Responses to the events

War in Rwanda (1990-1994)

For the entire duration of the war in Rwanda (1990-1994), various partners provided support for ORTPN's activities. Since this period was marked by a series of repeated crises interspersed with moments of relative calm, it is at times difficult to distinguish the mitigating activities from the rehabilitative ones. ( "Mitigating" here refers to limiting damage while a crisis situation is occurring, while "rehabilitation" refers to work done during the post-crisis phase. Note also that it can even be difficult to distinguish crisis from post-crisis when a situation has improved from the acute crisis but spasms of instability remain).

In any crisis situation such as a war, most donors decrease their general support, both for security and political reasons; sectors regarded as non-priorities, such as environmental and biodiversity conservation, are often the first to feel the cut. As a result of the drastic decline in tourism income, ORTPN soon found itself in a situation of catastrophic financial crisis. At the same time, the deteriorating security situation stopped a number of forest conservation projects around the country that had been funded by USAID. With these planned activities blocked, USAID agreed to reallocate already budgeted funds and provide partial payment of ORTPN employees' salaries in Volcanoes National Park for six months. After that six-month period, however, the USAID budget expired. The agency's support clearly represented an important lifeline for ORTPN, but the limited duration meant that it was possible to meet only a portion of ORTPN's VNP-related needs during this period of war. Then USAID, along with all other aid agencies, rapidly withdrew from conservation activities.

At this critical moment, and, despite their relatively modest means, nongovernmental conservation organizations came to ORTPN's aid. The main partners who stepped in at this point were the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund, the Morris Animal Foundation and the International Gorilla Conservation Program (a coalition made up of the African Wildlife Foundation, Fauna and Flora International and the World Wide Fund for Nature – International). They intervened to help rehabilitate facilities, provide equipment and materials, pay employee bonuses, and monitor gorilla groups.

Rwandan refugee crisis in Zaire (1994-1996)

This section describes positive mitigating actions taken by various humanitarian, development, and conservation agencies in an effort to stem the drastic degradation of the environment that began when the refugee crisis erupted. Appendix 2 provides the details of mitigating actions taken by each agency.

Wood supply (Henquin, Blondel, 1997)

Wood supply operations were mainly financed by the UNHCR in cooperation with a number of implementing agencies (including GTZ). The effectiveness of the conservation measures can be analyzed using the following table:

Note: First year = first year (first 12 months) of presence of refugee camps, i.e. July 1994 - July 1995; second year = July 1995 - July 1996

The amount of wood distributed to refugees in the camps increased by a factor of three between July 1994 and July 1996. On average, 50 percent of the camps' energy needs were met during the second year. Around the month of March 1996, trucks brought some 650 tons of wood to the camps each day--approximately equivalent to cutting one square kilometer of eucalyptus stands per month (Blondel, 1997). When that figure is applied to overall wood consumption rates in all five camps, we see that the wood-distribution efforts effectively allowed a significant reduction in the deforestation rate. The wood that was distributed came from plantations, some of them located more than 100 kilometers from the refugee camps.

With respect to overall consumption, the figures do not show any change from Year 1 to Year 2. There were, however, important differences among the different camps.

In Katale, Kahindo and Kibumba, total wood consumption decreased significantly and the reduction in deforestation within the park proved to be much greater than the increase in wood supply to these camps. One factor that explains this seeming paradox is the introduction of energy-saving techniques, especially better cookstoves. Another factor is the improvement in surveillance within the park. ICCN, for instance, received some extra support from external partners and was able to boost its surveillance system. In other places, patrols were introduced. (See Appendix 2: list of projects and organizations that took mitigating steps during the refugee crisis.).

In contrast, around the Mugunga and Lac Vert camps, the situation remained so precarious that guards did not patrol the forest. There, both deforestation and wood consumption intensified. It should also be noted that the level of wood consumption in this zone was influenced by the commercial trade in wood cut in the park and sold in Goma.

