, authority to undertake joint law enforcement patrols may have to come from forestry or wildlife department headquarters in both countries, or even the ministries responsible for foreign affairs. Development of a transboundary wildlife corridor involving multiple forms of land use is likely to involve different government ministries on both sides of the border, and local or national land-use planning authorities if they exist. Development of international nature tourism as part of a regional economic development strategy is likely to involve multiple government ministries including those dealing with finance, planning, commerce and tourism, immigration and customs, transport, and natural resources—as well as regional organizations if they exist [e.g., the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)].
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Figure 2.1 — Levels of Authority |
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| Note that not every level exists in every country. In some cases, there may be additional levels (for example, wards in Zimbabwe). |
Sometimes levels in different countries do not correspond, or they have different degrees of empowerment. This can be a constraint to transboundary collaboration, if people have difficulty determining the appropriate level to work with across the border, or need to work with more than one level.
Within this structure of authority levels (shown horizontally), Figure 2.2 indicates with vertical lines the possible ranges of levels at which TBNRM interventions may operate at a particular time. For convenience, only one country is shown, but this would obviously apply to both/all countries involved.
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Figure 2.2 — Possible Ranges of Levels of TBNRM Intervention |
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The range of levels increases from 1 to 6. Note that when it is necessary to involve high levels, it is key to ensure that the lower levels also remain involved in the overall transboundary process. The level most dependent on the resource, which is often the local level, is particularly important. Ultimately TBNRM is implemented at the local level, with support as necessary from higher levels. It is therefore very important to ensure local-level involvement, buy-in, and ownership during planning and implementation, however many levels are involved in the process (see also Section 2.1).
This is not always easy to achieve, especially in transboundary projects covering large geographical areas, which may have a considerable number of people living in remote, scattered communities in border regions. Ensuring their participation requires extensive resources and takes time. Pragmatically, it may not be possible to involve every community in every decision along the way. However, it is important to ensure sufficient participation and representation in key decisions that affect people directly or indirectly, and enough time to consider the implications beforehand.
If adequate participation does not occur, there is a risk that upper levels will exert influence and control that is not in the best interests of local communities or private landowners. At worst, TBNRM can present an opportunity for corrupt national-level powers to gain personally from TBNRM benefits. Donors, the private sector and NGOs can also drive the TBNRM agenda in a way that usurps local interests. Two-way transparency and accountability are very important.
It is not necessary to operate at the same range of levels for each transboundary objective. For example, control of illegal hunting may be done locally at community or warden level, or by this level in collaboration with district officials, and perhaps with the involvement of wildlife department headquarters. The creation of a border post to enable border crossings by tourists, however, is likely to be done at the multiple ministerial level, with the involvement of lower levels such as the district level.
Each individual action to achieve a transboundary objective does necessarily involve every level within the range of levels the process is operating at. For example, the passing of legislation to create a new border post in the example above would be done at the ministerial level, once the need for the border post has been discussed and proposed by lower levels. The lower levels benefit, but are not involved in the legal process itself.
The levels of formal authority and decision making shown in Figure 2.2 mostly involve government, and traditional authorities at the community level. Other actors such as NGOs, the private sector and academic organizations may be involved at various levels, and often move flexibly across levels during the TBNRM process. While communities may have inputs at higher levels, they are most frequently involved at the local level for obvious reasons (see Section 2.1). Roles that different organizations can play were discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2.
2.3.2 Deciding on the Appropriate Range of Levels
There is no single optimal, predetermined, range of levels at which to work. Each transboundary situation is different, with its own combination of ecological, social, economic, political and institutional factors. Leaders in each transboundary situation have to decide what the best range of levels is for them at a particular time in the process. It is important to have a flexible approach, and to be ready to move up or down the range of levels as appropriate. For example, it may be necessary to get the headquarters of the two immigration authorities on either side of a border involved to agree to establish a new border crossing (range of level 5 in Figure 2.2). Once that is done, it may be possible to return to working at a local level (range of level 1). There is one general rule: work at the lowest range of levels possible to achieve the goals set for the transboundary collaboration. This is where efficiency will be greatest. Another example is provided in Box 2.5.
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Box 2.5 Good Neighbors Meetings
Uganda and Tanzania presently have noncompatible logging policies. This has proved an issue within the Minziro-Sango Bay Forest Ecosystem. The current ban on harvesting timber in Sango Bay Forest, Uganda, has triggered more harvesting of trees on the Tanzania side of the forest in order to meet the heightened demand for timber in Uganda. The situation also encouraged dealers to move illegally cut Ugandan timber through the forest into Tanzania where it was “hammer stamped” to become legal and exported back to Uganda.
