Conclusions

The Virunga Volcanoes represent a remarkable case study. There are probably very few protected areas in the world that have been exposed to armed conflict with so many complicated repercussions, especially across several national borders and over a period of 10 full years. The Virungas are a real-life laboratory where different types of conflict and their multiple consequences have had a vast range of effects on the biodiversity of ecosystems.

This section provides a brief analysis of the different interventions and factors that have contributed to either the success or failure of measures intended to limit negative effects on the environment in emergency situations.

Negative mitigating actions

Although, overall, the mitigating actions that were taken were intended to have a positive impact, some did not produce the expected results, and still others had a completely negative effect. It is useful to note and analyze these negative actions and to draw conclusions from them.

Slowness of interventions

From the very beginning of the refugee crisis in the Goma region and during the first months after the camps were set up, steps to mitigate the impact on the environment were implemented only very slowly. Without dwelling on the broad scope of the problems, particularly humanitarian, that agencies providing assistance were forced to confront, it should be recognized that collaboration between the different sectors, especially between conservation agencies and humanitarian organizations, got off to a late start (Languy, 1995).

Lack of adequate preparation

One of the lessons to be learned from the region's refugee crisis is the dire consequences when humanitarian organizations fail to ready themselves. The aid groups working in the Goma region simply were unprepared. They lacked the most basic knowledge of the Zairean context, and they especially lacked knowledge of the significance and mode of operation of Virunga National Park.

Type of food provided to the refugees

During the entire existence of the refugee camps, dried beans were the primary food distributed to the refugees. Cooking dried beans consumes a lot of energy—posing a major problem in a part of the world with poor energy resources.

The selection of foodstuffs, that is, reveals the lack of communication between the World Food Program, the agency that provided food for the camps, and other UN agencies. While such humanitarian organizations as UNHCR were calling for firewood consumption in the camps to be reduced, the World Food Program was providing hungry, destitute refugees food that could only be cooked using a lot of firewood. The dilemma illustrates what happened when the World Food Program, the organization responsible for feeding the camps, failed to take into account the environmental concerns voiced by other humanitarian organizations (Penroche Development Services, 1995). One cannot help but conclude that communication between large UN agencies is not always optimal.

Reforestation requirements

Apart from the issue of deforestation caused by refugees, the local populations' wood requirements also need to be taken into account. An analysis conducted by the European Union's Programme Spécial pour la Réhabilitation des pays voisins du Rwanda (PSRR) project (Henquin, Blondel, 1997) sought to assess these requirements and determine future consumption after the departure of the refugees.

Various scenarios were analyzed, taking two factors into consideration: the shortage of wood that already existed prior to the refugee crisis (especially around the city of Goma); and the new shortages caused by the massive supply of wood to the camps from tree plantations in the region (Blondel, 1996).

This study concluded that it would have been necessary to reforest as quickly as possible an area of roughly 10,000 hectares (100 square kilometers) in order to avoid having local populations eventually turn to the park to satisfy their wood requirements. Unfortunately, UNHCR had to withdraw its rehabilitation program from the Goma area after only 10 months, and no other major funding has become available to continue these reforesting efforts.

Security considerations

The most crucial threat, and one that still is unresolved, was the extreme lack of security in southern ViNP. This lack of security prevented ICCN from exercising control over the entire park during the crisis and greatly hindered efforts to mitigate the environmental impact of the camps.

A few months before the camps disbanded, intensive discussions were held among various governmental institutions, humanitarian organizations and donor agencies hoping to implement a special military force whose mandate would have been to support ICCN in taking back control of zones occupied and used by various rebel groups (Leusch, 1995b). Participating in the talks were UNHCR, UNDP, EU, and GTZ. The cost of such a force was estimated at approximately $4 million for a period of three months

As it turned out, this "Green Contingent" (Blondel, 1995) never saw the light of day, mainly for financial and political reasons.

Mechanisms of intersectoral collaboration

In normal times, collaboration did exist between the development and conservation sectors. The main strategies for sustainable development, adopted in particular by IUCN during the 1980s (Ishwaran, 1994), culminated in worldwide implementation of a series of mechanisms designed to integrate development with conservation. Locally, in the Great Lakes region, several projects soon followed these basic principles. Among these projects was the Development Through Conservation program initiated by CARE International, first at the boundary of Bwindi Impenetrable NP and later at Mgahinga Gorilla NP (Adams, Infield, 1998; Wild, Mutebi, 1996).

However, it should be noted that these initiatives almost exclusively went forward within the context of stable situations, with no armed conflict or emergency at hand.

