Sierra Leone's 10-year-old civil war has had both positive and negative impacts on the country's biodiversity. The causes of these impacts have come from a number of war-related sources that may be summarized as follows:

• Revolutionary United Front (RUF) war strategy (forest war and abduction of large numbers of civilians)
• government and civilian reactions to RUF
• internally displaced persons (IDPs)
• breakdown of law and order.

At the start of its revolution, the RUF behaved like a conventional insurgency, moving weapons along roads and seeking to hold terrain and towns. They were easily driven back into the forest, first by the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) in 1993, and subsequently by Civil Defence Forces (CDF) from 1995. According to the movement's own account, the leadership was sequestered behind the Gola North Forest Reserve in Nomo Chiefdom, on the border with Liberia, contemplating withdrawal into Liberia (RUF/SL 1995). However, the path into Liberia was blocked by the decline in Charles Taylor's military fortunes across the border.

Isolated, the RUF then took on a new social character and adopted a new military strategy. They abandoned the heavy weapons and vehicles, and built camps in the thick forest. Then they embarked on infiltration and pinprick attacks mounted via the numerous forest trails that crisscross the country. Along these trails, small bands of RUF were safe from a motorized enemy at most times without maps. A wedge was driven between civilians and the NPRC government and the army through trickery, such as RUF cadres carrying out attacks dressed in military fatigues, or scattering army identity cards/passes to give the impression that the destruction was the work of government troops.

This new strategy involved the RUF permanently living in the forest reserves, a strategy which had potential negative impacts on biodiversity. The potential magnitude of this impact can be glimpsed from the fact that identified RUF bases from 1995 onwards were or are within natural reserves, as confirmed in Table 5.

The potential negative impact on forest reserves would have been exacerbated when, as an extension of their forest war strategy, the RUF started abducting large numbers of civilians. Unconfirmed estimates have put the total number of persons living with the RUF in the various forest camps at more than 50,000 at the peak of the campaign. While the war is going on, it is not possible to undertake an assessment of impacts on biodiversity resulting from these realities. If these numbers are even remotely accurate, the implications of camping and feeding this many people, mostly living within and on the forests and collecting firewood for cooking purposes, could be very serious. Large-scale mining activities (and possibly lumbering) that the RUF embarked on while in these enclaves, and which continues to date, will also aggravate the negative impacts.

The abandonment of village communities, due to abductions and forced removals or to residents fleeing, can sometimes reduce local pressures on the environment. Such depopulated areas may have time for rejuvenation that would otherwise not have been possible.

At various times during the 10-year civil war in the country, both the government army and civil defense forces have had to spend prolonged periods in forest reserves, perhaps in reaction to the RUF war strategy. By their own accounts, Government troops at the war front have not always received rations and salary. There are reports of the shooting of bush animals for food. (Accounts from government soldiers stationed on Tiwai) this is your reference Island in the early 1990s indicate that they often fed themselves on the monkeys in the sanctuary.

Civil defense forces have allegedly resorted to large-scale mining activities. These activities would have had negative environmental impacts. Again, actual field studies in these areas to assess these impacts are not yet possible.

A result of the civil war has been large-scale movements of people, either as refugees in neighboring countries or as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Accurate records of the numbers of people forced to flee their normal localities throughout the period of civil war are hard to come by. Table 6 summarizes the numbers of internally displaced persons in the various camps throughout the country, by district. These figures date from July 1999 when such records are available.

The numbers represent IDPs in various government-created camps. September to November 1999 represent high internal displacement with total numbers reaching 459,430, 605,851, and 592,523 respectively for these three months.

In these camps, IDPs would normally be supplied with rations of rice/bulgur, fish, and oil. Other cooking materials had to be provided by the IDPs. In particular, fuel wood for cooking is harvested from nearby vegetation. Such harvesting would be in addition to the demands of the original residents of such towns. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that the consumption of tree species normally used for firewood in these localities would have increased.