In December 1999 the Cross Borders Biodiversity Project hosted the first of a series of cross-borders “Good Neighbors” meetings between the two sides’ district officials including district commissioners. Cross-borders biodiversity management was on the agendas. The meetings brought together key sectors that are relevant to conservation and sustainable development on both sides of the border, including immigration, trade, revenue authority, livestock, agriculture, security systems, natural resources and environment. The meetings discussed, among other things, the need to control and regulate timber movement across the borders. While Ugandan officials acknowledged that much timber was moving from Tanzania into Uganda, they also noted that the timber was allowed to enter the country without any restrictions imposed by Tanzania. The meeting brought together a common understanding of regulating agencies across the borders, and steps to take in implementing collaborative approaches to control movement of illegal timber. Results to date indicate a positive impact as the amount of timber transiting the border has decreased. Field patrols suggest that the number of illegal This example shows what sort of action that can be effectively achieved at the district level, while waiting for formal policy harmonization to be completed at the national level. Source: Rodgers et al. (2001b). |
When working at lower ranges of levels without involving the highest levels, it is still very important to keep people at higher levels on both sides of the border informed of developments, achievements and constraints. They do not need to know all the details, but should know the basic facts. People do not like to be surprised by learning about things indirectly rather than through their direct chain of command. This can be particularly sensitive because of the transboundary nature of the work.
When deciding at which range of levels to work, it is important to understand the benefits and constraints of the different ranges. Figure 2.3 summarizes some of the main variables affected by the range of levels, and the way the variables may change. Note that these trends are not hard and fast, but are general observations. Figure 2.3 builds on the continuum concept presented in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 2.3 — Some Variables Affected by the TBNRM Range of Levels |
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There are advantages to working at a complex range of levels, as shown above. A greater variety of transboundary activities may be possible. Larger geographical areas generally can be covered, with a wider variety of land uses and forms of land tenure. Agreements are more likely to endure as they are more formal. However, for TBNRM to be successful with a more complex range of levels, a larger number and variety of stakeholders and actors must be involved, coming from a broader range of institutional and technical backgrounds (see Section 2.1). The degree of formality of transboundary agreements tends to increase as range of levels increases (see Section 2.4).
There are therefore also disadvantages to working with a complex range of levels. Transaction time greatly increases as higher levels of government and a greater number of stakeholders become involved. Financial costs increase, including communications and costs of meetings. There are also other types of costs, including consequences of channeling scarce management resources into TBNRM. This can be to the detriment of domestic, or internal, natural resource management—often essential ongoing work that still has to be done in addition to transboundary commitments.
Table 2.1 shows some of the advantages and disadvantages of working at each level, and Box 2.6 shows how the collaboration between Botswana and South Africa over the management of the Gemsbok and Kalahari Gemsbok National Parks increased the range of levels involved over time.
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Box 2.6 Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park
Informal collaboration occurred from 1948 at a local level between wardens of the Gemsbok National Park in Botswana and the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in South Africa. The two areas functioned as one ecological unit without fencing and with free movement of wildlife. Limited cooperative activities included joint monitoring of large animals. In early 1992, the two countries decided to make the arrangement more formal to enable a wider range of benefits. This led to the involvement of various ministries at the national level (e.g., those responsible for wildlife, customs, immigration) and the attorneys general to harmonize relevant policies and legislation. A formal agreement was signed by the two presidents establishing the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in 1999. |
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The arrangement comprises the following:
Bilateral agreement between the two countries
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park Foundation
Record of understanding between the two national parks departments
Kgalagadi Management Agency
Sources: Sandwith et al. (2001, Appendix 5.5); Griffin et al. (1999). |
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| Entry level | Examples | Initial reasons for collaborating |
| Multiple ministries | Caprivi/Chobe/Okavango/Hwange/S. Zambia | Tourism development |
| Headquarters of natural resource department/line ministry | Gasa/Kruger/Gonarezou "W" Park Virungas |
Wildlife conservation/restoration Control of illegal hunting Conservation of mountain gorillas |
| Province | Maloti-Drakensberg | Threats to shared biological and cultural resources |
| District | Minziro/Sango Bay | Sustainable use of biodiversity |
| Local | Gemsbok/Kalahari Gemsbok (wardens) Nyika/Nyika (community) |
CBNRM |
2.3.3 Choosing the Entry Point for Transboundary Collaboration
There is no rule about the level or range of levels at which to start. The entry point may well be opportunistic: where a particular champion (see Section 2.2) is working, or where initial dialogue and collaboration is easiest. It is often advisable to build on existing non-transboundary activities in each country. It may be that once the transboundary process is started, there is a rapid move up or down the range of levels as discussions develop, scope of possible collaboration becomes clearer, and constraints are identified and weighed against opportunities. Table 2.2 shows entry points for some existing TBNRM projects.
There is strong advice about how to start. If initial discussions start above the local level, it is very important to bring discussions down to lower levels as soon as possible, and have stakeholders at these levels fully involved very early on. This is particularly crucial for the local level. There is also a need for iterative dialogue—going back and forth between issues and stakeholders—within a country and across the border. Communication is very important throughout the process, but it is particularly crucial in the early stages (see Section 2.6).
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Conclusions on Levels in Transboundary Collaboration
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2.4 Agreements
Transboundary interactions can take many forms, ranging from very informal relationships among local resource users (e.g., local trading agreements) to international treaties governing resource management programs between countries (e.g., joint river basin management) (Singh 1999; Zbicz 1999). These agreements encapsulate the purpose, principles and programs for interaction across boundaries. At the global scale, there are many examples of such agreements, some of them just symbolic. These include one of the earliest agreements for transboundary protected areas—i.e., the 1932 Waterton/Glacier International Peace Park in the Rocky Mountains of Canada and the United States. In general, agreements can increase the sustainability of outcomes by making the process less dependent on the immediate actions of individuals.