Spontaneous bridges span the gulfs among the three sectors of conservation, development, and emergency relief. Many conservation projects and organizations are funded by large donors, and the conservation community usually maintains strong links with the development sector. Furthermore, donor agencies are increasingly interested in supporting conservation programs. This is a trend that existed to some extent for a long time, and one that has tangibly improved since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, when the international conservation community, governments and NGOs together vowed to reinforce environmental protection measures. Sustainable development and biodiversity conservation are now common goals within the conservation and development sectors, and joint projects are now relatively common on a worldwide scale. In the Great Lakes region, GTZ, USAID, and even the World Bank have been involved in community-based conservation programs, and many of these joint projects have been relatively successful.

Traditionally, there has also been good collaboration between the relief sector and the development sector, both in confronting emergency situations and in defining intervention strategies. That is to say, there exists some common ground between these two sectors. The link between the conservation and the relief sectors, however, seems less obvious. Their mandates are very different, and often subject to polarized, acrimonious debate (which can crudely be expressed as "animals vs. humans").

The most delicate area appears to be that of collaboration between the conservation and emergency relief sectors. Humanitarian agencies such as UNHCR, ICRC, Oxfam, and DWB are increasingly receptive to the issue of incorporating environmental components into their intervention programs. This is primarily a result of the scale of the humanitarian crises witnessed recently, but it is also due to greater awareness, all over the world, of environmental factors. In the case of the UNHCR, protecting the right of asylum also comes into play, since refugee populations have an ever greater impact on host populations from a socioeconomic, physical and environmental perspective.

Sharing common goals does not, however, mean that there is collaboration in the field, and this is all the more apparent when the crisis is acute. Thus, during the first moments of the refugee crisis in Zaire, a glaring lack of coordination was observed among the various entities working to protect the environment (Languy, 1995). Little by little, however, collaboration was organized around the partner common to all, in this case the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature (ICCN). Through regular meetings, the various actors working on environmental concerns were able to discuss strategies and coordinate their actions in order to improve their effectiveness. Furthermore, UNHCR eventually implemented an environmental coordination unit, and this structure helped to limit the damage in the field to some extent. A similar structure was also implemented by the European Union during the refugee-camp period.

During the rehabilitation phase in eastern DRC, UNHCR also ensured collaboration among various organizations through contractual agreements that made them implementing partners with UNHCR in their respective environmental programs. The selection of implementing partners was based on their technical expertise and credibility. For example, IGCP and the Virunga Education Program (WWF-Kacheche) implemented rehabilitation programs that were financed and coordinated by UNHCR.

During a crisis situation, it is important to coordinate field activities, and it is also important to exchange information and knowledge. Such exchanges, whether in the form of training seminars, colloquiums or less formal contacts, are of critical importance because they allow the different sectors to demonstrate to each other their respective methods, requirements and mandates.

Transboundary collaboration and emergency situations

The Virunga Volcanoes are a transboundary mountain range comprising three contiguous protected areas, a feature that has played and that continues to play a very important role in efforts to protect the region.

Maps and satellite images clearly show the insular nature of the protected areas of the Great Lakes region, particularly around the Virunga Volcanoes, where the forests are the sole natural habitats of the region, totally isolated entities set within a primarily agricultural landscape of human settlement. The Virunga forests are also the only areas where the plant cover allows armed groups to move freely without drawing the attention of their enemies. The fact that this is also a transboundary habitat enormously increases its strategic value to armed forces. All these regional characteristics help to explain why the Virunga Volcanoes quickly became a magnet for the several military forces operating in the region. The mountains became a battleground (mainly by serving as penetration corridors for different armed groups, who came one after another over time) and doubled as a zone of retreat in the eyes of military leaders. Furthermore, particularly during the insurrection that gripped northwestern Rwanda in 1997-1998, this region also served as a refuge for several thousand civilians, whether they had been taken hostage by armed groups or, more typically, simply sought to escape from the rebels by finding shelter in the forest.

The transboundary nature of the area also acted as a buffer. During periods of heavy fighting, for instance, animal populations such as elephants or gorillas could move into more secure, safer areas. When the violence shifted away, such conservation projects as the International Gorilla Conservation Program could concentrate on activities in those sections of the Virungas that were less insecure.

Transboundary collaboration among agencies responsible for managing protected areas in the three countries dates back to the early 1980s. This early collaboration was above all informal, exchanges of ideas and information about conservation issues within the mountain range. In 1991, when the International Gorilla Conservation Program was established, a more formal initiative for regional collaboration emerged (Kalpers, 1993). IGCP is a coalition of three conservation organizations: African Wildlife Foundation, Fauna and Flora International, and World Wide Fund for Nature-International. Quite remarkably, it was after the onset of war in Rwanda in 1990 that these organizations made the decision to undertake the field operations of IGCP. The three IGCP partners judged that there was far more to lose by waiting than by launching the program under precarious circumstances.