The available data suggest that the environmental programs developed during this period by various partners allowed at least 4,000 hectares (40 square kilometers) of forest to be saved over a two-year period. In other words, if there had been no intervention on behalf of the park, deforestation would have been 1.65 times greater than it was (Blondel and Henquin, 1997).

Regular meetings and coordination among stakeholders

Only in February 1995 did the various bodies working to protect the Virunga environment begin to coordinate their activities (Languy, 1995). ICCN and UNHCR were the most notable of the agencies who began working together at this time. Because of the magnitude of the deforestation, UNHCR quickly became aware of the environmental problems caused by the huge numbers of refugees surrounding the park. ICCN's partner conservation organizations contributed to the new cooperation by relaying and amplifying the alarm message, and by assisting ICCN in articulating and defining its needs. Many meetings were held between those organizations and the relief agencies (in particular UNHCR), and the need for a coordination mechanism slowly emerged.

As soon as the refugee crisis erupted, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Cooperation, GTZ) began to collaborate with the UNHCR Technical Unit to create a pilot environment unit in Goma (the Office of Environmental Information) capable of gathering and distributing information on the environment (Delvingt, 1994). By early 1995, UNHCR had established a new formal structure, creating a Coordinator for Environmental Affairs position (Leusch, 1995a).

It should also be noted that between May 1995 and October 1996, a European Union (EU) coordinator was stationed in Goma, working to harmonize the activities of the PSRR (Special Rehabilitation Program for Countries Neighboring Rwanda) with those of the United Nations (UNHCR, UNDP), GTZ, and local and international NGOs working on site (Delvingt, 1996). (See Appendix 2 for details about these projects.)

Improved cookstoves and energy-saving techniques

Several agencies, mainly GTZ and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), promoted improved cooking stoves and energy-saving practices in certain refugee camps (UNHCR, 1998a). GTZ initially focused on the Kahindo camp. Subsequently, IFRC expanded this initiative to the Kibumba camp, where the EU developed a similar program. GTZ also provided financial and technical assistance to a local NGO to implement similar activities in the Lac Vert camp in 1995.

Aware that the use of improved technologies was not going to reduce energy consumption on its own, GTZ did not concentrate solely on better cookstoves, but also disseminated other energy-saving techniques. GTZ workers demonstrated better ways to prepare wood—for instance, how to dry and store wood—as well as efficient ways to prepare and cook food.

The energy-saving techniques were popularized through an educational program conducted by trainers recruited from among the refugees. This program made it possible to reach more than 70 percent of the refugees. As it turned out, these improved cooking practices resulted in more substantial energy savings than the use of improved cookstoves (Penroche Development Services, 1995). Energy savings initially achieved through the use of improved cookstoves fell from 40 percent to no more than 20 percent. UNHCR is now aware that energy-saving practices (hence education and dissemination measures) are more important than the improved stoves alone. In other words, the "software" here is more important than the "hardware."

Educational and awareness-raising measures

Educational campaigns that targeted refugees in camps surrounding southern ViNP were conducted with the assistance of many organizations, both international and local NGOs.

Park authorities and rangers took the important step of clearly demarcating the park borders by installing a large number of warning signs in strategic locations. The new signs made the refugees very aware of the boundaries of protected areas. This operation was financed by UNHCR with assistance from local communities (Leusch, 1995b). The success of this initiative was difficult to assess. But the great advantage of the demarcation was that it made boundaries very obvious at a time when many refugees thought of the rangers' surveillance work as repression.

Protective and surveillance measures

ICCN, the organization with official responsibility for managing ViNP, was already a relatively weak institution before the refugee crisis began. The arrival and encampment of more than 700,000 Rwandan refugees along the borders of the park exacerbated this institutional weakness to such an extent that ICCN now found itself unable to confront the accelerated levels of illegal activities, which included cutting and felling trees, poaching, and land encroachment. Initiatives such as supporting ICCN operations in southern ViNP (see Appendix 2) proved to be particularly effective in reinforcing the Institute's visibility and especially in strengthening its capacity to enforce the law and conduct its general surveillance work.