In Africa, on the other hand, despite there being many instances of transboundary natural resource management opportunities and needs, there are relatively few examples of negotiated agreements. Notable exceptions in the field of biodiversity and conservation areas are the recent designations of transfrontier conservation areas by countries within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), e.g., the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area MoU signed on June 11, 2001. A general treatment of agreements for the development of transboundary protected areas is contained in the IUCN/WCPA Protected Area Guidelines series (Sandwith et al. 2001).
Agreements can take many forms, and there is no ideal form or blueprint. The specific terms are likely to depend upon the prevailing ecological, social, economic and political context, the objectives of the stakeholders, the specific institutional frameworks, and scale. The general guidance provided in this section is intended to create awareness of the diversity of issues to bear in mind when embarking on transboundary agreements, but clearly, it must be adapted to each specific situation. Note that this section describes what is involved, but not how to write an agreement, which would require specialist legal input.
2.4.1 Reasons behind TBNRM Agreements
It may sound obvious, but the success of any agreement is directly related to the outcomes that result from the agreement. Negotiating agreements is costly in terms of time and effort, and the purpose of the agreement should be clearly identified before embarking on this process. There are a variety of reasons why transboundary agreements are entered into, including the following:
On the whole, agreements are necessary in situations where either party would be unable to achieve a necessary or desirable goal without the participation of the other. Where there is a difference of opinion or conflicting goals, it may be more difficult, though possibly no less necessary, to promote some form of agreement. There are some cases, however, where agreements have been entered into that do not achieve these objectives. There may be a variety of reasons for this, including a lack of understanding or participation in the formulation of agreements by various stakeholders; a lack of political will and commitment at a high level, which prevents effective cooperation at a lower level; no real need for transboundary activities at the level of resource managers; or a lack of resources committed to implementing the agreements. A sustainable agreement is usually only possible when the net benefits exceed the net costs for all parties involved.
Some form of agreement is usually necessary as a means of declaring common interests, stating guiding principles, identifying objectives or ensuring commitment among all parties. Agreements ensure that the parties are clearly identified and that their roles and responsibilities are defined. They enable a holistic focus on the broad issues involved, as in many cases single jurisdictions are dealing with ecosystems and communities that have been artificially separated by boundaries. They ensure that issues of national sovereignty are not compromised, and they empower governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders to operate within an agreed framework. As agreements run over a determined time frame (and can be extended) they can increase the sustainability of the outcomes by making the TBNRM process less dependent on the immediate actions of individuals. Problems that arise can be dealt with collectively, and this promotes the development of trust and understanding. A collective effort results in more robust strategies and a higher profile at the national or even international level. One of the motivations may be to ensure a joint and more coherent approach to international agencies, particularly those that promote regional integration.
It is also important to guard against “paper agreements”—those that are not sufficiently grounded in reality to yield useful results. An agreement on its own will not necessarily be sufficient to achieve a desired outcome. If agreements are too informal, they might be easily overridden by powerful interests. If the problems identified at a national level are intractable—e.g., lack of security, landlessness, poverty—it is unrealistic to expect these to be resolved by introducing an international component. It is also possible that an agreement may expose conflicting interests or even generate new conflict, so it is important that the fundamental purposes and principles for implementing agreements are well thought out.
2.4.2 Agreements to Serve Different Purposes
Agreements are developed for many purposes, and therefore involve a variety of stakeholders in each case. For example, agreements in the wildlife and biodiversity fields have been developed for:
An example of an agreement is provided in Box 2.7. There could also be agreements in one area for different purposes, or an umbrella type agreement that determines overall policies, within which operational agreements are framed.
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Box 2.7 The Sangha River Trinational Cooperative Agreement
The Sangha River Trinational Initiative aims to promote TBNRM among three contiguous conservation areas—Nouabale Ndoki NP (Republic of Congo), Dzanga-Sangha Forest Reserve (CAR) and Lobeke Reserve (Cameroon) in order to help reduce elephant and bush-meat poaching. Various meetings were held between 1995 and 1999 to move this idea forward. In March 2000 a meeting of legal experts and project leaders from each country drafted a cooperative agreement. The cooperative agreement is intended to:
Source: Steel and Curran (2001). |
2.4.3 Different Types and Levels of Agreements
The variety of transboundary processes and purposes suggest that different types of agreements would be appropriate. Agreements can be highly informal verbal agreements between two adjacent villages, they can be written agreements between protected area managers, or they can involve bilateral or multilateral treaties between adjacent or non-contiguous states. Descriptions follow:
It may also be an option to negotiate an enabling agreement or protocol, which empowers stakeholders at different levels of authority or in different sectors to negotiate sub-agreements.