IGCP built its field operations in the midst of enormous international political and diplomatic tension. Most notably, during the entire Rwandan war, from 1990 to 1994, relations between Uganda and Rwanda were so extremely strained that the borders between these two countries were actually closed. Under these conditions, could regional collaboration be implemented? IGCP eventually created new routes to achieve regional cooperation. During the entire four-year period, the only formal bilateral collaboration was between Rwanda and Zaire. It was limited to the following actions: bilateral meetings between representatives of the two countries; cross-visits by rangers and field personnel; and, from November 1993 to April 1994, organized joint patrols.

IGCP and other conservation partners soon began relaying information between Ugandan colleagues and their counterparts in the other two countries. They exchanged reports and shared data vital to conservation of the mountain range. Finally, the protected area managers in the three countries made direct contact by attending international meetings, such as colloquiums and seminars. Thus, gradually, throughout this very difficult period and despite significant obstacles, a genuine fabric of regional cooperation was woven.

Rwanda's genocide ended in 1994; then, between 1994 and 1996 relations between Rwanda and Zaire slowly deteriorated over the Rwandan refugee issue. Next, in 1996-1997, civil war came to Zaire. Not until the beginning of 1997 did a propitious climate for official, peaceful relations develop among the three countries. It was at this point in time that regional collaboration, focusing on the Virunga Volcanoes and the Bwindi Forest, intensified, largely due to a series of IGCP initiatives. The group orchestrated this new level of collaboration through such events as quarterly regional thematic meetings and technical bilateral meetings, by encouraging mutual activities (e.g., joint patrols) and by implementing a joint program for ranger-based monitoring.

Because IGCP maintained a presence in each of these three countries and had national programs in place, it was possible to achieve a significant degree of consistency in conservation activities. Within the framework of regional collaboration, a broad variety of subjects could be discussed, all aiming to coordinate the management of this transboundary network of protected areas. For instance, IGCP workers discussed conservation policies, particularly within the ecotourism and community-based conservation sectors; they sought to define joint actions all three countries could carry out; they formulated strategies to improve the security of field staff; crafted action plans; and examined potential disputes between transboundary partners.

The possibility of creating a transboundary protected area in the Virunga Volcanoes has been examined in detail by Kalpers and Lanjouw (Kalpers, Lanjouw, 1997). Various terms have been used: a "Peace Park", an "International Park," a "Transboundary Park." The establishment of a transboundary park could be very useful from several points of view.

In terms of biodiversity conservation, a transboundary park would permit a more consistent and focused approach to management and conservation in the targeted area. Furthermore, such a park would serve as a magnet to the outside world because of its prestige and institutional standing. And finally, a transboundary park would also lead to the development of true regional tourism.

At the political and diplomatic level, a transboundary park would permit closer contact among the three national agencies in charge of protected areas. Such a park would also become an important instrument of political stabilization in the subregion.

Regional collaboration in the Virunga Volcanoes remains relatively informal. No official document has recognized these trilateral relations. But it is nonetheless firmly established in the field. Importantly, this cooperation was initiated and developed at the grassroots level, by players in the field such as rangers and project partners. It was not imposed by the hierarchy, as is often the case. This approach is keenly felt by all stakeholders in the field to be a natural way to resolve many issues and problems. Such "bottom-up" transboundary collaboration has played and continues to play a very important role in mitigating the effects of armed conflict in the region. It allows the exchange of information that is sometimes vital for the security of field staff and for the protection and/or rehabilitation of natural habitats and vulnerable species. It permits well-organized joint monitoring and surveillance activities so vital to early warning and detection. Because the armed forces also participate in cooperative mixed bilateral park patrols, this transboundary collaboration also directly increases the level of security in the Virunga Volcanoes.

Other lessons and conclusions

There is an important general lesson to be drawn at the diplomatic and political level: during the crisis that has gripped the Great Lakes region over the last 10 years, the international community has too often missed opportunities to play a positive role in problem resolution. The first missed opportunity came during the war in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994. The international community also failed to play a positive role during the genocide. The United Nations, in particular, demonstrated its inability to intervene in that extreme situation. A final missed opportunity came during the two civil wars in Congo, which resulted in a genuine balkanization of the region, with the emergence or reinforcement of a myriad of armed groups on all sides that leave a path of chaos and destruction in their wake.

Among the United Nations agencies with the specific mandate of protecting nature or the environment, it must be recognized that mobilization in a crisis situation has been slow or even nonexistent. It appears that neither UNEP (the United Nations Environment Program) nor UNESCO applied the recommendations they received during these years of crisis, particularly during the refugee crisis in Zaire (Biswas et al. 1994). Only recently has UNESCO, in collaboration with all active partners in eastern DRC, obtained any significant financing from UNFIP (United Nations Foundation for International Partnerships) for a project to provide support to the five Congolese World Heritage Sites, including Virunga NP (UNESCO, 1999). This project will supply a lifeline to the ICCN after a crisis lasting nearly 10 years.

