History of Conflict and Conservation: 1961-1991

The Conflicts

The Ethiopian-Eritrean civil war and the Ethiopian revolution took place for very different reasons. The civil war had its roots in World War II, when administration of the region then known as Eritrea was temporarily entrusted to British military rule -- following Italy's surrender -- until its fate could be decided by the United Nations General Assembly [Figure 2a Administrative Regions within Ethiopia (a) during the conflict period and (b) after the boundaries were redrawn in 1995. The region and nation known as Eritrea is illustrated in 2(a)] (Kapuscinski, 1989). At that time there were many bids for control of Eritrea, including one submitted by its residents, requesting independence, and one submitted by Ethiopia's emperor, Haile Selassie I, requesting its total appropriation. The UN elected to adopt a compromise resolution, however, stating that Eritrea was to establish its own form and organization of internal self-government while existing as a federated state of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was to be responsible for matters pertaining to foreign affairs, defense, foreign and interstate commerce, transportation, and finance (United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 15 September 1952; Testfatsion Medhanie, 1986; Kapuscinski, 1989). Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea was particularly pleased, however, with this manner of alliance. The emperor's opposition eventually became the motivation for his abolishment of the federation and imposition of imperial rule throughout Eritrea (Kapuscinski, 1989). These acts had the effect of consolidating Eritrea's opposition to any form of association with Ethiopia and became the catalyst for war.

Known as one of the longest-running civil wars in African history, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict lasted 30 years, primarily because both countries were struggling with a range of internal problems and civil discord. Eritrea's problems were ideological and religious in nature and caused a battle among its leading insurgent groups in 1974, at the end of which the Marxist-oriented Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) emerged as the victor (Testfatsion Medhanie, 1986; Mills, 1992). Ethiopia's problems, on the other hand, were related to the emperor's failure to effect any significant social, economic, or political reform, including transforming Ethiopia from a subsistence-based economy to an agro-industrial based economy (Kapuscinski, 1989; Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html 2000). By 1974, four-fifths of Ethiopia's population existed as poverty-stricken subsistence farmers, as the bulk of their production went to pay taxes, rents, debts, and bribes (Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993). The emperor's problems also stemmed from failure to combat famine and a growing trade deficit (Kapuscinski, 1989; Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993). These issues became the incentive for an armed forces-led rebellion that ended with the emperor's deposition on September 12, 1974, and the establishment of the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia (PMGSE) as the nation's ruling body (Kapuscinski, 1989; Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html 2000). Major Mengistu Haile Mariam eventually emerged as the leader of the PMGSE after three years of power struggles among the revolution's leaders.

The emperor was unable to effect any significant reform or economic growth, primarily because his government -- despite an expansion of bureaucratic structure -- lacked the administrative and technical capabilities for any large-scale development plans. Furthermore, the emperor's ideas met with resistance from Ethiopia's nobility and the church (Kapuscinski, 1989; Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html 2000). Finance also was an issue, particularly after 1960, as Ethiopia's annual defense budget consumed a large portion of funds available for all national programs, leaving few resources available for development (19% to 24% percent of total annual appropriations went to the military during 1960-1974) (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin 2000).

The PMGSE's solution to these challenges was to adopt myriad policies that led to the nationalization of rural and urban property, and to the nationalization and restructuring of Ethiopia's economy. It also formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to facilitate its restructuring efforts and its military campaign against Eritrea. The effect of restructuring, however, was to increase the size of Ethiopia's public bureaucracy by as much as 60% (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin 2000). This limited development opportunities even more than when under imperial rule, as did the escalation of the military campaign against Eritrea (Ethiopia's defense expenditures were consuming 40% of the total budget between 1977-1987).

The PMGSE's performance was affected by numerous other factors, including a series of natural catastrophes and civil unrest, and various ill-conceived development and movement policies. These included one involving the resettlement of people, another calling for the relocation of entire villages (termed villagization), and a third restricting free movement. These policies were implemented in the mid-1980s when Ethiopia was experiencing a series of devastating droughts and insect plagues that led to widespread crop failures and livestock losses. The measures involved the forcible uprooting of hundreds of people from the north and their resettlement to the south, the mandatory relocation of homesteads into structured villages, and the strict regulation of peoples' movements and transport (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987).