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Box 2.8 Bilateral Agreements on Transhumance in West Africa
Transhumance is practiced widely in West Africa and has an extremely well-established pattern of TBNRM. Bilateral agreements have been developed between Ivory Coast, Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger that fix regulations for transhumance and the principle of authorization of transhumance between the countries. Specifically they include the following:
Source: Lycklama à Nijeholt et al. (2001). |
The parties to agreements also vary, and could involve any or all of the following stakeholders, depending on the nature and scale of the agreement:
The initial idea or need for an agreement may be generated at any level and by any party. However, especially when crossing an international boundary is involved, the complexity of negotiation and decision making increases rapidly, and it is necessary to involve a complex set of stakeholders and protocols. In particular, it is difficult for sub-national jurisdictions to operate with any authority without the requisite endorsement of the competent authority at a national level. It takes time to set up an agreement properly and this needs to be planned for. There is, too, a need for adaptive management; at one stage of the process a very informal agreement may be needed, but as activities continue and trust builds up, different levels of formality for agreements will become appropriate among the different levels of players involved (Lanjouw et al. 2001; and also see Section 2.3).
2.4.4 Process for Reaching Agreement
There is no ideal process, and it is usually incumbent on those who identify the need for agreement to lobby the relevant stakeholders and convince them of the need and involve them in the steps to follow. In some cases, it may be useful to start with local-level initiatives, e.g., contact between two villages across the border. In other cases, the initiative may come from a high-level diplomatic process. Often, the process is slow and moves over many years from one type of agreement—e.g., an informal one—to another, more formal one.
The following points indicate aspects of the process that need to be considered:
2.4.5 Contents of Agreements
The drafting of an international agreement is a technically complex matter, requiring the services of skilled and experienced professionals. It does, however, help to identify some of the aspects that might be considered in such an agreement, and for the parties to discuss and even prepare notes that might aid in the drafting of an agreement that will address their specific purpose and circumstances. The following aspects might be considered:
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Conclusions on TBNRM Agreements
Agreements are necessary in situations where one party would be unable to achieve a goal without the other’s participation. The purpose of an agreement determines the level and type of agreement appropriate to a particular situation. Other conclusions are as follows:
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2.5 Organizational and Individual Capacity
The capacity of individuals, communities, agencies and countries is key for effective implementation of the TBNRM process. Each player needs to have the capacity to undertake its role. Capacity can be described as having the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to fulfill a role. Increasingly access to financial resources and to equipment are also included under capacity. This section is not going to discuss capacity building per se but will focus on how the status of organizational and individual capacity affects performance in the TBNRM process.
2.5.1 Critical Minimum Capacity of National Agencies and Organizations
Experience to date has shown that the levels of capacity of national agencies and organizations is a crucial factor in determining whether TBNRM processes will be successful. Good natural resource management practice comes from strong capacity and plans and programs at national and lower levels within a country. The presence of strong national counterpart agencies in two countries greatly facilitates the progress that can be made in TBNRM because these agencies have an understanding of how NRM works and what the additional areas of focus would be to ensure good TBNRM. The development of the capacity of many communities and national agencies to coordinate community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) projects in Southern Africa bodes well for these players to now engage in TBNRM. In reality, however, many national agencies and organizations in Africa do not have the necessary capacity, and are not therefore in a position to maximize impacts from TBNRM.
At its simplest, if a national organization is extremely weak, it will need to be strengthened to a certain minimum capacity before being able to play a role in TBNRM. Ideally this would be done before the organization becomes involved in the more complex realm of TBNRM. For example, in Eastern Africa GEF-UNDP funded a four-year project that focused on developing national institutional capacities in biodiversity conservation before it developed the current Cross Borders Conservation Project. Agencies, although not necessarily equal in capacity, were thus poised to work with others both from within and outside the country—and indeed many professional relationships had already been established through shared training in the first project (Rodgers et al. 2001b).
In many cases, however, projects try to develop the capacity of the national organizations at the same time as they expect them to engage in TBNRM—and as a result, the often complex TBNRM process is adversely affected when players are not yet able to fulfill their roles completely. This is of particular concern with the current trend in donor funding for TBNRM projects. Donors anticipate that a project’s objectives will be achieved. But with the short time frame of many projects and the understandable emphasis on directing the bulk of the effort to building national capacity, many projects will fail to deliver on the transboundary aspects of the process and may well contribute to disillusionment about the efficacy of TBNRM.
If there is a combination of a strong and not so strong partner then there are opportunities for the strong partner to provide support to the other—as for example in the development of the Drakensberg/Maloti TFCA and the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (TFP). The challenge in that case was to establish a relationship based on equality between the partners, but for the strong partner to be responsive to requests for technical support and the like when asked. The strong partner had to recognize that the other one might work more slowly at producing deliverables but provided there was openness about reasons for delay and a continued commitment from both sides the process could continue. However, extremely uneven capacity is a constraint for TBNRM. The stronger partner can become frustrated at the failure of the weaker partner to participate fully. In turn, the weaker partner feels threatened and dominated by the stronger partner. Mutual trust and cooperation are hard to foster in these circumstances.
Can weak organizations work together toward TBNRM? This type of situation is the one least likely to be effective. For example in the “W” Park (a park in Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger, so named after the distinct curve of the Niger river that runs through it) the initial collaboration dwindled as the three protected area authorities suffered significant reduction in capacity (Magha et al. 2001). However, the case studies have shown that with the help of an outside facilitator (or facilitators) progress can be made—as shown, for example, by the development of the Sangha River Trinational park concept in CAR/Congo/Cameroon instigated by three international conservation NGOs working in projects in each country at the common border site (Steel and Curran 2001). When funds and technical assistance are available for regional components, it is possible to achieve a high level of TBNRM despite constraints in available capacity—for example, in the case of IGCP working to conserve mountain gorillas and their habitat with three protected area agencies of uneven capacities (Lanjouw et al. 2001).