Another observation rooted in the events that have taken place in the region over the last 10 years is the vulnerability of conservation projects financed by official donors. As soon as the political and/or military situation appears to be unfavorable, such donors' activities - often of large scale - are promptly suspended or terminated. This is what happened in Zaire in 1991-1992, when the European Union retracted a major project that was being implemented in Virunga Park, and later in Rwanda when USAID withdrew from the conservation sector in Volcanoes Park and Nyungwe Forest. Most bilateral and multilateral donors must comply with political and diplomatic requirements imposed by their respective governments. That is, each side has its own dilemma: large projects may be well intended, but their absolute lack of flexibility makes them unable to adapt their approach as conditions change. At the same time, the sudden withdrawal of key partners causes a crisis within a regional institution that already must confront the consequences of war.

A corollary to this observation is the role played by nongovernmental conservation organizations active in the region. Unlike official funding sources, conservation NGOs have little to no political constraints. They may devote themselves wholeheartedly to their mandate, which is conservation. The other difference between NGOs and foreign-government sponsors is the flexibility of their interventions: NGOs are much more able to adapt to changing conditions and redirect their actions when the need arises.

The example of the International Gorilla Conservation Program is particularly striking. During the 10 years of repeated crisis that affected the Virunga Volcanoes region, IGCP managed to maintain an almost permanent presence. It withdrew only for a few brief periods, for instance during the four months of genocide in Rwanda. The example of IGCP illustrates a very salient fact: in situations where armed conflict is having a negative impact on biodiversity, conservation NGOs, despite their limited financial means, can achieve a very positive impact, not only by providing material and financial assistance, however minimal, to the agency in charge of protected areas, but also by giving technical and even moral support to field agents who are at times disoriented by the events that surround them. Finally, conservation NGOs have an important role to play in the area of communication. By serving as a conduit for their on-site partners, NGOs may transmit appropriate messages to the international community, identify and solicit funding sources, coordinate actions that are sometimes in confusion and even apply pressure on Western governments and international institutions.

A general observation is that the weaker the institution in charge of protected areas, the more difficult (or even nonexistent) the coordination between partners from different sectors becomes (Languy, 1995). It appears that institutions that are already strong before a crisis strikes are more able to manage a crisis situation. In all cases, it is up to these institutions to initiate and develop mechanisms for collaboration in areas where several partners or sectors coincide. This observation is of critical importance to future operations and highlights the need to define a series of preventive actions in the case of armed conflict or any other acute crisis.

In peacetime, long-term interventions that strive to build the institutional capacities of individuals and organizations are very important. They encourage individuals and organizations to forge ties and to improve their effectiveness in a secure, normal context. Such peacetime interventions also help individuals and organizations become confident and experienced enough to be able to evolve autonomously and appropriately in emergency situations. This recommendation is especially valid for junior personnel, such as rangers and guides, who at times must play a key role when their institutions are no longer able to provide them with support (Plumptre, 2000). It is also valid for the institution's senior personnel. who in a crisis may have to make important decisions and assume all types of responsibilities. In particular, management's ability to design and organize operations may take on fundamental importance in crisis situations. In all cases, capacity-building for different categories of personnel should take into consideration the three traditional focal points of training and strive to develop knowledge, skills and attitudes.

Collaboration with military personnel can also be a very important matter in emergency situations. In the event of armed conflict, typical outcomes may include the very sudden seizure of protected areas by the military (a very real possibility in transboundary protected areas); the isolation, sometimes quite emphatic, of conservation agents (for example, by preventing their access to the protected area or by confiscating their arms); and the exploitation of resources by some military personnel (who may hunt wildlife with automatic weapons or systematically cut down forests).

Within this context, it may be in the interest of managers of protected areas to develop close contacts with military officers in the region and explain the reasons behind their actions. It is up to the managers of protected areas to make the military understand the role of conservation agencies, to develop codes of conduct for the military and also to convince the military that field personnel, with their enormous knowledge of the area, are a very precious asset.

Epilogue

From 1990 to 2000, the Virunga Volcanoes were the scene of an extraordinary series of violent events. If such events had been foreseen 10 years ago, conservationists would certainly have predicted the disappearance of this ecosystem and its population of mountain gorillas. However, even though they were greatly affected by the course of events during this period, the Virunga Volcanoes ecosystems are still there, still generating interest among the authorities in the three surrounding countries and in the international community at large. It is the author's hope that this case study will permit a fuller understanding of the factors that contributed to the survival of this unique environment and a more thorough analysis of the failures that occurred.