These policies were carried out under the pretext of security concerns -- that land in the south was more productive, and that resettlement and villagization would facilitate efforts to provide much-needed social services and developments (Desmond, 1986; Cohen and Isaksson, 1987; Mills, 1992). The restriction on peoples' movements and transport, however, left people in many areas desperate for food and other commodities. Furthermore, many of the promised services never materialized because natural catastrophes and conflict with Eritrea had left the nation's economy in a state of collapse (Cohen and Isaksson, 1987; Clapham, 1988). These factors, in conjunction with famine, resulted in the displacements and deaths of hundreds of thousands of people within Ethiopia during the mid-1980s, and forced over 100,000 refugees into Somalia (Desmond, 1986; Bazyler, 1987; Cohen and Isaksson, 1987; Clapham, 1988; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html 2000). These same factors led many Ethiopians to join forces with Eritrea and contributed to the condemnation of Mengistu by the international community (Mills, 1992; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html 2000).

Further adding to Ethiopia's problems was that its relationship with the Soviet Union was undergoing a fundamental change (due to a new direction in Soviet foreign policy); Meanwhile, Soviet leaders disapproved of Ethiopia's management of internal affairs and use of Moscow-sent aid (Patman, 1990). The implication of this change was profound because military assistance from the Soviets was vital to the pursuit of Mengistu's military solution in Eritrea. Beginning in 1988, the Eritreans won a series of victories against the Ethiopian government, including the capture of an army division, all of its armaments, and the town of Afabet (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html 2000). Then, in 1990, Eritrea succeeded in capturing the city of Massawa; in 1991, it captured the city of Asmara (Mills, 1992; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html 2000). These last two victories ended Ethiopia's control of Eritrea and led to the defeat of the PMGSE in 1991.

Ethiopia's Conservation- and Protected-Area Program and Exclusionary Protected-Area Policy

The managing conservation and protected area authority during the period of conflict was the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organization (EWCO). This institution was established in 1965 and formally recognized as an autonomous body in 1970 (Negarit Gazeta, 1970). The EWCO's responsibilities during that period included establishing nine national parks, four wildlife sanctuaries, seven wildlife reserves, and 18 controlled-hunting areas between 1965 and 1980. It also was responsible for adopting and implementing a range of hunting and conservation policies, including the adoption (unpublished) of IUCN (the World Conservation Organization) protected-area descriptions and guidelines (UNESCO, 1964; Abraha Misginna, 1991). These included classification of all national parks as "Strict Conservation Areas."

Termed an exclusionary protected-area policy, the conditions of this category include the limitation of "... all kinds of human use of that area like settlement, exploitation of natural resources, grazing of livestock, mining, etc., … except as required for the management of the wildlife and conservation" (Moore, 1982). The imperial government's adoption of this particular IUCN standard proved most controversial, however, as it imposed restrictions on the taking of previously unregulated species and natural resources and required involuntary resettlement of indigenous peoples (Moore, 1982; Turton, 1987). The controversy persisted into the next regime following the PMGSE's continued empowerment of the EWCO and public endorsement of the EWCO's conservation- and protected-area efforts (Negarit Gazeta, 1980).

Forceful and continual adherence to this exclusionary protected-area policy, in conjunction with a nationwide lack of basic development and a diversion of finances toward conflict, was the most significant factor contributing to the conservation program's lack of success. Other important factors were policies related to resettlement, villagization, movement, and commerce. These policies also were responsible for considerable damages to, and losses of, protected natural resources when a change in government occurred. Government transition periods were characterized by disorder and lawlessness.

The following discussion elaborates on these factors and the resultant negative impacts on conservation in, and management of, Ethiopia's protected areas. Where applicable, positive impacts are presented as well.