2.5.2 Learning by Doing
Besides the need to acknowledge/recognize the importance of a critical minimum level of national capacities for TBNRM processes to proceed, it is important to remember that implementing TBNRM has a major learning component to it. The deeper partners/organizations are involved in TBNRM the better they get at doing it. Those countries participating in TBNRM over a long period of time are the ones that build up their capacity and experiences and are then able to transfer those to new, similar initiatives (Rodgers et al. 2001a).
2.5.3 Organizational Space and Establishing Special Institutional Arrangements
The discussion in this section has so far implied that existing organizations are brought into the TBNRM process. It is important to remember, however, that there can be a danger of imposing structures upon people rather than allowing organizations to evolve on the basis of need (Metcalfe 1999) and that the concept of allowing for “organizational space” is important in TBNRM. New organizations may form as a result of the process and these will emerge with varying capacity. The principles discussed above will apply to these new organizations.
The TBNRM process experience has shown the importance of setting up platforms as mechanisms where information and ideas are exchanged in a transparent and participatory way to ensure the appropriate involvement of all relevant stakeholders. These may be informal in the beginning but often evolve into more formal structures later based at varying levels—e.g., from district/local level groups forming committees to the establishment of bilateral/multilateral-level steering committees. In terms of capacity much will be gained through learning by doing—although facilitators may need to invest considerable effort to ensure that these specifically established institutions start off on the right track that furthers the TBNRM process.
2.5.4 The Role of Regional Institutions
Established regional institutions are uniquely placed, if they themselves have the capacity, to play a role in TBNRM. For example SADC has a natural resources management program with three technical coordination units. SADC recognizes that these units have a responsibility to provide clear and concise guidance for the management of the region’s natural resources and ecosystems—especially those that are transboundary in character (SADC 1999). [It is acknowledged, however, that they are underresourced, that there has been some duplication of effort among units and that there is a need for more efficient sharing of lessons within SADC if its role is to be maximized. See Griffin et al. (1999) for details.] To cite another example, in 2000 the three countries of East Africa reestablished the East African Community (EAC). While it is still in the early stages there will, under the protocol, be many opportunities for cooperation in environment and natural resource management. Similarly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) working in the Horn of Africa has recently added NRM to its program because of the links between land degradation and food insecurity. (The role of NGOs as regional institutions was discussed in Section 2.3.) The capacities of these institutions will need to grow in order to fulfill a maximal role as TBNRM takes root on the continent. Technical and financial investment in these institutions will be needed if there are to be mechanisms that are truly regional. This is an important area where future donor support should focus.
At this point several training institutions have been established on a regional level. Examples from the wildlife sector include the College of African Wildlife Management at Mweka, Tanzania; the Ecole de Faune at Garoua, Cameroon; and the Southern African Wildlife College in South Africa. Their courses and regional seminars could provide opportunities to integrate TBNRM approaches.
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Conclusions on Organizational and Individual Capacity
TBNRM will draw in organizations either with regional mandates or national ones that have to learn to work in partnership with counterpart agencies across borders. Conclusions regarding their capacity are as follows:
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2.6 Communication in the TBNRM Process
In any situation where there are multiple players communication is a crucial component and this is most certainly the case in any TBNRM process. Effective communication will need messages to be put across to different target audiences in different ways and be sensitive to cultural differences across borders. It must not be assumed that such complex communication will happen by default, communication plans and approaches must be actively thought about and prepared. While these will be specific to each situation, some broad principles can be cited here.
2.6.1 Getting Buy-In
The first communication challenge in the TBNRM process is getting buy-in, or gaining acceptance from a critical mass of players to get the process started. This is likely to start within a country and then move to the transboundary level, but it is likely to be an iterative process as broader buy-in is sought both within and between countries. How a leader goes about getting buy-in will depend greatly on scale—the magnitude of the issue to be addressed, the extent of collaboration that is going to be needed and the size of the geographical area. Also of importance is the need to identify whom should be approached and whether certain target groups should be given priority. An example in reference to aforementioned three aspects of scale was the Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity Conservation Project. Based on research findings from several countries, GEF was interested in supporting a project to address unsustainable NRM practices in and around Lake Tanganyika. Presentations were made at the ministry level in the four countries within which the lake falls. Once there was clarity at the national level of the need to address the issue through a transboundary approach, a regional meeting (again at the ministry level) was arranged to agree to initiate a regional project. After that the process of getting buy-in from other stakeholders continued at local and national levels.
The importance of gaining clarity as to the need for a transboundary approach to ensure buy-in needs to be stressed. In establishing the Kilimanjaro Heartland project, AWF describes how it hired a senior conservation professional specifically to foster relationships in support of landscape-level conservation with relevant statutory authorities, land owners and other stakeholder groups. Interestingly, when the first participatory planning meeting was held, several agencies did not attend as they still wanted further clarification about why they should interest themselves in transboundary issues (Muruthi and Frohardt 2001). This illustrates how TBNRM practitioners must allow enough time for this kind of process, which often takes longer than anticipated.