Table 6: Displaced Persons in Various Camps by District

It should also be noted that the numbers of internally displaced people shown in Table 6 only represent those who went to major towns and registered in a refugee camp. It is also normal that residents of small rural communities do not make the long trek to major towns to register, mostly for reasons of traditional or cultural pride, or sheer ignorance of this alternative. Such residents have been known to simply withdraw from their village into nearby forests and to remain there until word comes back that their village and surrounding areas are free of rebel activities. IDPs in this category have never been counted or provided for. They would therefore depend on the forest to supplement whatever meager supplies they may have escaped with from the village.

Negative impacts on biodiversity resulting from various degrees of breakdown in law and order in Sierra Leone predate the civil war. Two consequences of this breakdown have significant negative impacts: increased illicit diamond mining activities and encroachment on forest reserves.

Diamonds were first found in Sierra Leone in the 1930s with the main deposits in the high forest zones and alluvium and river terraces in the south and the east. The Siaka Stevens All Peoples Congress (APC) regime (1968 to 1985) built its power through taking control of small-scale diamond mining operations in Kono (Reno, 1998; Zack-Williams, 1995). As part of his plan to control Kono diamonds, Stevens uprooted the old colonial government railway line through the south and the east (the axis on which many of the main provincial secondary schools lay and also the axis of power for the rival Sierra Leone People's Party, (SLPP)) and replaced it with a main road leading directly to Kono through the Northern provincial centers of Makeni and Magburaka. This helped to secure more control of the Kono alluvials for the northern dominated APC elites.

A typical small-scale alluvial mining operation is likely to involve a Lebanese "supporter," in partnership with a local landowner, a political protector, and a team of diggers. Many of these laborers were footloose youngsters from Freetown or the northern part of the country. Operations in more accessible parts of the alluvial belt will generally have mining licenses (Zack-Williams, 1995). Toward the Liberian border, an area of dense forest reserves, operations tend towards greater informality, sometimes bordering on illegality, as all mining in reserves is illegal. Even when legally licensed, but particularly where illegal, a mining venture requires good "contacts." These realities were the prelude to intensified alluvial mining, particularly in Kono.

Experts claim that years of uncontrolled digging under wartime conditions in Kono have more or less exhausted the Kono alluvials (Fithen, 1999). The lesser field at Tongo, on the edge of the Panguma forest concession, northwest of Kenema, remains viable and has been hotly contested throughout the war by all the armed factions in the country. The best alluvial deposits are now thought to be in the southeastern border zone in an arc below the Gola Forest complex of reserves, centered on Zimmi in Soro Gbeima Chiefdom, Southern Province, adjacent to the Liberian border. In the early years of the civil war, this area was chiefly dominated by the RUF, and initial financing of their war efforts was from alluvial mining in these areas. It has only recently been wrested from the RUF by the CDF, who according to eyewitness accounts are reportedly continuing mining activities.

Illegal logging and other activities in forest reserves, occasioned by a breakdown in law and order, have been another source of serious potential negative impact on biodiversity, as illustrated by the following examples.

The Western Area Peninsular Forest (WAPF) is located on the hills of the Freetown Peninsula. The total reserve is 17,688 hectares consisting of a narrow chain of hills about 37 km long and 14 km wide; the highest peak rises about 900 m (Cole, 1976) at Picket Hill. The hills are covered with moist forest and they form the westernmost closed canopy forest remaining in Sierra Leone. An automobile road circles the reserve with feeder roads and trails within the reserve, which is within 5 km of the center of Freetown. The breakdown in law and order during the war years has led to serious encroachments on this reserve. During the period of NPRC (National Provisional Ruling Council) rule, license was granted to a stone mining company, SWALFORD to operate near a village called Mile 13 close to the reserve. This company's activities encroached on the reserve and today massive deforestation has taken place in this area.