After the refugees arrived in July 1994, security in the camps and the surrounding areas deteriorated continuously. Then, after months of negotiations, UNHCR and the government of Zaire agreed to station a special military force in the region to provide security inside all five camps.

The troops—several hundred soldiers—were provided by Zaire's Special Presidential Division (SPD). The cost of their surveillance operations, including employee bonuses, communications, transportation, and operating expenses, was covered by UNHCR. As a result of these measures, security inside the camps improved significantly. But the mandate of this force was exclusively to enforce the security within the camps and neutralize the Interahamwe, the most dangerous of the armed groups operating within the camps. Environmental protection was not yet seen as a priority. The soldiers' duties did not encompass illegal activities carried out by the refugees when they left the camps and entered the park.

Rehabilitation phase in DRC (after November 1996)

When the Rwandan refugee camps at last closed in November 1996, a number of agencies initiated rehabilitation programs of all sorts in the region. UNHCR undertook an ambitious rehabilitation plan for North Kivu Province in various sectors, including the environmental sector. Many local organizations assisted UNHCR in implementing this program, particularly with respect to reforestation and nursery operations. UNHCR also approached two conservation projects and long-time partners of ICCN, the Virunga Education Program and the International Gorilla Conservation Program. Together they planned and implemented a number of rehabilitative activities through October 1997. That was when the region's new political authorities forced UNHCR to halt all its operations in the Goma region. The large-scale rehabilitation program was not completed. Projects to repair many hospitals, roads, and markets had to be abandoned almost overnight. But, despite difficult circumstances, both ICCN and IGCP have found alternative funding sources and managed to continue their work.

Another program, the Virunga Education Program, a WWF project, received funding from UNHCR in order to intensify its reforestation activities around southern ViNP and to continue its educational and awareness-raising programs targeting local populations (see Appendix 2).

Meanwhile, the International Gorilla Conservation Program focused its rehabilitation work on the park, and especially on restoring the capacities of its managing agency, the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature (ICCN). This program had several components (Kalpers, 1998; Kalpers, Lanjouw, 1998), concentrating mainly on surveillance and on institutional capacity building. The first component provided emergency support for surveillance and patrols, with the goal of resuming ranger operations in southern ViNP. This support was made tangible through the following actions: payment of employee bonuses for patrolling the Mikeno sector; provision of radio-communications equipment, solar energy systems, office equipment, and field equipment (such as camping gear, rain gear, boots); and payment of additional rations for surveillance patrols (most rations during this period were paid for by the World Food Program through the Food for Work plan). The second component focused on human resource development: training and monitoring surveillance patrols (including development of a training protocol, modules, and procedures; mapping, including satellite imaging; and data analysis); organizing workshops; creating an emergency action plan for southern ViNP; creating an ecotourism strategy and plan of action for the entire Virunga National Park; presenting a day-long workshop for the new military, administrative, and political authorities in the region; sending field personnel in Uganda on study trips; and, thanks to the hiring of a technical advisor financed by UNHCR, putting in place permanent institutional support for ICCN.

In April 1999, representatives from many organizations in the conservation sector attended a seminar in Naivasha, Kenya on endangered World Heritage Sites in DRC. These groups included governmental organizations such as the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature; non-governmental organizations such as World Wide Fund for Nature, Wildlife Conservation Society, Gilman International Foundation, and International Rhino Foundation; and groups from the development sector, including UNESCO and GTZ. By providing an overview of the prevailing situation in the DRC sites on the list of endangered World Heritage Sites, the seminar enabled the participants to define precise strategies for the conservation of these sites and to develop a joint action plan (ICCN, 1999). The seminar thus served to mobilize the international community's attention, and it also produced a proposal for emergency financing, sent to the United Nations Foundation by UNESCO (UNESCO, 1999). This proposal was accepted in November 1999, but the project implementation only started officially in June 2001, and it is still too early to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of this project on ICCN.