Another important aspect of getting buy-in is being able to demonstrate that information needed for the TBNRM process has been (and will continue to be) collected in a transparent way. And concomitant with this must be the agreement to share information (see below).
2.6.2 Forging a Common Focus across Sectors, within Levels, within Organizations, up and down Levels and across Countries
In sections 3.1 and 3.3.2 the need for a vision and focus for the TBNRM process is highlighted. Developing the common focus is primarily through a good scoping process, followed by a design and planning phase (see Chapter 3)—communication is a crucial tool for this to happen. Any planning process will involve participants who are selected for the constituency they represent. For TBNRM to be successful it is vital that these participants communicate the vision and progress (or lack of it!) on the TBNRM process to their constituents who need to be kept informed and involved.
Developing a common focus is relatively simple if players come from the same sector and speak the same technical language. However, several TBNRM practitioners are looking to mainstream TBNRM in broader regional economic processes (see Chapter 1). This involves the need to communicate across technical sectors and with people who have very different goals—and made all the more complicated by needing to do this across borders. Practitioners need to develop strong communication skills to be convincing proponents of TBNRM.
2.6.3 Sharing Information Widely
Much TBNRM work involves the need for cross-sectoral interaction; participants in the TBNRM process may need to reach out to key target audiences beyond their normal sphere of influence in order to be effective. TBNRM practitioners should always have uppermost in their minds the question—who needs to know this information and who would be the most appropriate individual/agency to share it with? It is worth noting here that people do not need to have expertise in other sectors—collaboration and willingness are the factors that matter.
Mechanisms need to be set up to share information. The important aspect with respect to TBNRM is how information is shared across boundaries. Players need to be aware that despite the intention to be transparent with information—which should be inherent in any TBNRM process—there may be issues of national sensitivity in some situations.
Mechanisms for sharing can be formal or informal, and they can take advantage of existing mechanisms or specifically establish new approaches. The most obvious approach is to establish regular regional meetings that bring specific players together for the purpose of moving the process forward and that also provide an opportunity for updating and other information exchange. The focus of discussions should be on the transboundary aspects of the TBNRM process. IGCP holds quarterly regional meetings that bring wardens of the gorilla parks, as well as other players, together. At each meeting the next set of activities toward TBNRM are agreed on jointly by all players (Lanjouw et al. 2001). However, in many situations regional meetings can be very costly—and as a result need to be well structured to be efficient and effective.
One other method of sharing information is to establish links with counterpart institutions across borders that then work at the national level to promote TBNRM. The Minziro-Sango Bay forest project across the Uganda/Tanzania border, for example, has established Site Steering Committees that discuss TBNRM with counterparts across the border. Each Site Steering Committee then makes a similar report and set of recommendations to its respective district meetings. In this way the TBNRM process is moved forward through national mechanisms (Rodgers et al. 2001b).
Feeding information into regional institutions can be another effective way of sharing. Most regional institutions have formal systems of reporting to the countries of the region.
2.6.4 Keeping up a Dialogue
Sometimes aspects of the TBNRM process can get slowed down or delayed. This is not surprising in something so complex. In many cases it may take a long time for the vision to be finally achieved but, provided the key players keep up a dialogue, the process can be resumed at any point along the way. The formation of the Kgalagadi TFP, for instance, took over seven years. The protected area authorities from South Africa and Botswana started collaborating informally in 1948; in 1992 they decided to formalize the arrangement, but it was not until 1999 that they were able to finalize the agreement. During that period a lot of joint “on the ground” activities were put in place that paved the way to managing the area as a transfrontier park.
Obviously the principle of regular contact should not be followed rigidly if nothing of immediate concern is happening; funds should not be wasted on bringing groups to regional meetings if there is no substantive agenda.
2.6.5 Constraints for Communication
There are, however, many constraints to communication in transboundary contexts. Many of these can be anticipated at the start of the TBNRM process but others will emerge. Examples of constraints that have come out of project case studies include the following:
Some of these can be got round quite simply, others may be more difficult: solutions are often costly or need a lot of effort to put in place. Practitioners should try and tackle constraints because good communication is fundamental to the success of TBNRM.
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Conclusions on Communication
Good communication is an important component to the success of TBNRM, and a mechanism to get support and understanding of key players. Communication plans and approaches must be actively planned and prepared. Key considerations are as follows:
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2.7 Constraints and Enabling Conditions for TBNRM
TBNRM initiatives do not happen in an isolated ecological context. They are developed and implemented in a broad framework, which includes social, economic, political and institutional aspects as well. Within this broad framework there are both in-country and international aspects that have a direct or indirect impact on the success of transboundary initiatives. While it is not always possible or easy to change or influence this broad framework, it is necessary to be aware of the opportunities, enabling conditions and constraints imposed by it in order to assess the likelihood of achieving TBNRM objectives.
This section reviews common constraints and enabling conditions for TBNRM. Opportunities were outlined in Section 1.3. For the purpose of this review, an enabling condition is a condition that facilitates, supports or is essential for successful TBNRM. Not every factor mentioned below will be relevant in every TBNRM situation. Constraints, enabling conditions and opportunities vary among sites, with scale, and with changes over time. There is frequently a close relationship between constraints and enabling conditions: when a constraint is overcome, an enabling condition is often created. Many of the constraints for TBNRM are the same as constraints to good natural resource management within a country. If the conditions for in-country natural resource management are absent, the situation will generally not be improved by “going transboundary.”