Another reserve within WAPF is the No 2 River reserve that supports a wide range of biodiversity in addition to other functions. Indiscriminate logging has been taking place here throughout the period of the civil war. The white-necked Picathartes or Rockfowl (Picathartes geymnocephalus), a native bird in this part of the reserve, now has its habitat threatened.

Elsewhere throughout the country, similar stories of illegal logging abound. The capital, Freetown, has a constant supply of timber. Regional forestry officers, foresters, forest rangers, and forest guards, who are normally underpaid, have all gone unpaid for prolonged periods during the civil war, resulting in a breakdown of government control in some areas. Timber traders interviewed by our researchers revealed that officers whose normal duty is to protect the reserve sometimes connive with loggers and local community residents in illegally encroaching on the reserves. A chain of activities starting with loggers who are required to pay fees but receive no receipts for them, to timber buyers who must pay fees to legitimize their transport of such products to the capital has been operational for some time now.

The RUF, with support from then faction leader Charles Taylor, launched its attack from Liberia reportedly to overthrow the Joseph Saidu Momoh APC one-party state government. The rebels forcibly inducted diamond diggers and school children in the heavily forested border zones into their "people's army," but they failed to win wider civilian support (Abdallah and Muana, 1998; Richards, 1995 and 1996/8). The failure of the northern-dominated army to defend the south and the east of the country against the RUF led to a coup that brought in the populist military regime of the NPRC in April 1992. The size of the army was increased from 3,000 to about 15,000 without proper training or discipline for recruits.

Left defenseless, rural civilians resorted to forming the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) that were to become very effective against the RUF. With the RUF sequestered in isolated forest reserves in the border zone by the CDF, confidence in the army plummeted. But the RUF survived and revived. Selling diamonds to rogue soldiers, they acquired arms and uniforms for pinprick raids countrywide seizing hostages and forcing civilians to flee, adding to the already large numbers of internally displaced persons.

By 1995, RUF destabilizing raids had come close to Freetown causing panic, displacement of civilians, and expatriate evacuation. The NPRC government contracted the South African based Executive Outcomes (EO) to provide security for the mining company, Branch Energy, which was planning to exploit kimberlite pipes in Kono. Details of this contract were never made public, but payment is presumed to have included diamond-mining opportunities.

The political parties, whose role in government had become restricted since the declaration of the one-party state, took advantage of internal and external pressure on the NPRC to hold elections and threw themselves into the fray. The 1996 elections, held amidst a simmering civil war with people in parts of the country unable to vote, brought the SLPP government of President Ahmad Kabbah to power. Not long after, as a result of scrutiny from the Mandela government, EO was phased out in Sierra Leone to be replaced by the British-based firm Sandline to provide security for Branch Energy and training plus specialized support for the CDF who were loyal to the Kabbah government.

By November 1996, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed. Despite this accord, military operations against the RUF, which overran several of their important bases, intensified.

Before the start of the civil war, nongovernmental institutions involved in environmental issues and active on the ground were:

• Organisation for Research and Extension of Intermediate Technology (OREINT)
• Conservation society of Sierra Leone (CSSL)
• Environmental foundation of Sierra Leone (ENFOSAL)
• Commonwealth Human Ecology Council of Sierra Leone (CHEC – SIL).
• Friends of the Earth, Sierra Leone Chapter.
• Sierra Leone Adult Education Association- Ecological Promotion (SLADEA – Ecological Promotion)

These nongovernmental organizations were involved in environmental education, restoration of degraded lands, biodiversity monitoring, environmental sanitation, and natural resource management. Among these institutions, the NGOs particularly involved in biodiversity issues and natural resource management were OREINT, CSSL, CHEC-SIL, and SLADEA-Ecological Promotion. During the war these organizations suffered many setbacks, including the destruction of project infrastructures, carting away of working implements, and the occupation of project sites by combatants. As a result, most of the projects undertaken by these institutions collapsed. Despite the inaccessibility of some project sites to staff, some conservation projects did survive, primarily because of their location away from combat areas and away from occupation by internally displaced persons. However, even those projects that remained active encountered problems, among them indiscriminate tree cutting for fuel wood, logging, and medicinal herb collection.