The UNF/UNESCO program will provide logistical and institutional support for a period of four years at the five endangered World Heritage Sites in the DRC, including Virunga National Park. The goal of the program is to mobilize financial and diplomatic support while attracting international attention to the five sites--both in order to protect the sites and to demonstrate the lessons conservationists may learn from the effects of armed conflict on rare environments. Program funding exceeds $4 million, with approximately $2.9 million of this amount to be contributed by the UN Foundation (Kasereka Bishikwabo, 2000). One of the challenges of the program will be to secure other sources of funding when the original funding runs out.

Rehabilitation phase in Rwanda (after 1994)

Although the guerrilla war and the genocide in Rwanda were brought to a halt in 1994, the rehabilitation phase for protected areas in general and Volcanoes National Park in particular has never completely ended (Kabuyenge, 1997). In many respects, one can argue that the entire northwest section of the country was in a chronic state of emergency from 1995 through the end of 1999 (African Rights, 1998). The military activities conducted in the region in response to the numerous incursions made by rebel groups were responsible for VNP being closed between August 1997 and July 1999. In 2001, the situation has somehow improved, but rebel groups still sporadically make incursions into the park.

During the genocide and the refugee crisis that followed, ORTPN lost most of its staff. By July 1994, the organization was essentially moribund. But assistance from the conservation community enabled ORTPN to restore some of its activities both locally and nationally. Essential support came from two workshop seminars organized by IGCP. The first, highly successful seminar sought to determine priorities for the restoration of ORTPN's capacities. The second seminar tried to interest bilateral and multilateral donors in funding conservation groups (ORTPN, 1995). That goal, unfortunately, did not meet with success during the years immediately following these meetings. Potential donors held back when they saw security in northwestern Rwanda deteriorate rapidly under new rebel incursions.

The rehabilitation programs initiated in the VNP region thus underwent both highs and lows. This phase was characterized both by traditional aid activities, including infrastructure repair and the provision of all sorts of equipment, and by novel ones, most notably the forging of substantial new collaborations between ORTPN and its conservation partners, on the one hand, and the emergency sector and the development sector on the other hand. IGCP was instrumental in gaining assistance from, and attracting the interest of, certain development agencies.

Development agencies displayed their interest on two different levels. First, at the operational level, they implemented microprojects that combined direct advantages for ORTPN (e.g., infrastructure repair and the restoration of VNP's boundaries) with clear advantages for local populations (e.g., hiring local workers; raising local awareness of problems in the VNP). The microprojects program was financed by the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands in Rwanda (Rutagarama, 1999).

Second, at the strategic level, substantive contact was maintained with agencies such as CARE International for the purpose of implementing a genuine integrated biodiversity program such as an Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) (CARE, 1999).

In addition, beginning in 1995, IGCP and the government of the Netherlands forged close ties in order to launch a large regional program involving both the conservation and development sectors over a period of several years (IGCP, 1998). However, the major funding this program required has not been granted in light of the precarious security conditions prevailing since 1994. IGCP has still managed to secure ad hoc, small-scale grants from the Dutch embassy in Kigali, funding some clean-up efforts within the park and modest education-related activities.

In early 2000, the government announced a plan to resettle several hundred people on a strip of land measuring approximately 10 square kilometers in the westernmost part of the Virunga Volcanoes--a plan, that is, that meant the loss of a portion of VNP. The rapid in extremis intervention by partners of ORTPN and certain ministerial departments averted this serious threat. The resettlement decision had, in fact, come about as a result of confusion over the status of this portion of VNP and was partially due to a lack of coordination among the various entities holding jurisdiction over the region (Lanjouw, 2000).