Ideally enabling conditions should be in place before starting a TBNRM initiative. However, it would take a long time to create all the necessary enabling conditions, if indeed this were ever feasible. It is important to be pragmatic and start off on an approach where there are feasible opportunities, even if they are limited. Some enabling conditions will be created along the way. Practitioners should be proactive and try to anticipate and tackle constraints before they become severe limiting factors. New avenues should be explored to get around constraints that are not easily resolvable.
The review below draws on earlier sections in this chapter, and on other project documents: Biodiversity Support Program (1999), Griffin et al. (1999), Lanjouw et al. (2001), Magha et al. (2001), Muruthi and Frohardt (2001), Lycklama à Nijeholt et al. (2001), Rodgers et al. (2001a), Rodgers et al. (2001b), Steel and Curran (2001), and Wilkie et al. (2001).
2.7.1 Ecological Context
Constraints
Constraints include intrinsically low productivity and value of the natural resource base, ecosystem services, and biodiversity, which may mean that transboundary collaboration is not worthwhile. While restoration activities are often possible for degraded areas, it can take much time, effort and expense to repair severely damaged habitats and this can constrain TBNRM success. The presence of economically important animal diseases in a region may limit TBNRM collaboration owing to the necessity of control measures (e.g., border veterinary fences that constrain wildlife movement).
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Enabling Conditions
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2.7.2 Social and Cultural Context
Constraints
Participation of Key Stakeholders
It is important that all key stakeholders participate in the TBNRM process, from the planning stage through implementation (see Section 2.1). However, if the stakeholders have different degrees of empowerment and some are poorly organized there can be serious consequences. Organization in communities is particularly important, in order to be able to negotiate and collaborate effectively with other stakeholders within and among countries. A weakly organized community can become marginalized, and thus neither contributes its existing traditional knowledge fully nor benefits from TBNRM. In particular the private sector has difficulty in working with weakly organized communities, since it usually wants results faster than NGOs and government and does not have time to help communities to build capacity. If these problems exist within a country, it is unlikely that transboundary management will be successful.
Ownership of the TBNRM Process
Who and what drives the process and who facilitates it have a major impact on the success of a TBNRM initiative (see Section 2.2). Initiatives driven only by the interest of a donor or NGO are likely to be less sustainable than those that build on existing activities and structures. TBNRM imposed from above on the local level is less likely to succeed.
Lack of Trust
Lack of trust among stakeholders is a serious constraint. This includes trust among stakeholders on the same side of the border (e.g., government and communities; communities and private sector; NGOs and government) and among stakeholders across the border. Trust takes time to develop and cannot be rushed. In particular, it takes a long time to develop community trust and participation.
Cultural Heritage and Language
Language barriers may constrain TBNRM. For example, transboundary partner countries with different official languages may have severe communication problems, and incur additional costs for translation and dual language documentation. This occurs on the margins of the Anglophone and Francophone blocks of countries, with all the Lusophone countries and their neighbors, and is a particular problem on the West African coast where English- and French-speaking countries alternate.
The cultural heritage of local communities may become subordinated in the TBNRM process: communities value cultural as well as biological heritage, but other TBNRM stakeholders value the biological or economic side more and may force this at the expense of cultural factors.
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Enabling Conditions
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2.7.3 Economic-Financial Context
Constraints
High Costs Relative to Benefits
Transaction costs for TBNRM initiatives are often high. The benefits should be greater than the costs in order to justify working across borders. The net benefits of transboundary collaboration also should be greater than the net benefits of working separately at country level. While initial activities and start-up costs may need to be financed by external sources, longer-term sustainability depends on the bottom line: do the benefits outweigh the costs?
Costs and benefits should be analyzed before embarking on TBNRM projects. It is necessary to identify all costs and benefits, not only those that can be easily quantified in financial terms. It is important to review indirect use values such as ecosystem services, and nonmaterial values such as cultural, scientific and intrinsic values. It is also important to look at the distribution of costs and benefits across the range of stakeholders, on both sides of the border. Inequitable distribution of benefits is a major constraint to the success of initiatives.
Unfortunately this type of comprehensive economic analysis is difficult. Natural resource economists are still developing tools and techniques that can assist in the process. There is an urgent need to adapt existing valuation techniques to TBNRM situations, developing a valuation system that stakeholders can participate in and understand, and where linkages among resource production, ecological services and different types of economic benefits are understood.
More specific economic and financial constraints are listed below.
Economic Development
Differences in stage of development among neighboring countries can result in corresponding differences in priorities for TBNRM objectives, which may not always be compatible. Countries with more highly developed economies (e.g., South Africa and Nigeria) may overshadow their neighbors and make collaboration difficult. Similarly, differences in economic powers of individual stakeholders may cause difficulties.
TBNRM programs often have limited economic opportunities. Some rely on tourism to promote economic development and sustainability of the venture (to date this is more the case in Southern Africa than in the other regions). However, heavy reliance on tourism alone creates a very narrow economic base for TBNRM. The tourism industry is fickle and risks impacts of changing fashions, regional and global economic recessions, and insecurity anywhere in the region. Safari hunting tends to be less affected by insecurity than photographic tourism. Even so, a broad economic base is desirable.