Funding during the war was difficult for many local NGOs who were primarily the active players in conservation. Donor agencies were hesitant about the effectiveness of conservation programs in an atmosphere of insecurity. For CSSL and SLADEA, donors helped maintain staff members by providing staff costs. Recently, funding has begun for some organizations while others are yet to receive any form of donor funding. CSSL, for example, started receiving funds in 1999 from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and BirdLife International to undertake a bird count in the Sierra Leone River estuary. CHEC-SIL has recently received funds to carry out agro-forestry activities and women's programs such as soap making, Gara dyeing, etc. The Commonwealth Human Ecology Council in England made funds available to CHEC-SIL. OREINT has received no funds from donor agencies since the escalation of the war, and is inactive in terms of conservation activities. Their project sites, located in the northern part of Sierra Leone, still remain inaccessible. SLADEA-Ecological Promotion continued to receive funds throughout the war from EZE – a Christian association based in Germany that is interested in development. It sponsors the construction of fuel-saving stoves (a mud clay stove) and agriculture. The activities of this institution have been ongoing except during the May 1997 interregnum and the January 1999 invasion of Freetown. One area of conservation has been the protection of the hillsides of Freetown. Should funding be provided, the hillsides need to be replanted and protected, as vegetation clearance has occurred on most of the slopes.

Conservation, development, and relief agencies collaborated well before the war. CHEC-SIL and CSSL for example collaborated in areas of conservation and development, as did OREINT with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment. In addition, OREINT collaborated with Cause Canada (a Canadian NGO) on development and relief; and CSSL collaborated with Ministry of Agriculture on conservation and development. This last collaboration almost came to a halt when the war intensified and most project sites were inaccessible. However it continued in the western area except for an interruption during the January 1999 invasion.

Cross-sectoral collaboration usually comes about through formal and informal meetings among organizations. Success has been mainly in areas of planning and coordination. Quite often, organizations call on their counterparts to plan activities for both conservation and development. In most cases, this collaboration has been successful. An example is the national tree-planting activities undertaken by the CSSL in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and the Environment. This involved Forestry providing the seedlings and CSSL coordinating the planting activities with ORIENT, CHEC-SIL, SLADEA, and other interested environmental groups.

There has been no transboundary management of natural resources in this country, and no documentation relating to this could be found in the Forestry Division.

However a proposal exists on the management of the elephant community in the Outambi-Kilimi area between Guinea and Sierra Leone. The proposal was made at the African Elephant Range State meeting in Nairobi 1997, and the project was to be funded by the European Union. No practical developments appear to have taken place since the Nairobi meeting.

In 1999, Conservation International developed a similar proposal to protect the Upper Guinea forest block, and held a conference on conservation priority-setting entitled "From the Forest to the Sea: Biodiversity Connections from Guinea to Ghana" (Bangura, 2000). The proposal reportedly indicated that there should be a regional protection of elephant populations in the subregion, and both regional and national committees (Bangura, 2000).

A number of ideas on possible postwar conservation actions and policies and involving ex-combatants are being mooted in the Department of Forestry. The basic elements of this strategy may be summarized as follows:

• Involvement of ex-combatants in the rehabilitation of degraded areas,
• Ex-combatants should be taught nursery operations and techniques,
• Ex-combatants should be taught seed technology and plant taxonomy, and how to make fuel-saving mud stoves to reduce the use of firewood and conserve the forest environment.

These ideas are still at a discussion stage, and have yet to go through any of the formal stages needed to put them into action.

As a result of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), a chimpanzee rehabilitation camp has been set up in the western area. While conservation of animals was already in practice in the country, this program is a new one, and appears to have received its impetus, if not total funding, by virtue of this Convention.