Private Sector Investment
Private sector partnerships and investment are an essential part of many TBNRM programs. However, conditions in many African countries are not very conducive to investment. Constraints include the following:
Trade
Trade can be an important part of TBNRM. However, there are many restrictions and disparities that have a range of effects on the viability of TBNRM. They include the following:
Donor Funding
Constraints to donor funding include the following:
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Enabling Conditions
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2.7.4 Political and Policy Context
Constraints
Inadequate Political Will
Insufficient political commitment to transboundary initiatives—at local, national or regional levels—can impose major constraints to TBNRM success. The importance of trying to find win-win situations among stakeholders cannot be overstressed, but in some cases it just is not possible. There may be other agendas and vested interests, for example, in favor of other land uses. Corruption may preclude the transparency, openness, devolution of power and equitable benefit sharing that are necessary for successful TBNRM. In this case improved internal governance may be a necessary precondition before TBNRM can work.
National Sovereignty and Security
Issues of national sovereignty and security can be constraints to TBNRM. These include actual or perceived dominance by one country over another (perhaps in terms of size, financial means and the like); concern about losing control of sovereign territory; and security risks (including the risk of animal diseases spreading across borders). If governments are uneasy about TBNRM collaboration because of security or sovereignty issues, higher levels of government may insist on being involved. However, the fact that diplomats and officials at higher levels of government place high priority on the resolution of transboundary security issues may sometimes open doors and opportunities for TBNRM to hasten the process and increase the chances for success (Dorothy Zbicz, pers. comm.).
Insecurity and unrest pose extra challenges for TBNRM. If a government is not in control of areas near its country’s borders and there is a breakdown of social, economic, political and administrative structures, there may be nobody for a neighboring country to collaborate with at the local or national level. TBNRM collaboration is likely to be very low on the list of the beleaguered government’s priorities. There are also risks to the neighboring country. Control of shared natural resources may collapse, and illegal exploitation may damage the resource base. Problems may spread across the border: illegal extraction may occur on the peaceful side; refugees may cross the border and cause impacts; armed insurgents may cause instability; and animal diseases and invasive species may spread from one country to others owing to breakdown of controls.
Collaboration during times of instability is not impossible (as has been very ably demonstrated by the continued TBNRM collaboration in the Virungas despite 10 years of insecurity). There are even opportunities for transboundary collaboration to mitigate the impacts of conflict (see Shambaugh et al. 2001), such as exchange of information, joint monitoring and control of resource extraction.
Poor International Political Relations
Poor diplomatic relations among countries can inhibit TBNRM, particularly larger-scale initiatives. It may not matter so much in smaller, less formal initiatives (as the Virungas case demonstrates so well), but it can be a constraint to formalizing the collaboration and increasing the range of possible benefits from it.
Devolution, Decentralization and Empowerment
As for NRM within a country, TBNRM can be constrained if devolution of control
over land and resource use is inadequate for those at lower levels to play their roles effectively. In particular, local communities must have adequate empowerment and incentives for long-term participation. TBNRM at a formal scale tends to increase the involvement of upper government levels (e.g., the line ministry in each country and sometimes multiple government ministries). There is a risk that these levels will exert influence and control that is not in the best interests of local communities or private landowners. Other groups such as private sector, NGOs and donors may also drive the TBNRM agenda in a way that conflicts with local interests. The situation is often complicated by the existence of a dual tenure system (state and traditional), sometimes with lack of clarity over their juxtaposition. In addition to community empowerment, it is important for central government to devolve adequate power to local government in order for it to undertake transboundary collaboration. Buy-in of private landowners to the transboundary process is also necessary, and national-level agendas do not always take this fully into account.
Equity across Borders
Equity issues across borders may limit the success of TBNRM unless they are resolved. Benefits have to be shared, and perceived inequities may seriously constrain collaboration to manage shared resources. Types of benefit-sharing arrangements include establishment and implementation of quotas for harvesting of shared resources and revenue sharing (as found in, for example, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park).
Lack of Enabling Policies and Legislation
Inadequate policies and legislation to support sustainable natural resource management, as well as policy and legal inconsistencies among countries, can severely limit the effectiveness of collaboration. Examples include situations where tenure and user rights have not been devolved to local authorities or users, or where regional planning initiatives have not incorporated NRM adequately. Sometimes these problems have their origins in the legacies of colonial legislation. Policies may also promote perverse incentives, e.g., land uses in marginal areas that are not compatible with TBNRM. National legislation rarely makes provision for TBNRM (although South Africa is an exception).
Inadequate Application of Policies and Legislation
If laws are not applied equally to all stakeholders then one group may become too powerful and influence the TBNRM process to its own advantage.
Inadequate Role of Regional Organizations and Agreements
There is a wide range of regional organizations, protocols and economic agreements that could help to promote TBNRM. A few appear to be having positive effects, though judging by the case studies and regional TBNRM reviews of this project, impacts in general have been limited so far. Many of them have no strong powers and rely on countries to collaborate voluntarily, rather than playing a strong enforcing role to ensure implementation of regional policies. Regional institutions are often under-resourced, have poor coordinating structures,